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Abstract
“Settler colonialism” presents a vexing challenge to voting rights theory and praxis 
in liberal-democratic states. I call this challenge “Kymlicka’s dilemma,” after Will 
Kymlicka, the political theorist who has led contemporary discourse on “minority 
nation” rights. As Kymlicka observed, members of a state’s dominant cultural nation, 
or staatsvolk, may, by exercising universal mobility rights, numerically “swamp,” 
and then, by using universal voting rights, democratically dominate, an Indigenous 
minority nation in its homeland. To prevent this, an Indigenous minority nation may 
seek to exercise group-based voting protections, such as guaranteed representation. 
Where “Kymlicka’s dilemma” arises -  i.e., where minority group-differentiated 
voting protections challenge the voting powers of individual staatsvolk and vice 
versa -  a constitutional conflict seems certain. In Canada’s Northwest Territories, 
from at least the 1970s until the separation of Nunavut in 1999, the specter of 
“Kymlicka’s dilemma” (mis) shaped the constitutional evolution of the territorial 
government. There, in what was long Canada’s last Indigenous-majority jurisdiction, 
decades of Indigenous political resistance to settler control hinged on the 
permissibility of Indigenous overrepresentation in the territorial legislature. In the 
1990s, three developments portended changes to Indigenous overrepresentation in 
that legislature: Charter of Rights-inspired limits on electoral-district 
malapportionment, constitutional recognition of Indigenous group-based 
protections, and the amplified danger of settler “swamping” that would result from 
Nunavut’s separation. As if in a natural experiment, these developments created 
conditions for a potentially volatile constitutional conflict. This thesis analyzes the 
results of that experiment. It shows that a constitutional conflict did ensue, 
catalyzed by the territorial electoral reapportionment of 1998-99. This conflict 
involved a yearlong political clash over Indigenous versus individual rights. This 
thesis further shows that a controversial court ruling, and equally controversial 
political decisions, resolved this conflict, deciding “Kymlicka’s dilemma” by rejecting 
Indigenous group-differentiated voting protections in the territorial legislature.
v
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Chapter 1: Introduction
According to Kymlicka, in liberal-democratic multination states, settlers belonging 
to the majority-nation staatsvolk may, by exercising their universal mobility and 
voting rights, “swamp” and democratically dominate homelands of Indigenous 
national minorities -  or, conversely, those minorities, by exercising collective rights, 
may abridge the universal rights of settlers.1 This tension between individual and 
group rights poses a constitutional quandary I call “Kymlicka’s dilemma.” Owing to 
unique demographic and historical factors, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” for decades 
influenced constitutional evolution in Canada’s Northwest Territories (the NWT) . In 
the 1990s, a confluence of events exacerbated tensions between individual and 
group rights in the NWT. Finally, precipitated by the NWT’s electoral-boundaries 
reapportionment exercise of 1998-99, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” erupted into a full­
blown constitutional crisis, compelling a political and legal resolution.
Because of the NWT’s distinctive political challenges, including those that 
contribute to “Kymlicka’s dilemma,” Canadian political scientist Gurston Dacks has 
called the territory “a laboratory for students of political representation.”2 As Dacks 
observed thirty years ago, “of all jurisdictions in Canada, only in the NWT does the 
question still remain open as to which political philosophy -  liberalism based on the 
individual, nationalism based on ethnic identity, or consociationalism3 which 
attempts to integrate the two -  will ultimately guide the political process.”4 For 
years, the NWT’s Indigenous5 and staatsvolk peoples, championing nationalism and
1 Will Kymlicka, “Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice,” Review o f  Constitutional Studies  4, no. 2 
(1 9 9 8 )  .
2 Gurston Dacks, “Political R epresentation in the N orthw est T erritories,” in R epresentation and 
Electoral Systems, eds. J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 
1 9 9 0 )  , 138 .
3 “Consociation” is a governance system  based on de ju re  pow er-sharing betw een two or m ore in tra­
state polities. The best-known contem porary exam ple is Belgium, w here French-speaking Walloons 
and Dutch-speaking Flemish share pow er in a highly elaborated constitutional arrangem ent. For 
m ore see Arend Lijphart, Dem ocracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 44.
4 Gurston Dacks, “Politics on the Last Frontier: Consociationalism in the N orthw est T erritories,” 
Canadian Journal o f  Political Science  19 , no. 2 (1 9 8 6 )  : 354 .
5 In this thesis, “Aboriginal,” “Indigenous” and “Native” are used interchangeably in reference to the 
autochthonous inhabitants of various world regions. Among these term s, “Aboriginal” is m ost 
com m only used in Canada, w here it refers inclusively to three constitutionally recognized peoples, 
the Inuit, Metis and First Nations (i.e., “Indians”) .
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liberalism respectively, jockeyed for control over the territory’s constitutional 
evolution. The former sought Indigenous self-determination, either by shaping the 
NWT into an Indigenous-nationalist jurisdiction or by establishing consociational 
guarantees within it. The latter, meanwhile, sought to shape the NWT into a liberal- 
universalist federal subunit in the mold of Canada’s Anglophone provinces and 
territories. For each opposing camp, success would hinge on the rules of 
representation: whether Aboriginals would enjoy exceptional overrepresentation 
(perhaps even guaranteed majority representation) , or whether, instead, 
representation would be apportioned relatively equally among individuals, 
permitting possible settler domination.
In the 1990s, three developments brought this conflict to a boil: First, the 
Inuit-dominated territory of Nunavut separated from the NWT, leaving the “rump” 
NWT equipopulous between Indigenous and staatsvolk residents and dramatically 
amplifying the threat of settler “swamping.” Second, Canadian court interpretations 
of section 3 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms placed heightened emphasis on 
the principle of voter parity, amplifying the threat of settler majoritarianism. Third, 
and countervailingly, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien’s government affirmed 
the right of Indigenous self-determination and suggested that in the NWT, uniquely, 
this right could be realized through special protections in public government -  
protections that might obviate settler majoritarianism, even in the event of 
demographic “swamping.” These three developments thus set the stage for an 
inflammatory constitutional struggle over reapportionment.
Though scholars predicted such a struggle might erupt, they did not examine 
the eruption. I aim to correct that, analyzing the events surrounding the NWT’s 
reapportionment exercise of 1998-99, which was held to establish the territory’s 
distribution of representation following Nunavut’s separation. My analysis employs 
the lenses of liberal theory, voting-rights jurisprudence and NWT constitutional 
history. I show that at the cusp of division, reapportionment in the NWT ran 
headlong into “Kymlicka’s dilemma,” erupting into a constitutional crisis. The crisis 
featured a yearlong political conflict in which settlers and Indigenous residents each 
advanced the philosophy of representation -  liberal-universalism versus
2
nationalism/consociationalism -  that would further their collective interests. A 
controversial court ruling, and equally controversial political decisions, resulted in 
individual voting rights trumping the group-differentiated rights claimed by 
Aboriginals in the NWT legislature, thus deciding “Kymlicka’s dilemma” in favor of 
the NWT’s settlers.
3

Chapter 2: Literature review and methods
This thesis explores the intersection of three areas of scholarship: liberal theory as it 
pertains to individual and collective rights, electoral apportionment law, and the 
constitutional evolution of Canada’s Northwest Territories up to and including 
Nunavut’s separation in 1999. This chapter examines the academic literature in 
these three realms. It also explains the methods that will be used to analyze how the 
aforementioned theory, law and history intersect.
2.1 Individual and collective rights
Though the ancient Greeks expressed ideals that could be called liberal, scholars 
frequently trace liberalism’s origins as a political philosophy to English thinker 
Thomas Hobbes. In his 1651 Leviathan,1 Hobbes posited that people are inherently 
free and equal and are the source of all legitimate authority -  but that, to achieve 
security, they would rationally bequeath their authority to an all-powerful 
sovereign. Once people entered this “social contract,” Hobbes argued, the sovereign 
could not be held to account. For this reason, Hobbes is not himself considered a 
liberal. The title of “first liberal” goes instead to John Locke, who amended Hobbes’ 
theory with a radical idea. In his 1691 Two Treatises o f  Government,2 Locke argued 
that even after citizens empower rulers, they retain their natural rights. He held 
that, if rulers break their contract, their authority may be revoked, if necessary by 
force.
Locke inspired other champions of liberty, including philosopher Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau, celebrated by the French revolutionaries, and agitators in the 
American colonies, who cited Lockean justifications for splitting from England.3 
Proclaiming in the 1776 Declaration of Independence that “life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness” are unalienable rights, Thomas Jefferson almost directly 
quoted Locke. Thirteen years later, the Bill of Rights enumerated individual
1 Thom as Hobbes, Leviathan: The Matter, Form e, & Pow er o f  a Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill 
(The Floating Press, 1 6 5 1  [2 0 0 9 ])  .
2 Richard Ashcraft, L ocke’s Two Treatises on Governm ent (New York: Routledge, 1 9 8 7 )  .
3 William Uzgalis, “John Locke,” The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (W inter 2 0 1 4  Edition) , ed. 
Edw ard N. Zalta. h ttp ://p la to .s ta n fo rd .e d u /a rch iv e s/w in 2 0 1 4 /e n trie s /lo ck e / (accessed  February  
28 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
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freedoms that liberals felt no government, however powerful or popular, could 
abridge. And as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay demonstrated in 
the Federalist Papers,4 the U.S. Constitution was a blueprint for liberal government, 
where the threat of tyranny would be thwarted through devices such as federalism, 
bicameralism, judicial review and separation of powers.
After the American founding, the English philosopher John Stuart Mill 
emerged as the next great liberal thinker. Mill’s 1859 On Liberty5 explored “the 
nature and limits of the power that can be legitimately exercised by society over the 
individual.” Mill mounted a robust defense of individualism, freedom of expression 
and freedom of choice, maintaining that all persons may act as they please unless 
their actions deny others the same right. It is no surprise that Mill’s work coincided 
with an era of liberationist movements such as the abolition of slavery and the 
expansion of women’s rights, both of which he championed.
Mill may be seen as a proponent of classical, or “negative,” liberalism, which 
emphasized the right to be free from interference. But by the end of the nineteenth 
century, a new liberal view was gaining traction. It addressed substantive rather 
than merely formal equality, and took steps to make freedom of choice more 
“meaningful.”6 The Keynesian economic practices of the Great Depression, the 
“welfare-state” social policies of the postwar era, and the views of philosopher John 
Rawls exemplified this “positive” liberalism. In his 1971 A Theory o f  Justice,7 Rawls 
proposed a new kind of social contract, by which individuals might design a society 
that was not merely free but just. The rules of this contract would be arranged 
behind a “veil of ignorance,” preventing citizens from knowing whether, when the 
veil fell, they would be rich or poor, weak or strong, smart or feeble-minded. For this 
reason, Rawls argued, citizens would devise a situation maximally fair to all.
4 Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and Jam es Madison, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New  
York: New Am erican Library, 1 9 6 6  [1 7 8 7 ])  .
5 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty  (London: Longman, Roberts & Green, 1 8 6 9 ) .
6 Gerald Gaus, Shane D. Courtland and David Schmidtz, “Liberalism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia o f  
Philosophy (Spring 2 0 1 5  Edition) , ed. Edw ard N. Zalta.
h ttp ://p la to .s tan fo rd .ed u /arch iv es/sp r2015 /en tries /lib era lism / (accessed February 28 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
7 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard  
University Press, 1 9 9 9 ) .
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Rawls’ liberal theory was the most influential of the twentieth century, and 
most subsequent thinkers felt compelled to grapple with it. Among its early critics 
were the so-called communitarians, led by the likes of philosopher Charles Taylor.8 
Rawls was wrong, they said, to suggest that abstracted, deracinated individuals 
could rationally craft an objectively “just” society. Contrary to the longstanding 
liberal view, they argued, people are not atomistic actors but are instead 
inescapably culturally imbedded. They do not build communities but are, almost 
unwittingly, built by them; their beliefs are not disinterested but preconditioned.
For this reason, the communitarians maintained, Rawls’ project, even as a thought 
experiment, was pointless.
On the heels of the communitarians came the multiculturalists, such as Iris 
Marion Young.9 As Young observed, despite liberalism’s emancipatory history, 
oppressed groups in the post-Civil Rights Era had begun to encounter its limits. 
Liberal emphasis on formal equality was said to deny recognition, for instance, to 
women as women, instead treating them as neutral ciphers. According to 
multiculturalists, the very idea of individualism, as well as the qualities liberals 
expected individuals to embody, were particularisms of the dominant culture. 
Liberalism thus not only denied femaleness but also, de facto, privileged maleness. 
For this reason, liberalism offered not a route to equality but a new, insidious 
version of the old oppression.
Finally, out of both communitarianism and multiculturalism came the group- 
rights critique of liberalism. Perhaps its trailblazer was Vernon Van Dyke, who in the 
1970s observed that Rawls’ “just society” was by all indications culturally 
homogenous, unlike most real-world countries. How might Rawlsianism offer 
fairness to Quebecois, Walloons, Tibetans or Aboriginals? In ignoring the plight of
8 Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Philosophical A rgum ents, ed. Charles Taylor 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 9 9 7 )  .
9 Iris Marion Young, “Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal Universal Citizenship,” 
Ethics 99 , no. 2 (1 9 8 9 )  .
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minority nations, Van Dyke said, Rawls had sidestepped one of the most common 
sources of global injustice and conflict.10
And indeed, as intrastate turmoil flared in the former Soviet Union, Eastern 
Europe and even Canada in the late 1980s and ’90s, Canadian philosopher Will 
Kymlicka took up where Van Dyke had left off, becoming the most influential 
interlocutor in a vigorous conversation about individual and group rights in 
multicultural democracy. Kymlicka’s numerous articles and books -  particularly 
Liberalism, Community and Culture11 and Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory 
o f  Minority Rights12 -  challenged both individualist liberalism and group-focused 
communitarianism, charting a middle way that both defended and delimited group 
rights from a liberal perspective. His well-known “liberal theory of minority rights” 
sought to reconcile the undeniable power of liberalism as a political philosophy with 
the demands of countless minority nations seeking self-determination. His idea was 
based on three parts. First Kymlicka stated that, while liberalism is capable of 
exercising “benign neglect” with respect to interests such as religion, it is impossible 
for states to be neutral on culture, thus leaving subordinate cultures disadvantaged. 
Second, as individual autonomy (the ability to choose and revise one’s life plan) is 
the core goal of liberalism, rootedness in a particular culture gives individuals a 
meaningful “context of choice.” Having established that states cannot be culturally 
neutral, and that individual flourishing requires cultural rootedness, Kymlicka 
progressed to his conclusion: That in order to be truly liberal, states must treat 
minority cultures in ways that allow them to enjoy equal rootedness. Kymlicka thus 
insisted that it is perfectly liberal for states to provide minorities with autonomy, 
guaranteed representation and other group-based protections.
10 Vernon Van Dyke, “Justice as Fairness: For Groups? A Theory o f  Justice  by John Rawls, Review,” The 
A m erican Political Science Review  69 , No. 2 (1 9 7 5 )  .
11 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 8 9 )  .
12 Will Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1 9 9 5  .
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Kymlicka’s theory has been widely critiqued, by classical liberals,13 
libertarians,14 “cosmopolitans,”15 and Indigenous nationalists.16 It has also been 
widely adopted and utilized to explain and attempt to reconcile various intrastate 
conflicts, including in Kymlicka’s home country of Canada. Yet his work has not been 
tested against circumstances in Canada’s North. This thesis aims to do so.
2.2 Voting rights and apportionment jurisprudence
Discussions of “representation” must begin by defining the term. For this, scholars 
commonly defer to Hanna Pitkin’s 1967 work The Concept o f  Representation.17 
Conducting a linguistic and historical analysis, Pitkin identified three perspectives 
on representation. First are formalistic understandings, which, she said, focus on 
how representation is made or unmade -  how representatives are authorized and 
held to account. Second are approaches that gauge representatives by what they 
stand for, perhaps symbolizing a nation, as would a monarch, or mirroring it, as 
would a diverse assembly. Last are approaches exploring what representatives do, 
perhaps employing their personal judgment to discern the best course for their 
state, or, contrarily, following orders from, and serving the immediate interest of, 
their constituents. Having shone a light on representation’s many facets, Pitkin does 
not choose sides. Scholars would do well, she concludes, to see representation as all 
of the above.
Pitkin’s work is complemented by studies of the evolution of representation, 
of which there are many. A.H. Birch’s slim Representation,18 and Robert Dixon’s 
encyclopedic Democratic Representation,19 both include fine primers, especially 
regarding Western Europe. There, Birch says, authority was for centuries seen as
13 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique o f  Multiculturalism  (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2 0 0 1 )  .
14 Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory  20 , no. 1 (1 9 9 2 )  .
15 Jerem y W aldron, “Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,” in The Rights o f  Minority 
Cultures, ed. Will Kymlicka (New York: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 5 )  .
16 Robert Paine, “Aboriginality, Multiculturalism, and Liberal Rights Philosophy,” Ethnos 64 , no. 3 
(1 9 9 9  .
17 Hanna Pitkin, The Concept o f  Representation  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 6 7 ) .
18 A.H. Birch, Representation  (London: Pall Mall Press, 1 9 7 0  .
19 Robert G. Dixon, Dem ocratic Representation: Reapportionm ent in Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1 9 6 8 ) .
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descending from the heavens; only in late-Medieval times did “ascending” theories 
take hold. At first, royal courts were summoned merely to solemnize the edicts of 
monarchs, but over time courtiers evolved into parliamentarians. In 1215, England’s 
Magna Carta prohibited the king from levying taxes without the consent of 
noblemen, making it what Birch called “the first significant milestone on the road to 
representative government.”20 By the end of the 1300s more than a dozen European 
states featured bodies of feudal representatives. With a few exceptions,21 however, 
truly representative governments did not arise until England’s Glorious Revolution 
in 1688, followed by the American Revolution a century later. It was in the latter 
country that representation became broadly democratic, with suffrage open to more 
than just a fraction of the population. And it was there, too, that leaders first 
wrestled with how representation should be apportioned.
The U.S. Constitution provided little direction. Per the Great Compromise, it 
assigned to each state two federal senators and one representative, with the 
remaining representatives divided among the states by population. As to how 
(indeed, whether intrastate districts should be drawn, both for federal and state 
seats, this choice was reserved to the states. According to Dixon, in principle, state 
lawmakers sought to balance territorial and population-based representation. In 
fact, they also advantaged their own, and their parties’, fortunes. In the first half of 
the 1900s, as urbanization eroded America’s rural population base, state lawmakers 
declined to make appropriate boundary adjustments. The resulting “silent 
gerrymandering” was so egregious that critics charged it with abridging the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
At first, however, American judges steered clear of the “political thicket” of 
electoral-boundary adjustment. Policing apportionment was outside the courts’ 
constitutional mandate -  and, moreover, upon what objective standard could they 
adjudicate? When the U.S. Supreme Court finally intervened in 1962’s Baker v. Carr, 
it was to save democracy from the “stranglehold” of rural state lawmakers. A flurry
20 Birch, Representation, 26.
21 Iceland’s Althing, dating from 9 3 0  A.D., is often seen as the w orld’s first parliam entary institution. 
Similar claims have been made about the Jam tam ot, which governed Jam tland, in m odern-day  
Sweden, beginning in the early 900s.
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of further decisions followed, which Dixon deemed “kaleidoscopic.”22 When the 
smoke cleared, representation by territory in the U.S. was illegal. “One person, one 
vote” ruled the land.
In Canada, as has been shown by that country’s leading redistricting scholar, 
John C. Courtney,23 the rules of apportionment evolved even more haphazardly. At 
the federal level, the principle of representation by population, much emphasized at 
the time of Canada’s founding, almost immediately succumbed to demands from 
both small, slow-growing provinces (which feared diminution of parliamentary 
power) and new provinces (which demanded overrepresentation as a condition of 
confederation) . At the intra-provincial level, in the case of both federal and 
provincial seats, rural overrepresentation, fueled by “silent gerrymandering,” was so 
ubiquitous that it became what Norman Ward in The Canadian House o f  Commons 
called a “theory masquerading as a principle.”24
Coincident with the American redistricting revolution, Canada had its own, 
very different, “reapportionment revolution.” Beginning in the late 1950s, provinces 
as well as Parliament began to remove themselves from mapmaking, relinquishing 
the task to independent electoral boundaries commissions. This all but eliminated 
gerrymandering (which remained widespread in the U.S.) and diminished, but did 
not eliminate, malapportionment. A standard of +/- 25 percent deviation from 
parity became widely accepted.25 With the adoption of the Charter, and with the 
1991 Carter26 decision that flowed therefrom, malapportionment was further 
constrained. As will be further explored in this thesis, the Supreme Court of Canada 
ruled that, rather than the quantitative standard of “one person, one vote,” Canada 
would observe the more qualitative principle of “effective representation.” Scores of 
scholars examined the Carter decision, some deeming it hopelessly ambiguous27 and
22 Dixon, D em ocratic Representation, 7.
23 John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (M ontreal: McGill- 
Queens University Press, 2 0 0 1 )  .
24 Norman W ard, The Canadian House o f  Commons: Representation  (Toronto: University of Toronto  
Press, 1 9 5 0  .
25 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 165 .
26 R eference re  Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.). 1 9 9 1 . 2 S.C.R. 158 .
27 Mark Carter, “R econsidering the C harter and Electoral Boundaries,” Dalhousie Law Journal 2 2 , no. 1 
(1 9 9 9  .
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others lauding it as pragmatically Canadian.28 Many predicted it would prompt a 
rash of further cases, brought by underrepresented ethnic voters,29 critics of the 
deeply inegalitarian federal scheme, and so on. Yet with the exception of a handful of 
provincial-level rulings, and one noteworthy case upholding special protection of 
Francophones,30 Canada has not seen the “kaleidoscopic” array of court cases 
experienced in the United States.
A sole case has applied apportionment law to Northern Canada -  Friends o f  
Democracy v. Northwest Territories, examined in this thesis. Nor has there been 
substantial research on this subject. The key exception was a prescient study by 
political scientist Graham White, examining how voting-rights provisions in the 
then-recently adopted Charter had impacted the 1989 apportionment of the NWT.31 
White concluded that the Charter had constrained, and seemed likely to further 
constrain, “Northern distinctiveness,” foreclosing representational arrangements 
responding to the NWT’s unique historical and demographic challenges. This thesis 
aims to test White’s hypothesis.
2.3 Political and constitutional evolution of the Northwest Territories
The Northwest Territories for years attracted disproportionate political scholarship. 
And no wonder: Prior to the separation of Nunavut it was North America’s only 
Aboriginal-majority federal jurisdiction, uniquely splintered by pluralism and 
grappling with foundational questions that elsewhere were settled long ago. 
Politically it was (indeed, remains) in an evolutionary stage. In the NWT, state- 
making has been not history but current events.
Starting in the 1970s, when NWT Aboriginals rose up and challenged the 
authority of both faraway federal authorities and local settlers, a host of scholars
28 Yasmin Dawood, “D em ocracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking D em ocratic Rights under the 
Charter,” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 51 , no. 1 (2 0 1 3 )  .
29 Katherine Swinton, “Federalism , R epresentation and Rights,” in Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, 
Courts, and Electoral Values, ed. John. C. Courtney et al. (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1 9 9 2 ) .
30 Kim Poffenroth, “Rafche v Canada: A New Direction in Drawing Electoral Boundaries?” 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 31 , no. 2 (2 0 0 5 )  .
31 Graham W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness, R epresentation by Population and the Charter: The 
Politics of Redistribution in the N orthw est T erritories,” Journal o f  Canadian Studies 28 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )  .
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and commentators turned their eyes north. Over the next quarter-century they 
generated dozens of articles and at least a half-dozen books analyzing the territory’s 
ongoing constitutional troubles and prescribing solutions. These thinkers 
approached the NWT’s challenges from a variety of angles. For researcher/activists 
such as Wilf Bean and Peter Puxley, “the primary characteristic of social 
relationships in the territories . . . is their colonial nature.”32 They saw Aboriginals as 
engaged in a liberationist struggle akin to those being waged at the time by 
subaltern peoples all over the developing world. Like Zimbabweans or Angolans, 
NWT Natives sought to free themselves from the yoke of European imperialism.
Meanwhile, Gurston Dacks33 and Michael Asch,34 both separately and 
together, studied the conflict in the NWT and saw in it a divided-state rivalry akin to 
that between Belgium’s Flemish and Walloon populations and, indeed, between 
Canada’s French and English. To bridge the schisms in those regions, Dacks and 
Asch noted, the opposing cultural communities had arranged to share power. 
“Consociation,” albeit messy, had enhanced stability while guarding group rights. 
Why not try the same, Dacks and Asch suggested, in the NWT?
Mark O. Dickerson proposed a different route to stability and rights- 
protection in the NWT. He maintained that what Indigenous Northerners desired 
was not so much ethnic control as local control -  a diffusion of authority that 
consociation could not provide. He argued, “For many residents of the NWT, 
political legitimacy will come only after devolution or some form of decentralization 
has occurred.”35 Rather than sharing power at the political core, Dickerson argued, 
power should be radically dispersed to individual regions and communities.
32 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the  
N orthw est T erritories,” in N orthern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
R esources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8  , 315 .
33 Gurston Dacks, “Politics on the Last Frontier: Consociationalism in the N orthw est T erritories,” 
Canadian Journal o f  Political Science  19 , no. 2 (1 9 8 6 )  .
34 Michael Asch, “Consociation and the Resolution of Aboriginal Political Rights: The Example of the 
N orthw est Territories, Canada.” Culture X, no. 1 (1 9 9 0 )  .
35 Mark Dickerson, Whose N orth? Political Change, Political Developm ent and Self-Government in the 
Northw est Territories  (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , 189 .
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Finally, White focused on the institutional adaptations the NWT government 
had made in response to its peculiar difficulties. In articles addressing “Westminster 
in the Arctic,” he showed that the territory had in ways innovatively intertwined the 
political traditions of its two founding peoples -  a form of consociation not by power 
sharing but by cultural merger. Yet, in his 1995 Northern Governments in Transition, 
co-authored with Kirk Cameron, White made clear that none of the above­
mentioned strategies had been a panacea. With Nunavut’s division looming, and 
with the scramble for dominance of the rump NWT intensifying, he stated, “Perhaps 
the only safe prediction about the future of government . . . is that dramatic changes 
are in store.”36
They were indeed. But when separation came in 1999, most scholars turned 
their eyes to east, to Nunavut. This was an oversight. Though the new Inuit territory 
was rife with developmental challenges, these for the most part were not 
constitutional. In Nunavut, a homogenous polity had deliberately formed a new 
government; the challenge was about how to enact it. The NWT, conversely, entered 
division while heterogeneous, reactive and primordial. As if in a natural experiment, 
Nunavut’s departure changed a key variable in the NWT, demographics. Scholars 
had long hypothesized that the outcome of this change might be tumultuous, yet 
they did linger to confirm their suspicions. This thesis strives to fill that gap.
2.4 Methods
To explore the intersection of liberal theory, apportionment law and the 
constitutional evolution of the Northwest Territories, and to determine the 
relevance of the clash-of-rights phenomenon that I term “Kymlicka’s dilemma” to 
governance in the NWT at the time of Nunavut’s separation, I have examined the 
NWT’s first post-division reapportionment exercise, which took place in 1998-99.
To do this, I have relied almost exclusively on public documents. These include 
documents related to the 1998 NWT electoral boundaries commission (including
36 Kirk Cameron and Graham W hite, Northern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional 
D evelopm ent in the Yukon, Nunavut and the W estern Northw est Territories  (M ontreal: The Institute 
for R esearch on Public Policy, 1 9 9 5  , 41.
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public submissions to the commission and the commission’s report , local and 
national media reports (articles, editorials, commentaries and letters to the editor , 
legal documents (including submissions to, and rulings by, the NWT Supreme Court 
and the NWT Court of Appeals) , press releases (from Indigenous and “settler” 
organizations and interest groups) and legislative documents (including NWT 
Legislative Assembly acts, transcripts, committee reports and tabled documents) .
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Chapter 3: Individual rights, group rights and ‘Kymlicka's dilemma'
This chapter explores the challenges of reconciling multinational statehood with the 
principles of liberal democracy. It identifies at least six reasons why sub-state 
nations, particularly Indigenous peoples, might possess and deserve recognition of 
rights to national self-determination. This chapter then discusses consociational 
political arrangements aimed at accommodating these rights within the 
constitutional framework of multinational states, including through limited 
autonomy in “national” federal subunits. This chapter then explores threats to 
Indigenous self-determination and autonomy posed by settler colonialism. Finally, 
this chapter identifies a phenomenon, “Kymlicka’s dilemma,” whereby “universal” 
rights exercised by settlers threaten Indigenous self-determination and autonomy 
and vice versa.
3.1 Multinationalism, liberalism and democracy
Almost all Western liberal democratic states are “multicultural.” Thus, their political 
regimes face the challenge of accommodating cultural pluralism. This is especially so 
in states that are not merely multicultural but multinational, meaning they comprise 
multiple “nations.” Here, “nations” are cultural communities that occupy a specific 
territory or homeland and share a distinct language and history.1 In many 
multinational states, one cultural nation dominates. Political scientist John McGarry 
calls this dominant nation the staatsvolk.2 Subsidiary nations are often termed 
“national minorities.” National minorities may be either “stateless nations” or 
“Indigenous peoples.”3 Stateless nations have, or once had, the capability and/or 
desire to form sovereign states. They include the Catalans of Spain, the Walloons of 
Belgium and North America’s archetypal stateless nation, Canada’s Quebecois.
1 Will Kymlicka, “Citizenship, Communities, and Identity in Canada,” in Canadian Politics, eds. James 
Bickerton and Alain-G. Gagnon (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2 0 0 9 )  , 24.
2 John McGarry, “A sym m etry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States,” Ethnopolitics 6, no. 1 
(2 0 0 7 )  : 1 0 6 . Throughout this thesis I use staatsvolk rath er than the m ore com m on term  “national 
m ajority.” This is to avoid confusion when discussing federal subunits such as the N orthw est 
T erritories w here staatsvolk, though ethnoculturally dominant, are a num eric minority.
3 Will Kymlicka, “Federalism  and Secession: East and W est,” in Democracy, Nationalism and  
Multiculturalism, eds. Ramon Maiz and Ferran Requejo (Hoboken, New Jersey: Taylor and Francis, 
2 0 0 4  , 109 .
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Stateless nations may have joined multination states voluntarily (e.g., through 
confederation) or involuntarily (via annexation, etc.) . Indigenous peoples, 
meanwhile, were excluded from the process of modern state formation. They 
became national minorities involuntarily, through conquest, colonization, imperial 
cession and the like. Prior to colonization they were independent and self- 
governing, and in recent decades they have reasserted their rights to self­
determination and autonomy. Some Indigenous peoples, such as the Inuit of 
Greenland, aspire to full independence. In Canada and the United States, Indigenous 
peoples typically seek more limited sub-state autonomy.4 Accommodating 
Indigenous demands for increased self-governance and limited autonomy has 
significantly challenged liberal democracies.
Liberalism is a political philosophy holding that people inherently possess 
certain rights. Liberal theorist Chandran Kukathas identifies three core liberal 
principles: individualism, egalitarianism and universalism.5 Individualism identifies 
the individual as the irreducible rights-bearing unit. Egalitarianism holds that all 
individuals are political and moral equals. Universalism, according to political 
philosopher John Gray, is the liberal principle “affirming the moral unity of the 
human species and according a secondary importance to specific historic 
associations and cultural forms.”6 Universalism holds that except for humankind 
indivisibly, collectivities do not have moral standing -  that no group bears rights 
qua group.
Democracy, of course, is a form of governance involving rule by “the people,” 
also known as the demos. In liberal democracies, rule by the people must respect 
the rights of individuals. Majorities may not infringe personal freedoms. In most 
liberal democracies, personal freedoms include mobility and voting -  i.e., the right to 
live where one wants and to vote where one lives.
4 Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics o f  Recognition  (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2 0 1 4 )  , 64.
5 Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory  20 , no. 1 (1 9 9 2 )  : 108 .
6 John Gray, Liberalism (Concepts in Social Thought) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1 9 9 2 )  , 108 .
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3.1.1 Liberal democracy, statehood and (non)universalism
As noted above, liberal democracy involves both rule by and protection of the 
individual rights of “the people.” Thus, constituting a liberal democracy requires 
first defining the demos -  who composes it and, more controversially, who does not. 
As also noted, universalism posits that all humanity is politically and morally 
indivisible. Thus, in a fully liberal democracy, the demos would encompass all 
humanity. Either the liberal democracy would have porous boundaries,7 making it 
universally “open,” or there would exist a single worldwide democratic state.8
In practice, however, liberal democracies are constituted by, posit the 
political equality of, and guarantee rights to, only “the people” who form a given 
subset of humanity. Each of these demoi asserts a positive power to chart its own 
course, i.e. to engage in self-determination. Doing so requires delimiting itself, 
usually geographically, by drawing boundaries. As political theorist Frederick 
Whelan puts it, “a boundary has two sides, and the inclusion of some means the 
exclusion of others.”9 Hence, a self-determining liberal-democratic demos also 
exercises a negative power, to reject everyone outside its favored subset, even if the 
rejected are themselves liberal democrats.10 This is why, in liberal democracies, full 
political equality and individual rights do not extend beyond state borders or to 
foreign nationals. “The people” who are equal and rights-bearing, who owe loyalty 
to the state and expect from it the benefits of citizenship, are not humankind at 
large, but only the “in-group” of members of the relevant, boundary-circumscribed 
state.
How can this be morally justified? Theories of liberal democracy and 
statehood are difficult to reconcile. This difficultly is known as the “boundary 
problem.” Democracy provides no rationale for state formation, as people excluded
7 Joseph H. Carens, “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open B orders,” The Review o f  Politics 49 , no. 2 
(1 9 8 7  .
8 Charles R. Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice: A Survey of Thought,” World 
Politics 5 1  (1 9 9 9 )  .
9 Frederick W helan, “Prologue: D em ocratic Theory and the Boundary Problem ,” in Nomos XXV: 
Liberal Democracy, eds. Jam es R. Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University 
Press, 1 9 8 3 )  , 22.
10 Will Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory o f  Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1 9 9 5 )  , 124 .
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from the “in-group” have no democratic say in their exclusion. (Whelan observes 
that “[d]emocracy can be practiced for making collective decisions once the 
collectivity has been defined, but democratic methods themselves are inadequate to 
establish the bounds of the collectivity, whose existence democratic theory simply 
presupposes.”11) Liberalism, similarly, is challenged by the boundary problem. As 
Kymlicka observes, while liberalism is premised on the universal equality of 
individuals, the concept of citizenship is inherently group-differentiated and thus 
non-universal.12
In lieu of either a liberal or democratic defense of the non-universalism of 
delimited statehood, liberal democrats typically fall back on an alternate 
justification, nationalism. Nationalism, in the words of philosopher Ernest Gellner, is 
“a political principle which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent.”13 In this view, each ethnocultural nation has a natural right to form its 
own demos. When an ethnocultural nation acts on this right, it exercises national 
self-determination. Nation-based statehood was celebrated by thinkers such as 
Alexis de Tocqueville14 and John Stuart Mill,15 who maintained that the boundaries 
of democratic states should dovetail with those of ethnocultural nations. According 
to Kymlicka, this mono-national “idealized model of the polis”16 remains 
predominant in political theory today. Thus, though nationalism is antithetical to 
true liberal universalism, liberal democrats see it as logical, perhaps even proper, 
that the world’s existing states are the product of nations having detached 
themselves from the universal human whole.
11 W helan, “D em ocratic Theory and the Boundary Problem ,” 22.
12 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 124 .
13 E rn est Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1 9 8 3 ) , 1.
14 Marvin Zetterbaum , Tocqueville and the Problem o f  Dem ocracy  (Stanford: Stanford University  
Press, 1 9 6 7 )  , 1 50 . Zetterbaum  quotes de Tocqueville as stating, “The interests of the human race are  
b etter served by giving every man a particular fatherland than by trying to inflame his passions for 
the whole of hum anity.”
15 John Stuart Mill, “Considerations on Representative Governm ent,” in Utilitarianism, Liberty, 
R epresentative Government, ed. H. Acton (London: J.M. Dent, 1 9 7 2 )  , 2 3 3 .
16 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 2.
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3.1.2 Universalism and internal nationalism in multination states
If liberal democratic statehood subordinates universalism to national self­
determination, is the same justifiable at the substate level? On this question, liberals 
are divided. They are torn between the ideal of universal citizenship and 
“particularist” notions of differentiated citizenship.17
On one hand, as noted previously, liberal universalism rests on the 
indivisibility of peoples. Hence liberal democracies frequently treat their citizens as 
belonging to a single, unified demos. If, per the views of de Tocqueville and Mill, 
states and nations are coextensive, this is uncontroversial. But as already noted, few 
states are mononational. Multination states are by definition demographically non- 
universal,18 harboring Gray’s “specific historic associations and cultural forms.” Such 
states encompass one or more national minorities who form demoi separate from 
that of the staatsvolk. They see the authority of the larger state as derivative and 
that of their own demoi as primary.19 Thus, such national minorities often insist on a 
positive right to self-determination. Says Will Kymlicka: “If democracy is the rule of 
‘the people,’ national minorities claim that there is more than one people, each with 
the right to rule themselves.”20 Likewise, such national minorities may claim group- 
based negative rights protecting their autonomy from the state’s more numerous, 
more powerful, potentially expansionist staatsvolk -  Quebecois from Anglo- 
Canadians, Catalans from Spaniards. In such instances, official universalism is at 
odds with de facto  multinational non-universalism.
Rightly so, says political scientist Vernon Van Dyke: “[In] a multinational 
state, it is as inappropriate to think of majority rule as it would be in the world as a
17 Richard Sigurdson, “F irst Peoples, New Peoples and Citizenship in Canada,” International Journal o f  
Canadian Studies  1 4  (1 9 9 6 )  , 55. Sigurdson rem inds us of form er prime m inister John Diefenbaker’s 
m em orable call by for “unhyphenated Canadianism,” which econom ically captures the discordant 
liberal view  of citizenship: That it should be externally particular (“Canadianism,” as opposed to, say, 
“hum anism ”) y et internally universal (“unhyphenated”) .
18 Jan Erk, “The Sociology of Constitutional Politics: Demos, Legitim acy and Constitutional Courts in 
Canada and Germany,” Regional & Federal Studies 21 , no. 4 -5  (2 0 1 1 )  .
19 Will Kymlicka, “Group Representation in Canadian Politics,” in Equity and Community: The Charter, 
Interest Advocacy, and Representation, ed. Leslie Seidle (Institute for Research on Public Policy, 
M ontreal, 1 9 9 3 )  , 81.
20 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 182 .
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whole.”21 In addition to substate nationalism, there are at least five more reasons 
(democratic, liberal, legal, moral and pragmatic) why this would be so.
As James Madison recognized, true democracy does not exist where 
majorities and minorities are fixed. In such instances, the larger faction is a 
permanent winner and the smaller is vulnerable to “tyranny of the majority.”22 A 
divided state by definition comprises multiple polities with potentially starkly 
divergent interests. To suggest that citizens in a divided state should attempt to 
realize their interests and reconcile their differences through winner-take-all 
majoritarianism would be to grant “tyranny” to the more populous polity. It was in 
part to avoid this eventuality that Madison pressed for the U.S. to adopt a non- 
universal, federal system, whereby polities (i.e., the states) would reserve certain 
authority to themselves, facilitating democracy by constraining majority power.23
The second justification for internal non-universalism, most famously 
articulated by Kymlicka, is that of “liberal nationalism.” Here, nationalism is of 
instrumental rather than intrinsic value. Kymlicka argues that for individuals, being 
grounded in one’s “societal culture” (i.e., one’s nation is a prerequisite for enjoying 
the meaningful autonomy that is liberalism’s raison d'etre. In this view, liberalism 
rightly sacrifices the broader freedom of universalism to achieve the circumscribed 
but richer freedom of culturally rooted individual autonomy. Kymlicka argues that 
this is why liberal staatsvolk find national self-determination at the state level so 
appealing:
[F]ew people favour a system of open borders, where people could freely 
cross borders and settle, work, and vote in whatever country they desired. 
Such a system would dramatically increase the domain within which people 
would be treated as free and equal citizens. Yet open borders would also 
make it more likely that people’s own national community would be overrun 
by settlers from other cultures, and that they would be unable to ensure their 
survival as a distinct national culture.24
21 Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination  (W estport, Connecticut: Greenwood  
Press, 1 9 8 5 )  , 172 .
22 Lani Guinier, “[E]racing Dem ocracy: The Voting Rights Cases,” Harvard Law Review  1 0 8  (1 9 9 5 )  .
23 John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, “Federation and Managing Nations,” in Multinational 
Federations, eds. Michael Burgess and John Pinder (London: Routledge, 2 0 0 7 )  , 186 .
24 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 93.
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If, according to liberal nationalists, the “boundary problem” does not in fact pose a 
problem for liberal ideals, and if it is thus perfectly liberal to establish international 
borders to prevent one’s “national community [from being] overrun by settlers,” 
then the same would logically hold true at the substate level. Hence, Kymlicka urges 
liberal democrats to reject internal universalism, instead providing self­
determination and sub-state autonomy to distinct internal peoples. This, he argues, 
is true liberalism.25
Third, internal non-universalism may be justified on legal grounds. Treaties 
and conventions may enshrine internal political differentiation into constitutional 
law. For example, national minorities may claim rights to self-determination that 
flow from historical pacts, preconditions of confederation, or stipulations in 
international law. Even in the absence of existing legal agreements, domestic or 
international courts may affirm that national minorities possess “inherent rights” of 
political differentiation that were extant before, and not extinguished by, 
colonization, conquest and the like.
A fourth, moral, justification for internal non-universalism is based on 
appeals to justice. Philosopher John Rawls deemed justice “the first virtue of social 
institutions.”26 According to Rawls’ conception of “justice as fairness,” liberal justice 
requires eliminating, or compensating citizens for, “morally arbitrary” 
disadvantages. Rawls was concerned especially with social class -  for instance, with 
the unfair hardships faced by people born poor. Yet thinkers such as Van Dyke27 and 
Kymlicka28 have extended Rawls’ logic to cases of cultural disadvantage. As states 
are never culturally neutral, but instead privilege staatsvolk languages, economic 
systems, governance arrangements, etc., internal minorities are thereby arbitrarily 
shortchanged. Thus, Rawlsian justice compels states to treat national minorities in a 
non-universal manner, compensating their members by according them special 
rights that put them on a so-called “level playing field” with the majority.
25 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 125 .
26 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard  
University Press, 1 9 9 9 ) 3.
27 Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination.
28 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 109 .
23
Finally, in multination states, non-universal political and legal arrangements, 
such as power-sharing agreements, are commonly seen as necessary to facilitate 
legitimacy, stability or even peace. As political scientist Andrew Reynolds observes, 
in deeply divided societies, treating restive minorities in a non-universal fashion, 
such as by overrepresenting them in central legislatures, can reduce their sense of 
alienation, promoting inter-ethnic collaboration and building trust.29 In this manner, 
granting group-differentiated rights to internal nations may benefit not just 
minorities but also staatsvolk, by enhancing the viability of the state at large.
3.1.3 ‘External' and ‘internal' national-minority protections
If liberal democratic states should eschew internal universalism and grant special 
rights to internal minorities for nationalistic, democratic, liberal, legal, moral and 
pragmatic reasons, it must be asked which special rights are warranted and which 
are not. Kymlicka divides non-universal national minority rights into two categories. 
The first, “internal restrictions,” would allow minority cultures to violate basic 
liberties of their own members.30 Infamous examples include female circumcision 
and so-called honor killings. Internal restrictions, Kymlicka states, are correctly 
prohibited in liberal democracies.
The second, more acceptable, category of national minority rights are 
“external protections,” which guard national minorities from assimilation into, or 
domination by, the staatsvolk, putting the minority and the majority on an equal 
footing.31 Says Kymlicka, “a liberal view requires freedom within the minority group, 
and equality between the minority and majority.”32
Yet “external protections” are not all of a kind. They can be separated into 
two sub-categories based on their effects. The first involves protections that, while 
clearly group-differentiated, are victimless. Following constitutional law scholar 
Richard Pildes and political scientist Richard Niemi, one might say these protections
29 Andrew  Reynolds, “Reserved Seats in National Legislatures: A R esearch Note,” Legislative Studies 
Quarterly  30 , no. 2 (2 0 0 5 )  : 3 02 .
30 Kymlicka, M ulticultural Citizenship, 152 .
31 Ibid., 1 52 .
32 Ibid., 1 52 .
24
cause, at worst, “expressive harms.”33 While “expressing” values contrary to liberal 
universalism, this class of external protections does not injure the material rights of 
individuals. For example, New Brunswick, uniquely among Canada’s provinces, 
grants the French language equal billing with English -  a practice that, in the minds 
of many Anglophones, could be seen as “expressively” non-universal, as it breaks 
from the Canadian norm. Yet clearly, New Brunswick’s official bilingualism does not 
diminish any specific rights of the province’s non-Francophones.
The second sub-category of external protections is more problematic. Such 
protections guard the cultural integrity of a vulnerable national minority by limiting 
the rights of non-minority individuals. This is injurious not merely to an expressed 
“idea” but to the real freedoms of specific people. For example, unlike New 
Brunswick, Quebec has is the past not merely elevated the status of the French 
language but also limited the use of English, leading individual Anglophone 
Quebeckers to suffer specific harms. Francophone Quebecois argue these “external 
protections” are necessary to prevent their assimilation into, and domination by, the 
Canadian staatsvolk. As will also be shown, in adjudicating disputes such as this, 
involving injurious external protections, the key challenge is weighing the individual 
rights of injured staatsvolk against the group rights of the national minority.
3.2 Divided states and non-universalism
Where states are divided34 by internal multinationalism, and thus are 
ethnoculturally non-universal, comparative-politics scholar Arend Lijphart says 
national minorities face three possibilities: assimilation, separation or
33 Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, “Expressive Harms, 'Bizarre Districts’ and Voting Rights: 
Evaluating Election-D istrict A ppearances after Shaw v. Reno," Michigan Law Review  92 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )  : 
507 .
34 Not all pluralistic states are divided states. As Sujit Choudhry notes, in plural states with 
“crosscutting cleavages,” the effect of race, class and other divisions m ay be m oderated, with 
electoral losers maintaining hope of eventual victory and w inners restrained by the p rosp ect of 
eventual loss. But w here divisions do not cro sscu t -  w here lines betw een internal ethnocultural 
nations are stark and apparently perm anent -  internal pluralism can have an im m oderating effect on 
political behavior; see his Constitutional Design fo r  Divided Societies: Integration or A ccom m odation? 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 8 )  , 17. W here “divided state” voting takes place along ethnic 
lines, Donald Horowitz pithily observes, “This is not an election at all, but a census”; see his “Ethnic 
Conflict M anagem ent for Policym akers,” in Conflict and Peacem aking in M ultiethnic Societies, ed. 
Joseph V. Montville. (Lexington Books, 1 9 9 0 ) , 116 .
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consociation.35 Assimilation is seldom palatable, for reasons that, as noted above, 
may be nationalistic, democratic, liberal, legal, moral or pragmatic. In such 
instances, some national minorities seek Lijphart’s second option, separation. Often, 
however, outright independence is impractical. Then, Lijphart says, it is only 
through consociation that internal nations can be accommodated.36 Consociation 
accepts ethnocultural groups as the “basic building blocks” of stable government 
and seeks to accommodate those groups through power sharing.37 This is an 
external cultural protection, as described above. It is also inherently non-universal. 
This non-universalism may be either direct or indirect.
3.2.1 Direct non-universalism: direct consociation
Direct consociation explicitly recognizes minority cultural communities and 
provides them with external cultural protections.38 Though doing so contravenes 
liberal universalism, it is nonetheless common in liberal democratic states. It may be 
conceptually akin to “intrastate federalism,” where collectivities are represented 
and accorded power directly in central political institutions, such as in the “grand 
coalition” power-sharing arrangement of Lebanon, where the president must be a 
Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim, the speaker a Shi’a. Limited 
forms of direct consociation are more common. Canada’s constitution uniquely 
favors the languages and traditional religions of its two founding peoples (French 
and English, Catholic and Protestant) . Canadian Aboriginals also enjoy direct 
consociational protections, most obviously through historic treaties and modern 
land-claim and self-government agreements, but also via certain asymmetric 
accommodations in public government, such as Aboriginal-only schools created in 
several off-reserve communities to advance Indigenous educational prospects, and
35 Arend Lijphart, Dem ocracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 44.
36 Arend Lijphart, “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies,” Journal o f  Dem ocracy  15 , no. 2 
(2 0 0 4  : 96.
37 Lijphart, Dem ocracy in Plural Societies, 45.
38 Reynolds, “Reserved Seats,” 301 .
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distinct sentencing guidelines meant to take into account the oppressive cultural 
conditions faced by Aboriginal offenders.39
Elsewhere, consociation is similarly common. Finland’s Swedish-majority 
Aland Islands require that mainland Finns live in the islands for five years and learn 
to speak Swedish before voting or standing for office.40 Italy’s province of South 
Tyrol provides its indigenous ethnic Germans with veto power over provincial laws 
that threaten their minority-language rights.41 In American Samoa, U.S. citizens of 
non-Samoan ancestry are prohibited from buying land, thus protecting the 
traditional land base from alienation.42 In the United Kingdom, the national- 
minority Scots and Welsh enjoy significant overrepresentation in Parliament.43 In 
New Zealand, Maori are guaranteed permanent representation in the House of 
Representatives. The list, of course, goes on.
3.2.2 Indirect non-universalism: federalism
Either instead of direct consociation or in addition to it (depending on one’s stance 
on the so-called “West Lothian problem”44) , states may practice indirect 
consociation, a power-sharing method that is, on its face, universal.45 Because it 
tacitly rather than explicitly recognizes cultural communities, liberal democracies
39 Sigurdson, “First Peoples, New Peoples,” 68.
40 Shahnawaz Gul, “Kashmir and Aland Autonom y Models: A Com parative Study” (m aster’s thesis, 
University of Kashmir, 2 0 1 3 )  , 44.
41 Andrea Carla, “Living A part in the Same Room: Analysis of the M anagem ent of Linguistic Diversity 
in Bolzano,” Ethnopolitics 6, no. 2 (2 0 0 7 )  : 296 .
42 Michael W. W eaver, “The T erritory  Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The Question of Greater Federal 
Jurisdiction in Am erican Samoa,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 17 , no. 2 (2 0 0 8 )  : 325 .
43 T.H. Qualter, “Representation by Population: A Com parative Study,” Canadian Journal o f  Econom ics 
and Political Science  33 , no. 2 (1 9 6 7 )  : 2 5 8 .
44 The question of w hether d irect consociation is required by, or conversely prohibited by, indirect 
consociation is som etim es called the W est Lothian Problem, after a Scottish MP for the constituency  
of W est Lothian who questioned w hether he should vote on Parliam entary m atters only affecting 
England. According to Kymlicka, the “yes” argum ent goes like this: “A m inority’s right to self­
governm ent would be severely weakened if som e external body could unilaterally revise or revoke
its pow ers Hence it would seem  to be a corollary of self-governm ent th at the national m inority be
guaranteed representation  on any body which can in terp ret or modify its pow ers of self­
governm ent.” Yet, Kymlicka notes, a subunit th at has “drawn down” asym m etrical pow ers from the 
central governm ent could arguably be entitled to less representation in the central assem bly, as it 
would be unfair for it to have input into legislation from which it is exem pt. For m ore see Kymlicka, 
Multicultural Citizenship, 32.
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often prefer indirect consociation.46 Where cultural communities are territorially 
defined, federalism offers one method of indirect consociation. Federalism is among 
the world’s most common governance arrangements. According to political scientist 
Daniel Elazar, federalism involves “self-rule and shared rule,”47 assigning inalienable 
powers to both central and subunit governments and thus protecting each from the 
other. The degree of shared versus self-rule varies, with some federations more 
decentralized than others. Decentralized federations may exhibit “interstate 
federalism,” where power is brokered not primarily within central institutions but 
between the central and subunit governments in an almost ambassadorial 
relationship.
Whatever its degree of centralization, two very different forms of federalism 
exist, constituted to achieve different ends: multinational and region-based 
federalism. In what political theorist Phillip Resnick calls “multinational 
federations,”48 borders are drawn and powers granted so federal subunits 
encompass and provide limited autonomy to national minorities. Under this 
arrangement, a national minority enjoys an external protection against assimilation, 
and may pursue self-determination, by exercising liberal-democratic political 
control over its semi-autonomous region.49 In Belgium the boundaries and powers 
of Wallonia provide self-determination and sub-state autonomy for the Walloon 
minority, while in Spain, the “autonomous community” of Catalonia accommodates
45 Michael Asch and Gurston Dacks, “The Relevance of Consociation to the W estern  N orthw est 
T erritories,” in Partners fo r  the Future: A Collection o f  Papers Related to Constitutional Developm ent in 
the W estern Northw est Territories, ed. W estern  Constitutional Forum  (Yellowknife: Governm ent of 
the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 8 5 )  , 39.
46 Nicholas O. Stephanopolous, “Our Electoral Exceptionalism ,” University o f  Chicago Law Review  80  
(2 0 1 3 )  : 8 4 2 .
47 Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism  (Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 
1 9 8 7 )  , 5-6.
48 Phillip Resnick, “Tow ard a Multination Federalism ,” in Seeking a New Canadian Partnership: 
Asym m etrical and Confederal Options, ed. Leslie Seidle (M ontreal: Institute for Research on Public 
Policy, 1 9 9 4 )  , 71.
49 At the sam e tim e th at federalism allows nationalist m inorities to enjoy segm ental autonom y  
w ithout resorting to secession, it also provides security to m inorities-w ithin-the-m inority (such as 
Anglos in Quebec) , as their rights are protected  by the subunit’s inclusion in the federal regime. 
Helder de Schutter calls this “federalism as fairness”: Unlike either secession or assim ilation, 
federalism is fair to both minorities and m inorities-w ithin-the-m inority. For m ore on this, see his 
“Federalism  as Fairness,” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 19 , no. 2 (2 0 1 1 ) : 1 6 7 -1 8 9 .
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the Catalans. In Canada, Quebec functions as a semi-autonomous nation-based 
subunit, providing an “overtly universal” external protection to the stateless 
Quebecois.
However, federalism is not inherently, or even most commonly, a tool of 
consociation. According to Kymlicka, in the brand of federalism dubbed “region- 
based federalism,” federal arrangements provide a way for a political community to 
divide and diffuse power.50 Rather than concentrating authority in the hands of a 
unitary government, region-based federalism disperses control, reducing the danger 
of tyranny and safeguarding individual rights. The United States, which political 
scientists Patrick Malcolmson and Richard Myers deem “the blueprint of the first 
great modern federal regime,”51 showcases region-based federalism, with power 
strategically divided between the federal government and the states. American 
federalism does not aim to provide self-determination to national minorities.52 The 
federal regimes of Australia, Brazil and Germany are similarly “region-based.”
In certain circumstances, region-based federalism may not merely fail to 
provide consociational power-sharing to national minorities but may achieve the 
opposite, serving to disempower and assimilate them. This may occur in at least two 
ways. Borrowing from the parlance of voting-rights jurisprudence, these ways can 
be called “cracking” and “stacking.”53
Cracking involves constituting subunits so their boundaries split national 
minorities, denying them the opportunity to become majorities in any subunit. 
According to Kymlicka, this technique was utilized historically against both the 
Basques and Catalans.54 Stacking, meanwhile, involves overwhelming national 
minorities with a preponderance of staatsvolk. This may be achieved through two 
different means. First, minorities may be “stacked” by drawing subunit boundaries
50 Will Kymlicka, “Is Federalism  a Viable Alternative to Secession?” in Theories o f  Secession, ed. Percy  
B. Lehning (Hoboken, New Jersey: Taylor and Francis, 2 0 0 5 )  , 124 .
51 Patrick Malcolmson and Richard Myers, The Canadian R egim e: An Introduction to Parliam entary  
Governm ent in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2 0 0 9 )  , 58.
52 Kymlicka, “Is Federalism  a Viable Alternative?” 122 .
53 Jam es S. Fishkin, The Voice o f  the People: Public Opinion and Dem ocracy  (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1 9 9 5 ) , 118 .
54 Will Kymlicka, “Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice,” Review o f  Constitutional Studies 4, no. 2 
(1 9 9 8  , 2 21 .
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so their homeland is marooned in a larger, majority-dominated jurisdiction, as was 
the intent when Upper Canada, with its fast-growing Anglophone population, sought 
to merge with Francophone Lower Canada to form the greater Province of Canada.55 
Stacking can also be engineered by “swamping” a minority homeland with majority- 
nation settlers. This technique was utilized against Canada’s Metis in the 1870s: 
Prime Minister John A. Macdonald, determined to prevent the new province of 
Manitoba from remaining Metis-dominated, stated, “these impulsive halfbreeds . . . 
must be kept down by a strong hand until they are swamped by the influx of 
settlers.”56 Similarly, McGarry notes that in the American west and southwest, 
statehood was held in abeyance until Anglo settlers swamped local Hispanic 
populations.57 In the case of New Mexico, for example, Congress for more than half a 
century denied the pleas of Nuevomexicanos for statehood, often on explicitly racist 
grounds.58 Only when Hispanics became a minority was statehood granted.59
After national minorities have been cracked or stacked through the creation 
of region-based federal subunits, their nationalist ambitions can be quashed 
through simple democratic majoritarianism.60 This may render them worse off than 
they would have been without federalism. McGarry cites the case of African- 
Americans, who in the United States were “subjugated by particularly authoritarian
55 Kymlicka, “Federalism  and Secession,” 110 .
56 F. G. Stanley, The Birth o f  W estern Canada: A History o f  the Riel Rebellions (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1 9 6 1 )  , 95 .
57 McGarry, “A sym m etry in Federations,” 106 .
58 John Nieto-Phillips, “Citizenship and Empire: Race, Language, and Self-Government in New Mexico 
and Puerto Rico, 1 8 9 8 -1 9 1 7 ,” Centro 11 , no. 1 (1 9 9 9 )  .
59 From  1 8 4 8 , when it joined the United States, until 1 9 0 0 , the territo ry  of New Mexico was a t least
6 0  p ercen t Hispanic. By 1 9 1 0  the Hispanic proportion had dropped to 38  percent. Two years later 
statehood was granted. For m ore see Jens Manuel Krogstad and Mark Hugo Lopez, “For Three States, 
Share of Hispanic Population Returns to the Past,” Pew Research Centre, 
h ttp ://w w w .p ew research .o rg /fact-tan k /2014 /06 /10 /fo r-th ree -sta tes-sh are -o f-h isp an ic-  
p opu lation -returns-to-th e-p ast/ (accessed  Jan. 16 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
60 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the 
N orthw est T erritories,” in N orthern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
R esources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8  , 318 .
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regional majorities” in the post-Civil War South,61 and were forced to appeal to the 
federal government for help. Other scholars have argued that the same is true in 
Canada, where provincial resistance to Indigenous nationalism has served to 
suppress, not accommodate, Native self-determination.62
When a national minority finds itself “cracked” or “stacked” into a region- 
based federal subunit, it once more faces Lijphart’s three options: assimilation, 
separation and consociation. Again, national minorities seldom desire assimilation 
into the dominant staatsvolk culture. Separation, in the form of subunit partition, 
may be sought, as was the case when a small but vocal faction of Francophones 
moved to split French-speaking Acadia from New Brunswick in the 1970s.63 The 
final option is consociation, with the subunit governed through a power-sharing 
arrangement.64 Intra-subunit consociational arrangements exist in such 
jurisdictions as Northern Ireland, South Tyrol and Brussels.65 Rudimentary forms of 
intra-subunit consociation also exist in North America. In the above-mentioned case 
of New Brunswick, partitionist sentiment was quelled by the introduction of 
consociational accommodations that included entrenchment of dual official 
languages and establishment of parallel English/French education systems.66 As 
part of Canadian Confederation, the British North America Act required that Quebec 
retain twelve traditionally Anglo-dominated provincial electoral districts, called 
comtes proteges, or “protected counties.”67 Nova Scotia once featured two-member
61 McGarry, “A sym m etry in Federations,” 106 . This is not to suggest th at segm ental autonom y offered 
by federalism is a panacea for threatened national minorities. As Kymlicka notes, the asym m etric 
pow ers required for national-m inority self-determ ination m ay be m ore agreeable to staatsvolk when 
accorded “extra-federally.” He observes, “It is much easier to negotiate new self-governm ent 
provisions for the Navajo or Puerto Ricans than to modify the pow ers of individual states.” See 
M ulticultural Citizenship, 29.
62 J. Anthony Long, “Federalism  and Ethnic Self-Determination: Native Indians in Canada,” Jou rnal o f  
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 29 , no. 2 (1 9 9 1 )  : 193 .
63 Em ery M. Fanjoy, “Language and Politics in New Brunswick,” Canadian Parliam entary Review  
sum m er (1 9 9 0  : 7.
64 Arend Lijphart, “The Pow er-Sharing Approach,” in Conflict and Peacem aking in Multiethnic 
Societies, ed. Joseph V. Montville (New York: Lexington Books, 1 9 9 0 ) , 503 .
65 Stefan Wolff, “The Institutional Structure of Regional Consociations in Brussels, Northern Ireland  
and South Tyrol,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 10 , no. 3 (2 0 0 4 )  .
66 Fanjoy, “Language and Politics in New Brunswick,” 7.
67 John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (M ontreal: McGill- 
Queens University Press, 2 0 0 1 )  , 4 7 -4 8 .
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electoral constituencies, to provide both dual Catholic/Protestant and dual 
Anglo/Acadian representation.68 In Maine, delegates from several of the state’s 
Indigenous nations serve as non-voting members of the state house of 
representatives. And in culturally divided Hawaii, the Hawaiian language has been 
granted official status, politics have been described as inter-ethnically 
conscociational,69 and apportionment exhibits a degree of non-universalism, with 
the state constitution requiring that the different islands be considered separate 
units for purposes of redistricting.
3.2.3 Non-universalism in Canada
Canada is a multination state. It is thus, de facto, non-universal. De jure, it features an 
array of direct and indirect consociational arrangements. For example, as noted 
previously, Canada is directly consociational in its recognition of dual official 
languages. It is indirectly consociational through its federal scheme, which is partly 
region-based (a la the U.S.) and partly nation-based. Of Canada’s ten provinces, eight 
do not function as enclaves for protecting and empowering discrete national 
minorities. Only Quebec is a “national” province, serving as a homeland for the 
stateless Quebecois, providing them limited autonomy and self-governance.70 New 
Brunswick, meanwhile, is a consociational province, where power is shared 
between Francophone Acadians and Anglophone staatsvolk.
Canada also has three territories. While these are not fully empowered 
federal subunits (they are not strictly “constitutionally entrenched,” as their 
authority is for the most part delegated through Parliamentary legislation) , they are 
sometimes called “provinces in waiting” and wield “province-like” powers more
68 Governm ent of Canada Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reform ing  
Electoral Dem ocracy: Final Report, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1 9 9 1 ) , 
179 .
69 Michael Haas, “Politics,” in M ulticultural Hawai’i: The Fabric o f  a M ultiethnic Society, ed. Michael 
Hass (New York: Garland Publishing, 1 9 9 8 )  , 163 .
70 This is of course no accident. Before Canadian confederation, British North Am erica consisted of a 
num ber of colonies, including the Province of Canada, com prising both m odern-day Ontario and 
Quebec. At confederation, Ontarians pressed for the new Canadian state to adopt a unitary  
governm ent, but Francophones insisted on a federal system  th at would provide them  segm ental 
autonom y. For m ore see Malcolmson and Myers, The Canadian Regim e, 61.
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formidable than those of federal subunits in many other federations.71 Of Canada’s 
territories, the Yukon has long been a region-based subunit. Nunavut, formed 
through the signing of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement, became a nation-based 
federal subunit, providing a semi-autonomous homeland to the Inuit of the eastern 
Arctic.72 Finally, the pre-division NWT featured forms of consociational power- 
sharing -  an uneasy, ad hoc middle ground between region-based and nation-based 
federal status. The territory was for decades pulled between these two modes of 
federalism, in part because of the differing visions of, and a conflict of rights 
between, its staatsvolk and Indigenous peoples.
Conflicts between individual and group rights are not new to Canada. Only 
recently, however, have such questions become commonly adjudicated. For 
Canada’s first 115 years the country had no equivalent of the American Bill of 
Rights. Parliamentary power was sovereign.73 Legislative moderation, not legal 
action, was the primary defense against abuse of civil liberties. Only after 1982, with 
the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, did questions of rights begin to 
frequently come before the courts.
Quebec opposed adoption of the Charter, fearing it would compromise the 
province’s use of external protections to defend its distinct “national” status. Many 
of Canada’s staatsvolk, meanwhile, desired that the Charter would bring Quebec into 
line. Anglo-Canadians have generally opposed the “asymmetrical” federal demands 
made by Quebec.74 According to constitutional scholars Rainer Knopff and F.L. 
Morton, staatsvolk hoped the Charter would moderate “centrifugal territorialism” 
and promote national unity by adopting a set of universal individual rights to which
71 Doug McArthur, “The Changing Architecture of Governance in Yukon and the N orthw est 
T erritories,” in Northern Exposure Volume 4 : Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada’s North, eds. 
Frances Abele, Thom as J. Courchene, F. Leslie Seidle, and France St-Hilaire (M ontreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 2 0 0 9  , 207 .
72 Will Kymlicka, Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada (Toronto: Oxford 
University Press Canada) , 144 .
73 Shannon Ishiyama Smithey, “The Effects of the Canadian Suprem e Court’s Charter Interpretation  
on Regional and Intergovernm ental Tensions in Canada,” Publius: The Journal o f  Federalism  26 , no. 2 
(1 9 9 6  : 84.
74 Yash Pal Ghai, “Constitutional A sym m etries: Communal Representation, Federalism  and Cultural 
Autonom y,” in The A rchitecture o f  D em ocracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict M anagem ent and  
Dem ocracy, ed. Andrew  Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 2 )  , 160 .
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Quebec would be compelled to adhere.75 Indeed, the Charter’s greatest champion, 
Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, saw the entrenchment of individual Charter rights 
as a nation-building exercise. But as will be seen, one person’s nation building is 
another’s colonialism. It is no wonder that, within years of the Charter’s adoption, 
Quebec was embroiled in a clash involving individual versus group rights.
Under section 2 of the Charter, all Canadians enjoy freedom of expression. 
Yet Quebec’s Bill 101, which pre-dated the Charter, required commercial signage in 
the province to be in French only. In 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada found Bill 
101 to abridge the free-expression rights of non-Francophones. Nationalist 
Quebecois were outraged. In their view, the Charter, by preventing them from 
advantaging French in their own province, impaired their viability as a separate 
culture.76 Quebec invoked the Charter’s section 33 “notwithstanding clause,”77 
temporarily overriding the court’s decision. Anglophone Canadians, in turn, were 
outraged at the Quebecois, whose insistence on utilizing “external protections” such 
as Bill 101 seemed to insult the principles of both individual egalitarianism and 
universal citizenship.78
The resulting schism catalyzed Quebecois resentment toward Canada and 
was a prime contributor to the separatism crisis of the mid-1990s, the closest 
modern Canada has come to breaking up.79 Hence, political scientist Shannon 
Smithey argues that “[t]he Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Charter has 
contributed greatly to the failure to achieve greater unity. The impact of the Court’s 
evenhanded approach to the Charter’s language rights has been exactly the opposite 
of what was intended in 1982. A document designed to pull the nation closer
75 Rainer Knopff and F. L. Morton, “Nation Building and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedom s,” in Constitutionalism, Citizenship and Society in Canada, eds. Alan Cairns and Cynthia 
Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 9 8 5 )  , 1 33 .
76 Smithey, “The Effects of the Canadian Suprem e Court’s C harter Interpretation,” 89.
77 The m ost controversial provision of the C harter of Rights and Freedom s, the “notwithstanding  
clause” perm its Parliam ent or the provinces to override certain Charter provisions. (Section 3, the 
voting-rights provision, is not am ong them .) “Notwithstanding” declarations expire after five years, 
though in th eory governm ents could re -en act them  in perpetuity.
78 Ronald L W atts, “Canadian Federalism  in the 1 9 9 0 s : Once More in Question,” Publius: The Journal o f  
Federalism  21 , no. 3 (1 9 9 1 )  : 184 .
79 Smithey, “The Effects of the Canadian Suprem e Court’s C harter Interpretation,” 83.
34
together has been interpreted in ways that have added to the centrifugal forces at 
work in Canada.”80
3.2.4 Rights and settler colonialism
“Settler colonialism” in multination states presents an especially thorny challenge to 
liberal democrats. As noted previously, Indigenous nations were incorporated into 
multination states against their will. Indigenous nations are culturally distinct from 
“the people” comprising the national majority, were self-determining prior to the 
majority’s arrival, and did not consent to the political regime that the majority 
established. They thus assert inherent moral rights to continued self-governance 
and autonomy. As also noted previously, these rights may be defended on 
nationalistic, democratic, liberal, legal,81 moral and pragmatic grounds. Settler 
colonialism threatens these rights.
Colonialism is a phenomenon whereby one nation politically, economically 
and/or culturally dominates or incorporates another nation and exploits its 
inhabitants. Scholars distinguish colonialism from “settler colonialism,” where the 
original inhabitants are not merely exploited but, in effect, replaced.82 In settler 
colonialism, hegemony is achieved when exogenous peoples occupy a territory, 
eliminate or marginalize its inhabitants, and, in the words of colonial historian 
Patrick Wolfe, “erect[ ] a new colonial society on the expropriated land base.”83 This 
process may be driven by the settlers themselves or in collaboration with the 
colonial metropole. The latter case is sometimes called nation building. Others 
describe it less charitably. According to Kymlicka, “State governments, controlled by 
colonizing settlers, have often seen national minorities as obstacles to settlement
80 Smithey, “The Effects of the Canadian Suprem e Court’s C harter Interpretation,” 100 .
81 As Canadian political scientist Avigail Eisenberg notes, m any Canadian treaties express or imply 
th at Indigenous society will be perm itted to co-exist with, and be protected from, staatsvolk society. 
For m ore see her chapter “Domination and Political Representation in Canada,” in Painting the Maple: 
Essays on Race, G ender and the Construction o f  Canada, eds. Veronica Strong-Boag, Sherrill Grace, Joan 
Anderson and Avigail Eisenberg (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1 9 9 8  , 48.
82 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview  (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2 0 1 0 )  , 8.
83 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal o f  Genocide Research  
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and resource development, and so have pushed to strip minorities of their 
traditional political institutions, undermine their treaty rights, and dispossess them 
of their historic homelands.”84
In recent decades, settler colonialism has earned widespread scorn. Wolfe, 
among others, deems it a form of genocide.85 At least theoretically, many liberal 
democrats agree that settler colonialism is a grievous wrong. Courts have affirmed 
the right of internal Indigenous nations to both self-determination and cultural 
survival, and settler states have issued apologies for certain colonial actions.86
Yet in modern multinational liberal democracies, Indigenous rights to self­
determination and cultural preservation may still be imperiled where staatsvolk 
exercise individual rights to mobility and voting. As Kymlicka explains, these rights 
may not merely permit but protect ongoing settler colonialism. Often, liberal 
principles guard the freedom of staatsvolk to relocate to, and cast ballots in, 
Indigenous homelands, overwhelming and politically dominating them. According to 
Eisenberg, in such instances the imposition of liberal principles upon these 
homelands should not be justified as “liberalization” but condemned as colonialism. 
Likewise, she says the liberal rights themselves should not be seen as beneficently 
universal but the opposite -  as a particularistic tool “aimed at advancing the 
collective cultural dominance of the majority.”87 Examples are numerous, including 
in Bangladesh, Israel, Tibet, Indonesia and Brazil.88 Kymlicka calls settler 
colonialism “the most common origin of violent conflict in the world.”89
In such instances, Indigenous nations unsurprisingly seek to utilize external 
protections to block staatsvolk in-migration and voting. As Canada’s Royal 
Commission on Electoral Reform observed, Aboriginal peoples “entered treaties to
84 Kymlicka, Finding Our Way, 137 .
85 Wolfe, “Settler colonialism,” 3 8 7 -4 0 9 .
86 For exam ple, in the so-called Apology Resolution of 1 9 9 3 , Congress adm itted U.S. culpability in, and 
expressed contrition for, the overthrow  of the Kingdom of Hawaii a century before. See Jess Bravin  
and Louise Radnofsky, “Regrets Only? Native Hawaiians Insist U.S. Apology has a Price,” Wall S treet  
Journal, March 12 , 2 0 0 9 , w w w .w s j.c o m /a rtic le s /S B 1 2 3 6 8 2 3 3 6 9 6 4 8 0 3 7 6 3  (accessed January 27 , 
2 0 1 5  .
87 Eisenberg, “Domination and Political,” 39.
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89 Ibid., 2 1 9 .
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protect their traditional lifestyle against the influx of immigration Aboriginal
peoples have always viewed segregation as an essential means of defending their 
cultural heritage.”90 External protections barring settler in-migration and voting 
help guard Indigenous cultural integrity, but they simultaneously harm settlers -  
not just in an “expressive” manner, but also in ways that are materially injurious. In 
such circumstances, decisions must be made as to whether such external 
protections are nonetheless permissible. Such decisions may determine the political 
and cultural fate of Indigenous nations.
3.3 ‘Kymlicka's dilemma'
Whether staatsvolk swamping and political domination of Indigenous homelands is 
orchestrated or apparently accidental, and whether it is seen as “liberalization” and 
“nation-building” or as overt colonialism, Kymlicka deems it a “grave injustice.” He 
also identifies it as a difficult liberal-theory paradox, which demonstrates “that 
respect for human rights is not sufficient to ensure ethnocultural justice, and that 
where ethnocultural justice is absent, the rhetoric and practice of human rights may 
actually worsen the situation.”91 This confounding circumstance, in which the self­
determination of Indigenous minorities is threatened by settlers’ individual mobility 
and voting rights, while, conversely, settlers’ mobility and voting rights are 
threatened by non-universal Indigenous external protections, is what I dub 
“Kymlicka’s dilemma.” As will be demonstrated, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” presented 
significant challenges to liberal democracy in Canada’s pre-division and division-era 
Northwest Territories.
3.4 Summary
As this chapter has shown, for an array of reasons -  nationalistic, democratic, 
liberal, legal, moral and pragmatic -  liberal democratic multination states may owe 
to minority nations the right to use “external protections” to guard their collective 
self-determination and internal autonomy from infringement by majority-nation
90 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, Reform ing Electoral Dem ocracy, 1 8 0 -8 1 .
91 Kymlicka, “Human Rights and Ethnocultural Justice,” 2 14 .
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staatsvolk. Such protections may be facilitated through consociational power- 
sharing: either direct, such as via “intrastate” arrangements, or indirect, such as via 
federalism. Yet while federalism may empower national minorities, it may 
alternatively be arranged to disempower them, such as through “cracking” or 
“stacking.” One form of stacking, which poses a particular threat in settler-colonial 
states, is “swamping.” There, staatsvolk settlers, by exercising their individual rights 
of movement and voting, may succeed in occupying and democratically dominating 
a national-minority homeland. Where the national minority exercises “external 
protections” to prevent such settler actions, a clash of rights arises, presenting a 
constitutional quandary. I call this quandary “Kymlicka’s dilemma.”
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Chapter 4: Apportionment theory and case law
This chapter addresses the challenge of reconciling electoral apportionment with 
the principles of liberal democracy. It identifies three categories of such challenges, 
involving individualism, egalitarianism and universalism. It examines how internal 
multinationalism may conflict with universal apportionment, and explores such 
conflicts as they relate to Aboriginal rights in Canada. This chapter then examines 
case law in Canada and the U.S., including cases where national-minority rights and 
universal apportionment conflict. It concludes by suggesting that in such cases, 
courts must proceed with caution, and proposes a procedure for identifying and 
properly adjudicating such conflicts.
4.1 Voting rights and apportionment
In a liberal democracy the right to vote is sacrosanct. According to section 3 of 
Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, “Every citizen has a right to vote in an 
election of members of the House of Commons or of a legislative assembly and to be 
qualified for membership therein.” This right is essential because, as constitutional 
law scholar Katherine Swinton observes, “The hallmark of democracy is the ability 
of individuals to participate in the institutions that govern them.”1 Yet discerning 
the meaning of “the right to vote” is complex. Even in an Athenian-style direct 
democracy, “the right to vote” would present challenges. Who has the right to vote -  
all residents, or only citizens? How old must they be? What term of residency must 
they meet? Representative democracy, in which individuals “participate in the 
institutions that govern them” largely through elected representatives, raises even 
thornier questions. How should representation be apportioned to voters? By fixed 
geographic boroughs, as in the pre-reformed British Parliament? By an at-large 
proportional system, as in Israel? By clan, as in Somalia? In North America, 
representation is typically apportioned through single-member territorially-based 
districts. These districts are periodically reshaped and their population thereby 
adjusted so as to respect individual rights while at the same time facilitating
1 Katherine Swinton, “Federalism , R epresentation and Rights,” in Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, 
Courts, and Electoral Values, ed. John. C. Courtney et al. (Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1 9 9 2 ) , 18.
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democracy. After all, as John Courtney observes, courts have made it clear that the 
right to vote includes protection from “discriminatory treatment of voters under a 
particular set of electoral boundaries.”2
4.2 Three axes of (il)liberal apportionment
Of course, the twin goals of facilitating democracy and protecting voters’ rights are 
often in tension. Such conflicts are the subject of constitutional law, which seeks to 
discern at what point an apportionment scheme becomes impermissibly illiberal.
As guarding individual rights from majoritarian abuse is liberalism’s raison 
d'etre, liberal theory provides a useful lens through which to explore apportionment 
controversies. As mentioned previously, Chandran Kukathas identifies three key 
liberal principles: individualism, egalitarianism and universalism. The violation of 
any of these principles may thus be seen as illiberal. I suggest that apportionment 
questions can be usefully explored as they relate to each of these three principles, 
and, more specifically, that apportionment’s degree of (il) liberalism can be gauged 
along three sliding scales framed by these principles. Individualism informs the first 
axis. It is the principle that the state must treat citizens as individuals rather than as 
members of groups. This axis gauges the degree to which an apportionment scheme 
is “blind” to group difference versus the degree to which (and the way in which) it 
recognizes groups. Egalitarianism forms the second axis, embodying the principle 
that all citizens be treated as political equals. This axis assesses how closely a 
scheme adheres to “parity” versus how much it overrepresents some individuals 
and underrepresents others.
Disputes along these two axes will be familiar to students of voting rights. In 
the U.S. and Canada, most disagreements over apportionment involve one or the 
other of them. However, I contend that apportionment must also be considered 
along a “third axis,” informed by universalism. This is necessary where states are 
not universal. As noted above, “universal” states consider their citizens to be a 
single, unified polity. Asch calls this “the true ‘one person-one vote’ orientation to
2 John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (M ontreal: McGill- 
Queens University Press, 2 0 0 1 )  , 153 .
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democracy.”3 But states that exhibit multinational pluralism, and which are 
governed through direct or indirect consociation, relate to citizens as members of 
preexisting, distinct polities. These polities form the building blocks of non- 
universal power sharing. Clearly, apportionment must be conducted differently in 
consociational states. The “universalism” axis takes note of preexisting polities and 
the representational challenges that attend them. It explores whether, and how, 
representation is apportioned among multiple demoi.
4.2.1 The first axis: individualism
As liberalism rests in part on the rejection of de jure group differentiation, it might 
be thought that a maximally liberal representational scheme would be blind to 
voters’ group affiliations. Yet this is seldom the case, for at least three reasons.4 
First, as legal scholar Pamela Karlan observes, “The instrumental purpose of voting 
-  having one's preferences taken into account in choosing public officials -  
necessarily involves aggregating the votes of individuals to achieve a collective 
outcome.”5 Second, group expression is incoherent if aggregation is random (for 
example, if representation is apportioned by drawing lots) or senseless (for 
instance, apportioned alphabetically . For voting to have meaning, apportionment 
must group together not just any electors but electors who share politically salient 
interests. Only then will they, as individuals, enjoy the possibility of combining their 
votes and electing representatives of their choice.6 Third, because representation is 
enhanced when voters are aggregated into meaningful groups, it may be thwarted
3 Michael Asch, “Consociation and the Resolution of Aboriginal Political Rights: The Example of the 
N orthw est Territories, Canada.” Culture X, no. 1 (1 9 9 0 )  : 94.
4 There exist electoral system s th at are overtly “group blind” and do not require voter aggregation; 
for instance, at-large system s. Yet, for precisely the reasons discussed above, such system s m ay still 
violate voting rights. In the U.S. Suprem e Court case Mobile v. Bolden (1 9 8 0 ), African-Americans 
maintained th at Mobile, Alabam a’s municipal at-large electoral schem e allowed the city’s white 
m ajority to uniformly defeat black candidates -  a harm  they felt could be rectified by dividing the 
municipality into territory-b ased  single-m em ber electoral districts.
5 Pamela Karlan, “All Over the Map: The Suprem e Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy,” The Suprem e Court 
Review  (1 9 9 3  : 2 49 .
6 Swinton, “Federalism , Representation, and Rights,” 19. This is w hy U.S. Suprem e Court Justice 
P otter S tew art famously stated, in Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly  (1 9 6 4 )  , th at “[l]egislators do 
not rep resen t faceless num bers. They rep resen t people . . . people with identifiable needs and 
interests which require legislative representation .”
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when meaningful aggregation is denied, such as when districts are crafted to 
diminish collective influence through “cracking” and “stacking.”
Aggregation, achieving meaningful aggregation, and policing against 
invidious aggregation all require deliberate departure from group-blindness, 
making apportionment one of the rare instances in which liberal democrats 
embrace overtly group-conscious lawmaking. Hence, few apportionment schemes 
are maximally liberal along the individualism axis. Indeed, some representational 
arrangements that are ostensibly individualistic, such as those that provide 
representation at-large, have been judged unconstitutional precisely because they 
fail to provide power to, and thus invidiously abridge the rights of, voters of certain 
groups.7
It bears noting, however, that the act of aggregating voters into groups for 
the purpose of districting is distinct from assigning rights to, or recognizing 
collective interests of, groups themselves.8 The U.S. Supreme Court emphatically 
denied in Shaw v. Hunt that the “right to an undiluted vote . . . belongs to the 
minority as a group and not to its individual members. It does not.”9 Aggregating 
voters by group is said to provide each voter with a meaningful vote. As will be seen 
in the next section, to deny such aggregation to some but not others, as through 
“cracking” and “stacking,” is to deny them a form of individual equality -  what this 
thesis calls “interest” egalitarianism.
Though liberals permit group aggregation for purposes of representation, 
they may not accept certain types of aggregations. This acceptance will hinge on the 
kind of group being recognized and, sometimes, the overtness of that recognition. As 
noted above, the most common method of aggregating voters in North America is by 
geographic proximity, i.e., districting by territory. This requires eschewing 
“blindness” only so voters may be grouped based on the commonality of where they 
live. Liberals typically accept that voters who share a geographic region, and thus
7 Samuel Issacharoff, Pam ela Karlan and Richard Pildes, The Law o f  Dem ocracy: Legal Structures o f  
the Political Process, 3rd ed. (New York: Foundation Press, 2 0 0 7 )  , 5 3 8 -5 4 5 .
8 H eather K. Gerken, “Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote,” Harvard Law Review  1 1 4 , no. 6 
(2 0 0 1 )  : 1 6 6 3 -1 7 4 3 .
9 Shaw  v. Hunt, 5 1 7  U.S. 8 9 9  (1 9 9 6 )  , 9 17 .
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presumably the interests and concerns of that region, should also share a 
representative.10 Indeed, geographic representation has sometimes been considered 
the preeminent apportionment value: Until 1790 in Delaware, for example, three 
state senators and seven state representatives were elected from each county, 
regardless of population.11 Today, traditional districting principles such as 
contiguity and compactness underscore the widespread acceptance of geographic 
aggregation.12
However, proximity need not be the sole method by which to meaningfully 
group voters. Representation may be apportioned to voters who, in addition to 
living near one another, form a “community of interest.” Liberals usually condone, 
and may even insist upon, grouping voters by community-of-interest-related factors 
that correspond easily with proximity, such as socio-economic level, cultural 
heritage, employment type, or municipal residence. Such aggregations lead to 
districts that are, for instance, predominantly blue collar, or Italian-American, or 
composed of military personnel, or limited to residents of a specific city or county. 
As well, in party-based political systems, it is generally seen as inevitable, and 
perhaps essential, that voters be aggregated with an eye toward their party 
affiliation. In the view of apportionment scholars such as Bernard Grofman, this 
practice is not illiberal if done in a neutral manner, such that the resulting share of 
representatives of each party accurately reflects the partisan breakdown of the 
electorate overall.13
Less palatable are groupings that hinge on immutable, politically divisive 
traits such as race.14 Such aggregations are of course illiberal when they dilute the 
power of underrepresented minorities, “cracking” or “swamping” them into racial-
10 Alan Stew art, “Community of Interest in Redistricting,” in Drawing the Map: Equality and Efficacy o f  
the Vote in Canadian Electoral Boundary Reform, ed. David Small (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1 9 9 1 ) ,
188 .
11 Robert G. Dixon, Dem ocratic Representation: Reapportionm ent in Law and Politics, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1 9 6 8 ) , 60.
12 Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law o f  Democracy, 6 3 4 -6 3 6 .
13 Bernard Grofman, “Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective,” UCLA Law Review  33 , no.
1 (1 9 8 5 )  .
14 Benjamin Forest, “Electoral Redistricting and Minority Political R epresentation in Canada and the 
United States,” The Canadian G eographer 56 , no. 3 (2 0 1 2 )  .
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majority-controlled districts. These are classic racial gerrymanders, violating both 
individualism (group blindness) and egalitarianism (individual equality) . A more 
difficult problem arises with so-called affirmative racial gerrymanders, where race­
conscious districting is used to bolster the voting power of underrepresented 
minorities. Over the years the U.S. Supreme Court has hotly debated this practice. 
Supporters argue that engineering African-American or Latino-majority districts is 
no different than creating districts whose dominant “communities of interest” are 
Italian-Americans or military personnel. Indeed, they suggest that to provide the 
latter groups with purpose-built districts, while denying blacks and Hispanics the 
same opportunity, is egregiously discriminatory. Critics, however, suggest that race- 
based lawmaking, even when ostensibly ameliorative, is always suspect.15 When 
used in redistricting, they say, it causes “expressive harms,”16 reifying racial 
divisions and communicating to lawmakers that they represent only one race or 
another. This is especially the case, they maintain, when affirmative gerrymanders 
defy geographic compactness, resulting in odd-shaped districts.17
4.2.2 The second axis: egalitarianism
As liberalism rests on the political equality of individuals, then a maximally liberal 
apportionment scheme would provide equal representation. But as political theorist 
Hanna Pitkin famously observed, representation is a concept that can be understood 
in various ways.18 How one understands representation will affect whether one 
feels it has been apportioned equally. I suggest there are many dimensions of 
representational egalitarianism, of which I will discuss six: Formal equality,
15 W hy do liberals look askance a t affirmative racial aggregation while perm itting aggregation by 
dwelling-place, class or party? I suggest th at the latter categories, being based on m utable factors, are 
the kinds of “com m unities of interest” th at classical liberals like Jam es Madison defended as essential 
to protecting individual rights in dem ocracy. Madison famously imagined th at Am erican majorities 
would in reality be ever-shifting coalitions of m inorities, and th at no single group would ever be so 
dom inant as to dare engage in tyranny. Aggregations based on im mutable qualities, like race, are by 
th at theory undesirable because they m ay reify divisions and thus encourage m ajoritarianism . For 
m ore, see Guinier, “[E]racing Dem ocracy.”
16 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 152 .
17 Bruce E. Cain, The Reapportionm ent Puzzle (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 8 4 )  , 66.
18 Hanna Pitkin, The Concept o f  Representation  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 6 7 ) .
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substantive equality, “community of interest” equality, “stakeholder” equality, 
partisan equality and voting-system equality.
Formal equality is sometimes said to result when apportionment adheres to 
the principle of representation by population, also known as “rep by pop” or “one 
person, one vote.” Under strict “rep by pop,” representatives are elected by and/or 
represent equal numbers -  of people, or citizens, or registered voters, etc.19 This 
purportedly gives electors equal “power” to affect election outcomes or provides 
constituents with equal “weight” when their representatives cast votes. When 
districts are not equipopulous, they are said to be malapportioned. Voters in 
districts that have a greater population than average are said to be 
“underrepresented” and their voting power “diluted.” Voters in low-population 
districts are in turn “overrepresented.” If one district has just half as many voters as 
elsewhere, those voters’ formal voting power may be said to be double. Critics 
maintain this is no more acceptable than if each of those voters’ ballots were 
counted twice. Among liberal democracies, this view is most closely associated with 
the United States, where, within each state, formal numeric equality is required. 
Other liberal democracies show somewhat less concern for “rep by pop.” Australia 
permits ridings to deviate from parity by as much as plus or minus 10 percent. Most 
of Canada observes a rough plus or minus 25-percent limit. In the United Kingdom, 
the largest parliamentary constituencies have five-fold the population of the 
smallest.
Of course, formal equality is impossible to achieve. Censuses have margins of 
error, and moreover, certain groups (and thus electoral districts are 
disproportionately prone to being undercounted. As well, as was noted by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in that country’s preeminent redistricting case, Reference 
re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),20 (better known as the Carter
19 For an intriguing discussion of dem ocratic versus republican theories of representation as they  
relate to the question of how  population should be m easured for apportionm ent purposes, see 
Issacharoff, Karlan and Pildes, The Law o f  Dem ocracy, 1 4 4 -4 6 .
20 In Canada, federal or provin cial/territorial governm ents m ay seek advisory opinions from the 
cou rt about the constitutionality of legislation. Decisions rendered by the cou rt on these “reference  
questions” are often called “reference cases.”
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case) “voters die, voters move.”21 This reality makes parity a moving target. Indeed, 
whereas the U.S. requires that “rep by pop” be based on the latest census data, 
Australia conducts reapportionment using projected populations -  a method felt to 
be more egalitarian. Finally, strict adherence to formal equality may be criticized for 
favoring just one understanding of representation: Pitkin’s “liberal” concept, 
whereby representatives compete to advance the subjective interests of their 
district vis-a-vis other districts. As Pitkin notes, the liberal concept augurs in favor 
of representation by population.22 As she also notes, this concept is quite different 
from “Burkean” representation, wherein representatives collaborate to discern the 
objectively optimal path for the jurisdiction at large.23 For the purposes of this thesis 
it bears noting that “consensus”-based governments, including ostensibly that of the 
NWT, are premised on the Burkean model, where formal egalitarianism should be of 
little import.
Even if precise numeric parity was achievable, it is not the only way in which 
apportionment might be considered “equal.” Substantive equality, i.e. equality of 
outcome, is another way. It was U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren who, 
in his majority ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, famously identified the goal of 
apportionment as being “fair and effective representation.”24 Though Warren’s 
ruling enshrined “one person, one vote” as the law of the land, scholars have noted 
that there are many facets of “effective representation,” of which equal-sized 
districting is but one.25
In Canada, “effective representation” carries with it the implication that all 
individuals should have an equal opportunity to receive quality representation. In 
Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1989, Canada’s now-chief justice, 
Beverley McLachlin, identified the two essential functions of representation as the 
“legislative role,” performed when legislators cast votes, and the “ombudsperson
21 R eference re  Prov. Electoral Boundaries (Sask.). 1 9 9 1 . 2 S.C.R. 158 .
22 Pitkin, The Concept o f  R epresentation , 190 .
23 Ibid., 1 88 .
24 Reynolds v. Sims, 3 7 7  U.S. 5 3 3  (1 9 6 4 )  , 5 6 5 -6 6 .
25 Voting-rights scholar Robert Dixon blasted W arren ’s ruling as “a good debater’s trick,” in which the 
judge conflated an objective concept (“one person, one vote” with a subjective, speculative outcom e  
(“effective representation”) . For m ore, see Dixon’s D em ocratic R epresentation, 2 6 9 .
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role,” where representatives act as liaisons between constituents and the 
government, canvassing voters, disseminating public information, providing 
constituent service, and so on.26 The ombudsperson role is often said to be 
unusually difficult in certain types of districts, such as those that are geographically 
large or remote. Egalitarian liberals may thus insist that voters in large or remote 
districts be numerically overrepresented. This practice eschews formalistic parity in 
favor of an alternate parity, in which it is not the “weight” or “power” of voters that 
is equal but the “effectiveness” of representation they receive.
Yet if substantive equality is indeed the true aim of apportionment, then 
electoral-district mapmakers might also be required to adjust for factors other than 
district size and remoteness. These could include voters’ relative wealth, official- 
language fluency, education level, whether a high proportion of them require 
government attention (for instance, if they are immigrants or aged) , whether 
government-service agencies are present in their district, and so on. (Critics, 
meanwhile, maintain that none of these disparities are best remedied by 
overrepresentation. They propose, for instance, that rural representatives might be 
given larger travel budgets, or provided with additional constituency offices, 
allowing them to provide “effective representation” with no need for 
malapportionment.
Finally, to achieve substantive equality, mapmakers might need to adjust for 
variations in constituencies’ expectations of their representatives. Pitkin, for 
instance, discerns between certain forms of descriptive representation, where 
representatives are expected to thoroughly canvass voters and dutifully report their 
wishes to the government (she sees this as but a step away from “direct 
democracy” ,27 versus representation in which elected officials are authorized by 
voters to act on their behalf.28 Apropos this distinction, Dacks has observed that in 
the pre-division NWT, Indigenous peoples demanded something like the former sort 
of representation: “They would prefer MLAs to consult them on all important
26 Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1 9 8 9  2 4 8  (BC SC) , 29 .
27 Pitkin, The Concept o f  R epresentation , 84.
28 Ibid., 1 16 .
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issues.”29 Settlers, meanwhile, expected the less-arduous, latter form of 
representation. It can easily be seen that where districts are formally equal, and 
thus equipopulous, “descriptive” representatives would be disadvantaged vis-a-vis 
“authorized” representatives, with the former less able than the latter to provide 
what their respective constituencies would deem “effective” representation.30
A third dimension of representational egalitarianism is “community of 
interest” equality. As noted previously, voters who share politically salient concerns 
form “communities of interest.” Where such “communities of interest” are “cracked” 
or “stacked,” voters’ ability to elect their favored candidate, and thus to have their 
politically salient concerns addressed, may be diminished. They thus suffer unequal 
treatment vis-a-vis members of other, unimpaired communities of interest. As 
political scientist Robert Dixon observes, an apportionment process that achieves 
perfect numeric parity and yet thwarts the political ambitions of voters belonging to 
certain interest groups while favoring those of others is in no way egalitarian.31
Clearly, representation that takes into account “community of interest” need 
not always violate mathematical equality. In the U.S., despite the absolutism of “one 
person, one vote,” electors are aggregated to at least some extent by “community of 
interest.” However, where apportionment is not constrained by parity 
requirements, “community of interest” egalitarianism may permit, or even require, 
non-equipopulous districting.32 Scholars and jurists have speculated that Canada’s 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms not only allows but mandates the creation of 
districts for small but distinct communities of interest, in order to provide voters
29 Gurston Dacks, “Political R epresentation in the N orthw est T erritories,” in R epresentation and 
Electoral Systems, eds. J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 
1 9 9 0  , 139 .
30 The distinction being drawn here is not the well-known distinction betw een “delegate” (a.k.a. 
“liberal” and “tru stee” (a.k.a. “Burkean” representation. Pitkin sees both delegates and trustees as 
falling within the “authorization” school, as both are authorized to act on the behalf of their electors. 
Under the form of descriptive representation required by Indigenous NWT residents, how ever, 
elected officials are not so much actors as “rep orters,” expected to dutifully convey the people’s will 
to the governm ent. Says Pitkin, “That is why theorists of descriptive representation so often argue 
th at the function of a representative assem bly is talking rath er than acting, deliberating rath er than  
governing.” See her, The Concept o f  R epresentation , 84.
31 Dixon, D em ocratic Representation, 272 .
32 Nicholas O. Stephanopolous, “Our Electoral Exceptionalism ,” University o f  Chicago Law Review  80  
(2 0 1 3  : 816 .
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therein with “effective representation.” Canadian electoral boundaries commissions 
have acted on this assumption. For many years the Nova Scotia provincial riding of 
Preston provided voters in an Afro-Canadian “community of interest” with a 
“protected seat.”33 In 2013, Preston’s population was approximately half that of the 
provincial average, granting its constituents significant overrepresentation. 
Conversely, aggregating voters by “community of interest” has sometimes justified 
their underrepresentation. In the federal reapportionment of 1991, the Inuit of 
northern Quebec successfully lobbied to be transferred from a lower-population, 
less-Aboriginal riding to a higher-population, more-Aboriginal riding, preferencing 
meaningful group-aggregation over raw numeric voting power.34
A fourth dimension of representational egalitarianism is what might be 
called “stakeholder” equality. Stakeholder equality is premised on the common 
conviction that voting is a right because individuals inherently deserve a say in the 
laws that affect them. This was the inspiration behind such pro-democratic rallying 
cries as “No taxation without representation” and “Old enough to fight, old enough 
to vote.” But why, then, is the right to vote shared equally? Clearly, laws’ effects are 
not shared equally.35 To suggest that where one person will be affected and another 
unaffected, both should have equal say, undermines the justification of the right to 
vote. Instead, says political scientist Ian Shapiro, “those whose basic interests are 
most vitally affected by a particular decision have the strongest claim to a say in its 
making.”36 This was the logic behind the historical denial of “universal manhood 
suffrage,” whereby landed classes who claimed to bear the greatest burden of 
government decisions reserved the franchise to themselves. Today one can see less 
controversial applications of “stakeholder” egalitarianism. Most notable are 
durational and “bona fide” residency requirements, whereby an individual cannot 
cast a ballot in a jurisdiction where their residence has been deemed too brief or too 
tenuous for them to possess “stake” in election outcomes. Apportionment, too, may
33 Jennifer Smith and Lori Turnbull, “On the Cusp of Change: The Nova Scotia House of Assembly,” 
Canadian Parliam entary Review  31 , no. 2 (2 0 0 8 )  : 15.
34 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 128 .
35 R obert E. Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and its Alternatives,” Philosophy & Public 
Affairs 35 , no. 1 (2 0 0 7 )  , 48.
36 Ian Shapiro, Dem ocratic Justice  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1 9 9 9 ) , 37.
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be conducted with an eye toward “stakeholder” egalitarianism. Where district sizes 
are based on equal populations not of “persons” but of citizens, or registered voters, 
or even active voters,37 some might argue that “stakeholder” egalitarianism is 
enhanced, as qualifying to be a citizen, or better yet a voter, or even better an 
engaged voter, can be read as a proxy for “stake.”38 This was indeed the theory used 
by Hawaii when, to prevent the voting power of “stakeholders” on Oahu from being 
improperly amplified by the island’s large transient military population, the state 
based apportionment not on population but on registered voters.39 In 1966, in Burns 
v. Richardson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld Hawaii’s decision. In doing so, the high 
court affirmed, in effect, that where a jurisdiction contains many transients, and also 
a distinctly non-transient population, apportioning voting power to both 
aggregations equally will abuse the “stakeholder” equality of the latter, invidiously 
harming those with a greater stake and arguably perverting the very purpose of the 
right to vote.
For the purpose of this thesis, it is suggested that the importance of 
“stakeholder” egalitarianism is even further amplified where transients and non­
transients are starkly divided; where for non-transients the jurisdiction in which 
they seek influence is their ancestral homeland; where transients are clearly 
exogenous and enjoy a “right of exit”40 to various other liberal-democratic sub-units 
in the state; where the government is nascent and at an evolutionary crux point; and 
where the decisions “at stake” involve not mere day-to-day legislative matters but
37 This is, uniquely, the practice in Belarus, w here apportionm ent is based on the voter turnout in the 
previous election. For m ore see Lisa Handley et al., “Delimitation Equity Project: Resource Guide,” 
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (2 0 0 6 )  , 28 ,
h ttp ://w w w .ifes.org /~ Z m ed ia/Files/P u b lication s/M an u alH an d b ook /2006/292/D elim itation s_M an  
ual_full.pdf (accessed March 6, 2 0 1 5 )  .
38 Ronald Keith Gaddie, Justin J. W ert and Charles S. Bullock III, “Seats, Votes, Citizens and the One- 
Person, One-Vote Problem ,” Stanford Law and Policy Review  22  no. 2 (2 0 1 2 )  , 433 .
39 Kent. D. Krabill and Jerem y A. Fielding, “No More W eighting: One Persons, One Vote Means One 
Person, One Vote,” Texas Review o f  Law and Politics 1 6  No. 2 (2 0 1 2 )  , 280 .
40 Helder de Schutter praises federalism as the m ost “fair” governm ental arrangem ent in part 
because the presence of multiple jurisdictions in a single state provides residents who feel oppressed  
under the asym m etric laws of one jurisdiction with the “right of exit” into som e other, m ore  
sym m etric jurisdictions. See de Schutter, “Federalism  as Fairness,” Journal o f  Political Philosophy 19 , 
no. 2 (2 0 1 1  .
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foundational, long-term constitutional questions.41 (Also for the purpose of this 
thesis, it is noteworthy that in voting-fraud parlance, the act of improperly skewing 
an election outcome by importing non-residents to cast ballots is called 
“colonization.”42
A fifth dimension of representational egalitarianism is partisan equality. In 
most liberal democracies, voters organize to achieve political ends through political 
parties. Voters’ equality may thus be abridged through unfair weighting of their 
partisan interests. Unfair weighting is, infamously, the aim of partisan 
gerrymandering. Even where all districts are perfectly equipopulous, boundaries 
may be configured to exaggerate the power of one party vis-a-vis others.43 In the 
United States, apportionment is felt by some to be at a crisis point, with party 
operatives bluntly stating that artful boundary-rigging has “basically do[ne] away 
with the need for elections.”44 Yet American judges have largely declined to 
intercede, citing an absence of standards by which to police the practice.45 In 
Canada, the situation is different. Independent electoral boundaries commissions 
now apportion Parliament and provincial and territorial assemblies. Even in 
jurisdictions where legislators may override commissions’ decisions, they seldom 
do.46 As will be seen, the NWT reapportionment in 1998-99 was a rare exception.
41 The con cept of stakeholder egalitarianism  is captured in a statem en t issued by the NWT’s Akaitcho 
First Nation when it refused to participate in a 1 9 9 5  conference aimed a t designing a territorial 
constitution: “W e will not condone persons with no in terest in our lands to dictate our future. For 
instance, the City of Yellowknife has been assigned 12 delegates for this conference, as opposed to 
the seven delegates assigned to the [Akaitcho], the rightful and legitim ate governm ent of these  
lands.” See Constitutional Developm ent Steering Committee, W orking Toward Consensus: Conference 
Report, First Constitutional Conference, W estern NW T  (Yellowknife: Constitutional Development 
Steering Committee, 1 9 9 5  , 12.
42 John A. MacLeod and Merle F. W ilberding, “State Voting Residency Requirem ents and Civil Rights,” 
George W ashington Law Review  38 , no. 1 (1 9 6 9 )  , 94.
43 Grofman, “Criteria for Districting, 90.
44 Andrew  Gumbel, Steal This Vote: Dirty Elections and the Rotten History o f  D em ocracy in Am erica  
(New York: Nation Books, 2 0 0 5 )  , 44.
45 New York Times, “D em ocracy Takes a Hit,” April 29 , 2 0 0 4 ,
h ttp ://w w w .n y tim es.co m /2004 /04 /29 /o p in io n /d em o cracy -tak es-a -h it.h tm l (accessed  Feb. 8,
2 0 1 5  .
46 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 1 16 . Legislatures can, how ever, constrain com m issions’ decisions 
in various ways, including by fixing the num ber of seats in the assem bly or by requiring th at 
com m issions take into accou nt considerations ranging from the com m onplace, such as “geography,” 
to the unusual, such as Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit -  Inuit traditional knowledge.
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A final dimension of representational egalitarianism may be called “voting 
system” equality. According to Dixon, the purpose of government is to establish a set 
of power relationships “where a part may conclude the whole.”47 This poses perhaps 
the most intractable problem for egalitarian representation. If part of the people 
may make decisions for the whole, what part? A plurality? Majority? Supermajority? 
Different political systems provide different answers, some more egalitarian than 
others. In a three-way race for a single-member district decided by winner-take-all 
voting, a bare plurality of voters may choose for everyone in the district who the 
district’s representative will be. If the same occurs in a majority of other districts, a 
party with comparatively little popular support can dominate the legislature 
outright. As Dixon observes, these sorts of “majority-exaggerating” effects at the 
district level, and “pyramiding” effects at the legislative level, overrepresent the 
interests of some voters while all but silencing others. He deems this an especially 
insidious form of malapportionment,48 stating, “A mathematically equal vote which 
is politically worthless because of . . . winner-take-all districting is as deceiving as 
‘emperor’s clothes.’”49
4.2.3 The third axis: universalism
Questions such as those discussed above, concerning whether and how to respect 
the liberal principles of group-blindness and egalitarianism in the apportionment of 
representation, may arise in unitary as well as federal states and in mononational as 
well as multinational states. However, it is essential in this thesis to examine an 
additional dimension of representation applicable only to federal, multinational or 
other “divided” states. This dimension gauges whether representation is 
apportioned to voters as members of a unified demos or, if not, in what manner 
representation is apportioned to distinct, non-universal polities.
As discussed previously, in non-universal states, internal polities such as 
national minorities may demand, and be rightfully owed, “external protections.”
47 Dixon, D em ocratic Representation, 38.
48 Ibid., 17.
49 Ibid., 22 .
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Where “external protections” include consociational power-sharing, either direct or 
indirect, then shares of political power, usually in the form of representation, must 
be apportioned to each consociating polity. Uniquely in this sort of apportionment, 
individual voters are not aggregated into groups for the purpose of facilitating 
individual voting rights. Rather, representation is apportioned to groups as groups, 
much in the same way as sovereign states are apportioned one seat each at the 
United Nations. Non-universal apportionment not only compromises group- 
blindness but also abridges individual voter parity. However, these violations of 
group-blindness and egalitarianism, unlike those that occur in a unified polity, are 
an epiphenomenal consequence of non-universalism.
In North America the most familiar example of multi-demoi apportionment is 
the representational scheme of the U.S. Senate, in which every state, no matter its 
population, is guaranteed two senators.50 This is deeply inegalitarian, providing 
voters in the smallest state, Wyoming, with approximately fifty times the voting 
“power” as those in the largest state, California. This inequality is the product of the 
underlying non-universalism of senatorial representation. It violates liberal 
universalism because it accords primacy to the individual states as “historic 
associations” predating, and “cultural forms” distinct from, the unified American 
demos. Chief Justice Warren recognized this undergirding non-universalism when, 
referencing senatorial apportionment in Reynolds v. Sims, he noted that “at the heart 
of our constitutional system remains the concept of separate and distinct 
governmental entities which have delegated some, but not all, of their formerly held
50 The Senate is not the only exam ple of high-level non-universalism  in the U.S. political system . 
Am erican presidential elections are notoriously non-universal, as the Electoral College accords 
disproportionate voting pow er to electors in less-populous states. Clearly non-universal is the lack of 
substantive Congressional representation  for W ashington D.C. and all U.S. territories and 
possessions. And even U.S. House of R epresentative districts are skewed by non-universalism : 
Though the districts within each state m ust be equipopulous, the size of districts betw een  states 
varies dram atically, since each state m ust have a t least one representative and since no d istrict may 
cross state lines. As a consequence, the least populous House districts, those of Rhode Island, 
currently have barely half the voters of the m ost populous district, Montana. And of course, these  
exam ples of Am erican non-universalism  pale in com parison to the non-universalism  of the country’s 
past, when, for instance, slave states w ere perm itted to apportion blacks as three-fifths of a person, 
slave and free states w ere adm itted to the union in consociational pairs, tw o-by-tw o, and various 
peoples, ranging from the aforem entioned blacks to Native Am ericans to Asians w ere denied the 
right to vote on the grounds th at they could not be citizens.
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powers to the single national government.”51 For the states, this arrangement was a 
precondition of the American founding. Thus, despite the U.S.’s otherwise strict 
adherence to “one person, one vote,” senatorial apportionment is constitutionally 
protected.
Similarly anti-universal apportionment requirements are built into the fabric 
of federal Canada, where the “Senate floor” and “grandfather” clauses guarantee 
Parliamentary overrepresentation in varying degrees to certain provinces. 
According to political scientist Russell Alan Williams, “right from Confederation, a 
norm emerged that the allocation of seats in Parliament was to provinces, rather 
than to Canadian voters.”52 Anti-universal apportionment is further seen in the 
consociational regimes of places ranging from Northern Ireland53 to Bosnia- 
Herzegovina54 to Lebanon,55 and to certain “ethno-republics” in Russia, which, to 
reverse Soviet-era “Russification,” have pressed for republic elections to be open 
only to members of the local ethnicity.56
In multination states composed of settlers and Indigenous peoples, non- 
universal representational protections are similarly widespread, either shielding 
Native national minorities from political domination by staatsvolk or, at the very 
least, guaranteeing them power disproportionate to their numbers. Indigenous 
Fijians,57 New Zealand Maori58 and various constitutionally recognized “scheduled 
tribes” in India59 enjoy such guarantees. Even in the U.S. territory of American 
Samoa, the upper house of the legislature is reserved for tribally appointed 
Indigenous chiefs -  an arrangement which, though illiberal, has yet to be struck
51 Reynolds v. Sims, 3 7 7  U.S. 5 3 3  (1 9 6 4 )  , 377 .
52 Russell Alan Williams, “Canada’s System of R epresentation in Crisis: The ‘2 7 9  Form ula’ and Federal 
Electoral Redistributions,” The A m erican Review o f  Canadian Studies Spring (2 0 0 5 )  : 103 .
53 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 11.
54 Sujit Choudhry, Constitutional Design fo r  Divided Societies: Integration or A ccom m odation? (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 8 )  , 34.
55 Stephanopolous, “Our Electoral Exceptionalism ,” 8 3 8 .
56 Graham Smith, “Russia, Ethnoregionalism , and the Politics of Federation,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 
19, no. 2 (1 9 9 6 )  : 4 0 5 .
57 Yash Pal Ghai, “Constitutional A sym m etries: Communal Representation, Federalism  and Cultural 
Autonom y,” in The A rchitecture o f  D em ocracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict M anagem ent and  
Dem ocracy, ed. Andrew  Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 2 )  , 150 .
58 Stephanopolous, “Our Electoral Exceptionalism ,” 838 .
59 Louise Tillin, “United in Diversity? A sym m etry in Indian Federalism ,” Publius: The Journal o f  
Federalism  37 , no. 1 (2 0 0 7 )  .
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down.60 However, in Canada, the integration of such non-universal Indigenous 
protections into apportionment has been fraught with controversy.
As noted earlier, Indigenous peoples were autonomous and self-governing 
before being non-consensually incorporated into Canada. Various treaties and 
declarations acknowledge their past and present non-universal status and provide 
them with “external protections.” The Royal Proclamation of 1763 promised 
protection of Aboriginal peoples and preservation of their unceded lands. Section 
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 transferred responsibility for Aboriginal 
peoples from the British monarch to the Canadian federal government.61 The 
“numbered treaties,” struck between 1871 and 1921, promised to Aboriginals such 
benefits as reserve lands and annuities in exchange for either the surrender of their 
historic territories (in the federal government’s view or peace and friendship 
(according to Aboriginal signatories) .62 As early as the 1950s, Canadian courts ruled 
that the federal government has a unique fiduciary responsibility toward Aboriginal 
peoples.63 Then, in the Constitution Act, 1982, and in the accompanying Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms, two key Indigenous “external protection” rights were 
recognized. Section 25 of the Charter, anticipating clashes between individual rights 
and collective Indigenous rights, shielded the latter from the former. Called the non­
derogation clause, section 25 states that other Charter rights “shall not be construed 
so as to abrogate or derogate from any Aboriginal, treaty or other rights or 
freedoms that pertain to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.” Meanwhile, Section 35 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 was eventually interpreted to affirm a positive right to 
Indigenous self-government.
Section 35 states that Aboriginal Canadians possess unspecified “existing 
rights.” In 1992, the Charlottetown Accord acknowledged an Aboriginal “inherent
60 Michael W. W eaver, “The T erritory  Federal Jurisdiction Forgot: The Question of Greater Federal 
Jurisdiction in Am erican Samoa,” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 17 , no. 2 (2 0 0 8 )  : 325 .
61 Royal Commission on Electoral Reform, Reform ing Electoral Dem ocracy, 180 .
62 For exam ple, the Akaitcho First Nation describes T reaty  8 as “an international peace treaty  
negotiated betw een tw o sovereign nations.” For m ore see Constitutional Developm ent Steering 
Committee, Working Toward Consensus: C onference Report, First Constitutional Conference, Western 
NW T  (Yellowknife: Constitutional Developm ent Steering Committee, 1 9 9 5 )  , 12.
63 St. Ann's Island Shooting & Fishing Club Ltd. v. R., [1 9 5 0 ] S.C.R. 2 1 1 ; [1 9 5 2 ] 2 D.L.R. 2 2 5 , a t 2 32 .
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right of self-government” (though the accord failed after being put to a referendum) . 
Then, in 1995, the government of Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced the 
“Inherent Right Policy.” The policy acknowledged that section 35 provides an 
Indigenous right to self-government and proposed how this right might be 
implemented in different parts of Canada. It affirmed the desire of many First 
Nations to establish “their own government on their land base.”64 Such ethno- 
exclusive Aboriginal self-governments would relate to Ottawa and the provinces in a 
relationship that has been termed “treaty federalism.”65 In the North, however, the 
policy urged that self-government be expressed through the public territorial 
governments, in which Aboriginals would be accorded “specific guarantees.” These 
guarantees can be understood as “external protections.” As Abele observes, this 
option has so far been utilized just once, through the creation of the territory of 
Nunavut.66 There, the seminal “external protection” is the territorial boundary, 
drawn to accord local Inuit with a supermajority, thus all but ensuring their self­
determination and limited autonomy.
4.3 Adjudicating apportionment in Canada: first- and second-axis questions
When according representation in a rights-based democracy, may liberal principles 
be compromised? If yes, in what ways, and to what degree? As noted previously, in 
Canada apportionment decisions were for decades left largely to legislators and 
boundaries commissioners. But with the adoption of the Charter, apportionment 
became judicable.
In Canada, first-axis apportionment questions, relating to liberal 
individualism, have provoked little controversy. May (or must) apportionment 
depart from group-blindness, and in what way? As representatives in Canada are
64 Governm ent of Canada, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Governm ent o f  Canada's Approach to 
Im plem entation o f  the Inherent Right and Negotiation o f  A boriginal Self-Government (Ottawa: 
Governm ent of Canada, 1 9 9 5 )  , P art II.
65 Graham W hite, “T reaty  Federalism  in Northern Canada: Aboriginal-Governm ent Land Claims 
Boards,” Publius: The Journal o f  Federalism  32 , no. 3 (2 0 0 2 )  .
66 Frances Abele, “Aboriginal Peoples in Northern Canada: The Peaceful Revolution Meets Global 
Capital,” in The Canadian North: E m bracing Change, ed. Centre for Research and Information on 
Canada (M ontreal: Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2 0 0 2 )  , 574 .
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elected from contiguous geographical districts, voters must be aggregated by 
proximity. Moreover, in affirming such districting principles as “community of 
interest” and “minority representation,”67 Canadian courts have confirmed that the 
Charter rejects “blindness” in favor of other, non-geographic groupings. The limits of 
such aggregation have barely been tested. For instance, while it appears that 
districts based on racial, religious and linguistic minority status are permissible,68 
only a few cases -  including Raiche v. Canada, to be discussed in greater detail below 
-  have explored the degree to which such aggregation may, or indeed must, 
compromise other districting principles.
Second-axis questions, meanwhile, have in Canada been legally contentious. 
As noted above, such questions relate to liberal egalitarianism: May an 
apportionment scheme treat voters unequally? Prior to 1982, departure from 
formal egalitarianism was sometimes considerable, with rural ridings commonly 
overrepresented vis-a-vis urban ones. Adoption of the Charter, however, resulted in 
a number of malapportionment challenges, including the aforementioned climactic 
1991 Carter decision. Carter saw the Supreme Court examine an earlier ruling in 
which the Saskatchewan Court of Appeals had invalidated a provincial 
apportionment scheme for departing too far from parity.69 Ruling for the majority, 
Justice McLachlin disagreed. She insisted that the Charter be read in a “broad and 
purposive way, having regard to historical and social context.” Such a reading, she 
argued, showed that the absolutist standard of “one person, one vote” was neither a 
Canadian tradition nor the intent of the drafters of section 3. Instead, she declared 
that the right to vote guarantees “not equality of voting power per se, but the right 
to ‘effective representation.’” While “relative parity of voting power” is the principal 
requirement of effective representation, deviations from parity are permissible,
67 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 159 .
68 Ibid., 1 68 .
69 R obert G. Richards and Thom as Irvine, “Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries: An Analysis,” 
in Drawing Boundaries: Legislatures, Courts and Electoral Values, ed. John. C. Courtney et al. 
(Saskatoon: Fifth House, 1 9 9 2 )  , 52. According to Richards and Irvine, interested parties in the 
N orthw est Territories waded into Carter on opposite sides of the case. While the territorial justice  
m inister participated as an intervenor to press for the reversal of the low er cou rt’s decision, a group 
of concerned NWT citizens made the con trary  argum ent, acting as intervenors in support of one- 
person, one-vote.
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even essential, if they provably contribute to the concept she had established in 
Dixon -  that of “better government.”70 McLachlin emphasized that “effective 
representation” must take into account not just formal but also substantive equality, 
and, as noted above, must consider the “effective representation” needs of various 
sorts of voter aggregations. Further, given the light touch required to discern if 
representation will indeed be “effective,” she urged judges to show deference 
toward the decisions of electoral-district mapmakers “unless it appears that 
reasonable persons applying appropriate principles . . . could not have set the 
electoral boundaries as they exist.”
The Carter ruling had multiple ramifications. On one hand, it indicated that 
the apportionment standard of “one person, one vote,” preeminent in the U.S., would 
in Canada take a back seat to the more nuanced principle of effective representation. 
On the other hand, as the first Supreme Court ruling to address apportionment, 
Carter announced that arbitrary or egregious departures from parity would no 
longer be tolerated. Finally, by refusing to provide a quantitative pan-Canadian 
guideline for permissible deviation, and insisting that the Charter be read with an 
eye toward “historical and social context,” Carter indicated that each case must be 
adjudicated qualitatively, as shaped by the circumstances of the jurisdiction in 
question. In essence, the court held that an electoral-boundary scheme providing 
“effective representation” in one place might not do so in another.
As a consequence of Carter, the balance between meaningful aggregation and 
formal equality varies by jurisdiction. Still, subsequent lower-court decisions have 
affirmed (if not enshrined) a rough quantitative guideline for permissible deviation 
from parity: +/-25 percent.71 (Parliament and six of Canada’s ten provinces have 
adopted this guideline as their legal standard. Three provinces have tighter 
guidelines. Writing in 2001, Courtney reported that just one province, Nova Scotia, 
exhibited a looser, unofficial pattern of +/-33.3. Canada’s territories have not
70 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, 159 .
71 In Canadian redistricting, deviations from parity are expressed in percentages by which a riding’s 
population exceeds, or is exceeded by, the jurisdiction’s “electoral quotient,” i.e., the average 
population of its ridings. Ridings with populations above quotient are said to be underrepresented; 
ridings below  quotient are overrepresented.
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legislated fixed guidelines.72) Under the +/-25 percent standard, “effective 
representation” may be pursued through the formation of districts that vary in 
population as much as 25 percent above or below the provincial/territorial average. 
The courts have suggested that deviations beyond this limit are unconstitutional, 
except in the case of legal outliers.
In these “exceptional circumstances,” faced mainly by low-population islands 
and remote regions, deviations below -25 percent are permitted (indeed, possibly 
even required) . Establishing uniquely lenient apportionment standards for such 
places is, in legal scholar Kent Roach’s memorable phrase, “as Canadian as maple 
syrup.”73 In provincial legislation and practice, such special cases fall into two 
categories. In the first, exceptional districts must not drop below a specific limit of 
overrepresentation. For instance, the two districts comprising northern 
Saskatchewan are held to a dejure  limit of -50 percent, meaning their population 
can be no less than half the provincial average. In the second category, exceptional 
districts are held to no explicit limit. Thus, in the Yukon, the tiny, remote village of 
Old Crow has long enjoyed its own standalone district, Vuntut. Vuntut’s permissible 
departure from parity is not stipulated in law.74
However, exceptionally small districts may face a significant judicial 
constraint. In some provinces and territories, lower courts have permitted 
“exceptional” overrepresentation only when it does not cause concomitant 
“exceptional” underrepresentation. A district may not be unusually small if it results 
in others being too big. The Alberta Court of Appeals articulated this rule when, in 
Reference re Order in Council O.C. 91/91 in Respect o f  the Electoral Boundaries 
Commission Act, usually called the Alberta Reference Case, it drew upon Carter to 
state, “No argument for effective representation of one group legitimizes under­
72 Courtney, Commissioned Ridings, Table 6.2.
73 Ibid., 42 .
74 Nor is Old Crow included when calculating the Yukon’s territorial electoral quotient. This is, 
frankly, a bit of sleight-of-hand. Determining the electoral quotient based on just 18  ridings, rather  
than the Yukon’s true 19 , masks underrepresentation of large electoral districts. For exam ple, in the 
Yukon’s 2 0 0 8  reapportionm ent, rem oval of Old Crow resulted in a stated territorial electoral 
quotient of 1 1 4 8  (2 0 ,6 5 8  + 1 8 ) , w hereas the true quotient was 1 0 9 6  (2 0 ,8 2 8  + 1 9 ) . Under the form er, 
“official” quotient, the deviation from parity of the largest proposed district, W hitehorse Centre, was 
+ 19.3  percent. Using the true quotient, how ever, its deviation was + 24 .8  percent.
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representation of another group.”75 In provinces with proportionally few 
“exceptional” districts, such as Saskatchewan, this balance is easy to achieve, as the 
departure from parity of the few small ridings will have little mathematical impact 
on the nearness-to-parity of the many normal-sized ridings. As will be seen, 
however, in jurisdictions with few overall districts and numerous candidates for 
“exceptional” status, the creation of “exceptional” districts becomes more 
problematic. If the size of such a legislature is fixed, the formation of exceptionally 
low-population districts will be constrained by the need to keep down the 
populations of larger districts. If the size of the legislature is not fixed, low- 
population districts can be accommodated by concomitantly adding seats in above­
parity regions -  but of course, each extra seat in above-parity regions will water 
down the relative exceptionalism of the low-population districts.
4.4 Adjudicating apportionment in Canada: third axis questions
As noted previously, third-axis apportionment questions arise when redistricting 
must grapple with conflicts between liberal universalism and illiberal non- 
universalism. Where representation is apportioned non-universally, the resultant 
districting schemes will violate both individualism and egalitarianism. In the U.S. 
and Canada, where non-universal apportionment is rare, it is these latter, 
epiphenomenal violations -  of parity and group-blindness -  that may be most 
conspicuous. To explore third-axis questions, one must not confuse them with, or 
adjudicate them based on, their impacts on the first and second axis. This is because 
the balancing act required along the third axis is distinct from the more familiar 
apportionment challenges involving parity versus underrepresentation and 
blindness versus group aggregation. Those challenges are already premised on 
universalism, as they arise from the bedrock of a single state demos. But, again, 
universalism is a precondition of the formation of a singular rights-bearing polity. 
Where a state does not enjoy universalism, apportionment must first reckon with 
divisions between demoi. Those in charge of apportionment must decide whether
75 R eference re  O rder in Council O.C. 91 /9 1  in R espect o f  the Electoral Boundaries Commission Act, 1991, 
8 6 th DLR 4 th 4 4 7  (1 9 9 1 )  .
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power, in the form of representation, will be shared (and to what degree) , or 
whether it will be denied to groups qua groups. The appropriateness of such 
decisions must be adjudicated along the third axis before being considered along the 
second or first. As states containing Indigenous and settler populations by definition 
do not enjoy universalism, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” involves a contest over voting 
rights straddling two demoi. Apportionments involving “Kymlicka’s dilemma” 
cannot be properly understood from the perspective of the first two axes.
Sometimes distinguishing third-axis questions is easy, as in the 
aforementioned example of the U.S. Senate, where constitutionally enshrined non- 
universalism clearly shields inegalitarian senatorial apportionment from court 
challenge. Other times, however, what appears to be a third-axis case may not be. 
Many apportionments seek to balance power between discrete factions, but not all 
such factions are polities that can legitimately claim group-based voting rights. That 
is why, in Reynolds v. Sims, the U.S. Supreme Court found that inegalitarian state 
senate apportionment is unconstitutional. Chief Justice Warren, deeming analogies 
to the special case of the U.S. Senate “inapposite,” stated, “Political subdivisions of 
states -  counties, cities, or whatever -  never were and never have been considered 
as sovereign entities.”76
Similarly, in Canada, Carter itself was prompted by a scheme in which the 
Saskatchewan legislature, by imposing “a strict quota of urban and rural ridings,” 
seemed to conceive of these two blocs as akin to “sovereign entities” deserving 
group-based representation. Justice McLachlin found the Saskatchewan scheme 
sufficiently egalitarian and thus, in effect, declared concerns about antecedent non- 
universalism to be moot. But Justice Peter Cory, delivering the court’s minority 
opinion, disagreed, arguing that the “weight” of Saskatchewan’s urban voters had 
been unnecessarily diluted due to the inappropriate non-universalism of the 
urban/rural quota. Stated Cory, “The province has failed to justify the need to 
shackle the commission with the mandatory urban-rural allocation.”77
76 Reynolds v. Sims, 3 7 7  U.S. 5 3 3  (1 9 6 4 )  , 377 .
77 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan).
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Just as Reynolds and Carter involved first- and second-axis illiberalisms that 
unsuccessfully sought third-axis-based exemption, the reverse may also occur. 
Ostensibly first- and second-axis violations may be justified by third-axis 
protections. This was arguably the situation in Raiche v. Canada, a 2004 
apportionment challenge in which Acadian voters in New Brunswick protested an 
apportionment plan that, to increase parity, would have moved them from a 
Francophone-majority district to an Anglophone one. In overturning the scheme, the 
Federal Court of Canada determined that the boundaries commission had erred in 
part by failing to fulfill requirements of the federal Official Languages Act. Those 
requirements, which protect language rights only of Anglophones and 
Francophones, are part of the non-universal fabric of Canadian consociation. Raiche 
ultimately succeeded because Francophones are not a run-of-the-mill “community 
of interest” whose aggregation and overrepresentation facilitate “effective 
representation” (per Carter), but rather because they are a constitutionally 
protected “founding peoples,” and thus a distinct polity whose right to inegalitarian 
overrepresentation flows from, and is shielded by, antecedent non-universalism.78
Raiche may be seen as parallel to a similar, more overtly third-axis case, 
Campbell v. British Columbia, handed down in 2000. There, in what has been called 
Canada’s most significant case involving Aboriginal peoples and section 3 voting 
rights,79 officials representing B.C.’s Liberal opposition had challenged the Nisga’a 
Treaty, a self-government agreement that had been signed between the Nisga’a First 
Nation, Ottawa, and B.C.’s New Democrat-controlled government. The applicants 
maintained that provisions of the treaty abridged Charter-protected voting rights of 
non-Nisga’a. The B.C. Supreme Court affirmed that this was so -  but, it held that such
78 Given the relative scarcity  of p ost-C arter apportionm ent cases in Canada, it is notew orthy th at  
Raiche was the second  time Acadian New Brunsw ickers had challenged an apportionm ent schem e  
th at threatened to diminish their representation in Parliam ent. In the m id-’90s  a sim ilar suit, again 
involving alleged violations of the Official Languages Act, fizzled after a local cou rt w orried th at 
invalidating the impugned ridings would cause “electoral confusion.” For m ore see Courtney, 
Commissioned Ridings, 2 3 2 , and Maxine Leger-Haskell, “Federal Electoral Boundary Redistribution  
and Official Language Minority Representation in Canada” (m aster’s thesis, University of Ottawa, 
2 0 0 9  .
79 Bradford W. Morse, “Tw enty Years of C harter Protection: The Status of Aboriginal Peoples under 
the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedom s," W indsor Yearbook o f  A ccess to Justice  21  (2 0 0 2 )  , 394 .
62
abridgement was protected under the Charter’s section 25 “non-derogation clause,” 
which guarded section 35 Indigenous rights, including self-government, from being 
overridden.80 In effect, then, sections 25 and 35 provided to the Nisga’a the same 
“external protections” that the Official Languages Act had provided to Francophones 
in Raiche -  a shield, guarding non-universal founding polities from first- and second- 
axis charges of voting-rights abuse.
From Reynolds, Carter and Campbell, if not Raiche, one can discern a general 
procedure courts might follow to distinguish third-axis questions from first- or 
second-axis ones. First, as in Carter, a court might determine whether first- or 
second-axis violations exist. If the finding is no, as the Supreme Court majority 
concluded in Carter, then the case need go no further: The scheme is constitutional. 
If, however, first- or second-axis violations are confirmed, then, per the minority in 
Carter, the court must determine if those violations are the epiphenomenal result of 
antecedent third-axis issues. If the answer to this question is no, then the case would 
need to be adjudicated on merely first- or second-axis bases. If, however, third-axis 
issues do exist -  if the jurisdiction potentially comprises multiple voting-rights- 
bearing polities -  a determination must be made as to whether these polities are 
constitutionally protected. Where they are not, as in the case of American counties 
in Reynolds, then the resultant first- and second-axis violations are indefensible. But 
where they are constitutionally legitimate -  i.e., where non-universalism is legally 
protected, as in the case of the U.S. Senate -  then the epiphenomenal first- or 
second-axis violations must presumably be allowed to stand.
I suggest that, unless a court follows the above-outlined process of 
investigation, it is possible that third-axis cases may be mistaken for first- or 
second-axis ones, leading them to be misadjudicated. Again, when an apportionment 
dispute involves a question of voting rights straddling two demoi, as in “Kymlicka’s 
dilemma,” attempts to resolve it from the perspective of only the first two axes will 
result in incoherence. It is further my contention that precisely this problem was
80 Thom as Isaac, “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s: The Challenge of the Individual and 
Collective Rights of Aboriginal People,” The W indsor Yearbook o f  A ccess to Justice  21  (2 0 0 2 )  : 444 .
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encountered by the Supreme Court of the Northwest Territories when, in 1999, it 
adjudicated a climactic apportionment case that hinged on “Kymlicka’s dilemma.”
4.5 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that where Kymlicka’s dilemma arises, the rights 
that are in conflict may relate to the apportionment of democratic representation. 
Conflicts involving representation may usefully be considered along three 
dimensions, corresponding to the three foundational liberal principles: 
individualism, egalitarianism, and universalism. Along the first axis, voting systems 
are rarely individualistic, as group-blindness is antithetical to the aggregation of 
voters to provide them a meaningful vote. Along the second axis, voting systems 
must weigh various interpretations of voter equality. These include formal equality, 
where voters are aggregated into districts with equal numbers, as well as 
substantive equality, where they enjoy equal quality of representation, and 
“stakeholder” equality, where the weight of their voting power is in proportion to 
their stake in the electoral results. Along the third axis, representation may be either 
universal, apportioned solely to voters as individuals, or, in a divided state, non- 
universal, and thus rightly apportioned first to “polities” and only secondarily to 
individuals. Entrenched non-universal, polity-based representation is an “external 
protection.” In settler-colonial states, such an external protection for Indigenous 
polities may be entrenched through treaties or “inherent rights.” In Canada, section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 affirms such rights while section 25 “shields” those 
rights from “derogation.” For Francophones, the Official Languages Act protects 
such rights. As case law suggests, where apportionment encounters non-universal 
Aboriginal or Francophone voting protections, formal egalitarianism is compelled to 
give way. Thus, in at least certain cases where “Kymlicka’s dilemma” involves 
Canadian apportionment, the “constitutional quandary” has been resolved in favor 
of collective rights.
64
Chapter 5: The pre-division Northwest Territories: a background
As Kirk Cameron and Graham White stated in 1995, the Northwest Territories 
“stands out as the most distinctive society within Canada.”1 This chapter provides an 
overview of the Northwest Territories’ history, geography, demographics and 
distinctive governance practices and policies, focusing on the pre-division and 
division-era period in the “western territory” -  the current NWT. It notes that the 
western territory was equipopulously divided between non-Aboriginals (i.e., 
settlers, or staatsvolk) concentrated in the territorial capital of Yellowknife, and 
Aboriginals, who predominated throughout the rural areas. It further explores the 
transfer of governance from Ottawa to Yellowknife, noting that while some 
observers saw this as an act of decolonization, ostensibly providing the territory 
with home rule, others saw it as settler colonization, flooding Yellowknife with 
settlers sent north to manage, “swamp” and democratically dominate an Indigenous 
homeland. This chapter finally examines certain “consociational” features of the pre­
division NWT government that distinguished it from more conventional 
parliamentary-style governments elsewhere in Canada.
5.1 Geography
The NWT currently encompasses 1.35 million square kilometers of land and water, 
an area four-fifths the size of Alaska (see Figure 1) . It spans diverse landscapes: 
boreal forests in the south, Precambrian taiga and tundra in the east, the Mackenzie 
River and Mackenzie Mountains in the west, and the treeless Arctic coast and islands 
in the north.2 Just thirty-three communities lie scattered through these regions. Of 
these, barely half are accessible by road today; even fewer were road-accessible in 
the decades before division. To drive from road-accessible communities of the 
southern NWT to those of the Mackenzie Delta requires a detour through British 
Columbia and the Yukon, an excursion of several days.
1 Kirk Cameron and Graham W hite, N orthern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional 
Developm ent in the Yukon, Nunavut and the W estern Northw est Territories  (M ontreal: The Institute 
for R esearch on Public Policy, 1 9 9 5  , 44.
2 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North  (Toronto: Methuen, 1 9 8 1 )  , 10.
65
NORTHWEST TERRITORIES 
TERRITOIRES DU NORD-OUEST /
/
/
/
:  ARCTIC OCEAN | 
/  OCEAN ARCTIQUE !
CMatortl
Prince ’I ' J  I Pdtrity—^ s Ji
C Manning r J  Jw r ~'r '-v
'  C  Prince A IO e d l------ ../ Beaufort Sea
f  Mer de Beaufort
_A .<, 
eanfcs A
Ar
/ S a c h s  ^Harbour
f  /  Victoria I I
Holman |
/\  MacAeivJe 
/  i S j*' veoyaActu*
/  J \  AmunOsen
A k la v lk i , v  J i— .
Fort ^ • •Inuvik “ £ / ~ S .  £ “ — l»
McPherson# _  . „ . ,  Paulatuk/
^  • T s lig e h tch lc  ;
‘ I  ColevillE (  200
•  fort Good Uqpe Arctlc Clrcle
Scale / Echelle
200 _l_ 400  I__ 600  I km
LEGEND / LEGENDE 
°  Capitalc territoriale
•p * Norman — rvAImn”:- I I _r..<,% , Nor.m y  • D#ll " c Grand** Cercle arctique
«• W e l l s • ‘ a t *  \
» Tuiita
# O ther populated places / •/-
Autres lieux habites
M ajor road /
Route principale
_________ International boundary /
Frontlere Internationale
*  1
Rac
Lakes
ITfur*
Wrigley w ha Ti 
Fort Marie e~.. O-V
• W ekw eti
N U N A V U T
"vr-i
• Rae-Edzo . , ,  * ..oiW^nifc /
S im o s o n *  r o r t  • ■ tu ts e lk ’e
#R lv er P ro v id e n ce  S rr .it  S lave La«■
"<  Nahanrti ' *  « ! * * < * * *  * “ *
B u tte
I “  River - -*fP.fUj SASKATCHEWAN
•, fseta ires
W k W  , ^ - ^ r ^ F o r t  Resolution
----------------- Provincial, territorial boundary /  Hay Fort Smrth  1
Lim itc provmcialo ct territoriale Lfl ° / R ive r--* -------- —  ----------  •
flC/c. 8  • ALBERTA
Figure 1: NWT geography (post-Nunavut-division)3
5.2 History
Indigenous peoples have occupied the NWT for perhaps 12,000 years.4 In the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the British Crown incorporated much of their 
homeland into the Hudson’s Bay Company’s vast fur-trading empire of Rupert’s 
Land and The North-Western Territory. Soon after the birth of Canada in 1867, 
these regions became the Northwest Territories, which at the time sprawled over
3 Governm ent of Canada, Natural Resources Canada, “The Atlas of Canada,” 
h ttp ://atlas.n rcan .gc.ca /site /en glish /m ap s/referen ce/in d ex.h tm l# p ro vin cial-an d -territorial 
(accessed March 25 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
4 Gurston Dacks, “Canadian G overnm ent and Aboriginal Peoples: The N orthw est T erritories: Paper 
prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,” RCAP Notes (Ottawa: Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 9 9 5  , 6.
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most of the country. Iteratively this jurisdiction lost turf, leaving the modern NWT a 
rump state -  “Canada’s leftovers.”5
In 1898, the Klondike gold rush led to the carving off of the Yukon Territory. 
In 1905, Alberta and Saskatchewan separated, becoming provinces. In 1912,
Quebec, Ontario and Manitoba expanded northward, taking swaths of the NWT for 
themselves. A Northern vastness remained, thinly populated by largely nomadic 
Indigenous peoples. Administration defaulted to an Ottawa-based commissioner 
and a council of federal civil servants. Their management of the NWT was 
alternatively exploitative, custodial and inert. Influxes of gold- and then petroleum- 
seekers led to the signing of Treaties 8 and 11, which First Nations saw as peace 
treaties but which Ottawa considered cessions of Native land and sovereignty. At the 
same time, large areas of the North were declared off-limits to staatsvolk use. 
Between 1926 and 1946, in most of what is now Nunavut, non-Indigenous people 
were banned from hunting, trapping or pursuing other commercial activities.6
At first, modern government services were rare. In 1920, the entire NWT 
budget was just $7,000.7 Change came after World War Two, when Indigenous 
Northerners experienced what political scientist Frances Abele calls “a quantum 
increase in the level of state intervention in their lives.”8 Suddenly, federal 
administrators awoke to the existence of the North, providing healthcare, building 
schools and requiring school-attendance, constructing social housing, introducing 
wildlife-management rules, and imposing Canadian-style policing and justice.
Abele makes note of “the lack of democracy in the introduction of all of these 
changes.”9 Politically, the NWT remained an internal colony, with no elected
5 Kenneth Coates and Judith Powell, The M odern North: People, Politics and the Rejection o f  
Colonialism (Toronto: Jam es Lorim er & Company, 1 9 8 9 )  , 75.
6 Andre Legare, “Nunavut: The Construction of a Regional Collective Identity in the Canadian A rctic,” 
Wicazo Sa Review  17 , no. 2 (2 0 0 2 )  , 75.
7 Mark Dickerson, Whose N orth? Political Change, Political Developm ent and Self-Government in the 
Northw est Territories (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , 29.
8 Frances Abele, “Aboriginal Peoples in Northern Canada: The Peaceful Revolution Meets Global 
Capital,” in The Canadian North: E m bracing Change, ed. Centre for Research and Information on 
Canada (M ontreal: Centre for Research and Information on Canada, 2 0 0 2 )  , 10.
9 Ibid., 10.
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government.10 Residents had little say over territorial affairs. First Nations and Inuit 
people did not receive the right to vote in Parliamentary elections until 1960 
and1966, respectively.11 The first territorial election was held in 1951, for three of 
the eight members of the otherwise-appointed territorial council, still based in 
Ottawa. Though this election was ostensibly open to Indigenous voters, electoral 
districts were created only in the less-Indigenous western NWT. No Natives stood 
for office.
In 1967, ostensibly as a move to “decolonize” the NWT by providing it with 
home rule, the federal Department of Indian and Northern Affairs relocated the 
territorial administration to Yellowknife. In that year, for the first time, residents 
elected a majority of the territorial council members -  seven of twelve. In 1975 the 
council, now calling itself a legislature, became fully elected. In 1986 it assumed the 
final remaining duties of the federal commissioner.12 The federal government 
increasingly devolved responsibilities to the territory: over education in the 1970s, 
transportation in 1986, forestry in 1987, and health-care services in 1988. After 
division, in 2014, responsibility over territorially owned lands and non-renewable 
resources was devolved (though Ottawa continues to own “Crown” land) . Even now, 
unlike in Canada’s provinces, the NWT’s lawmaking powers are not constitutionally 
entrenched, meaning Parliament may override territorial laws.13 A final redrawing 
of the NWT’s map took place in 1999 when, following a long-anticipated Native- 
claims agreement, the Inuit of the Eastern Arctic formed the separate territory of 
Nunavut. As can be seen, the NWT’s evolution from “internal colony” to full-fledged 
federal subunit was slow, iterative and still remains incomplete.
10 The Yukon, while also a territory , had long enjoyed significantly m ore local autonom y than the 
NWT. The Yukon’s legislative branch, the territorial council, becam e fully elected in 1 9 0 9  and began  
wielding considerable executive influence over the federally appointed com m issioner as early as the 
1 9 5 0 s . It achieved “responsible governm ent” in 1 9 7 9 . For m ore see Michael Cameron and Kirk 
Cameron, “The Yukon Legislative Assembly: Similar in Form , Different in Style and Function,” 
Canadian Study of Parliam ent Group (2 0 1 4 )  , h ttp ://w w w .stu dyp arliam en t.ca/En glish/pd f/Y u k on - 
e.pdf (accessed March 20 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
11 Dickerson, Whose North?, 70.
12 Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, A boriginal Self-Governm ent in the Northw est Territories, 
Supplem entary Booklet 2 : The Constitutional Developm ent o f  the Northw est Territories (Yellowknife: 
Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 9 9 )  .
13 Ibid., 6.
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5.3 Demographics
As of 1996 (the last year in which a Canadian federal census was conducted prior to 
Nunavut’s separation) , there lived only about 40,000 people in the region that 
currently comprises the NWT. These few people exhibited great diversity. In part 
because the NWT was the product of excision rather than creation, it enjoyed little 
demographic coherence. Gurston Dacks identified demographic schisms as the 
“fundamental feature of the population of the Northwest Territories.”14 Cleavages 
existed along ethnic, regional, urban/rural and linguistic lines, often overlaying one 
another and thus amplifying their political significance. Consequently, the pre­
division “western” NWT could be divided into two, three or four national factions, 
depending on one’s point of view.15
As of 1996, just under half of NWT residents, 48 percent, were Indigenous. 
From one perspective, they formed a single ethnonational collective. Yet they were 
composed of either two or three smaller collectives, the Inuvialuit and the 
Dene/Metis. The Inuvialuit accounted for 11 percent of the total NWT population.16 
The Metis accounted for nine percent. In some regions and political contexts the 
Metis were intermixed with the Dene, while in others they were distinct and even 
competed for land, resources and governance rights. The Dene formed 28 percent of 
the NWT population. They could be further broken down into five First Nations, the 
Gwich’in, Sahtu, Ttjchg, Deh Cho and Akaitcho, some of which were themselves 
politically and linguistically divided. Two of these First Nations, the Gwich’in and 
Sahtu, along with the Inuvialuit, had settled comprehensive land-claims agreements 
with the federal government. Four land-claims remained under negotiation: those of 
the Ttjchg, Deh Cho, Akaitcho and Metis, of which only that of the Ttjchg has since 
been signed (see Figure 2) .17 (Before division, no self-government agreements had
14 Gurston Dacks, “Political R epresentation in the N orthw est T erritories,” in Representation and  
Electoral Systems, eds. J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 
1 9 9 0 )  , 138 .
15 Ibid., 95 .
16 Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, A boriginal Self-Governm ent in the Northwest Territories, 
Supplem entary Booklet 4 : Our Population Profile (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est 
Territories, 1 9 9 9  , 4.
17 Governm ent of Canada D epartm ent of Indian and Northern Affairs, “Settled NWT Land Claims and 
Self-Government Agreem ents, 2 0 1 0 .”
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been settled; today, such agreements have been settled only with the Ttjchg and the 
small Sahtu community of Deljne.) According to Dacks, the NWT’s Indigenous
peoples “lead the country on the indicators of Aboriginal cultural vigour___
However, they suffer from such social problems as high levels of unemployment, 
conflict with the law, suicide and substance abuse.”18
Figure 2: NWT Aboriginal groups and land-claims status (post-Nunavut-division)19
As of 1996, non-Indigenous residents comprised just over half of the NWT’s 
population, 52 percent. Compared to the NWT’s Indigenous population they were 
well-educated, highly employed, well-paid, healthy and long-lived.20 In the words of 
Peter Jull, the “white community has done very well, and has the most enviable 
social statistics in the country.”21 Staatsvolk were not linguistically, culturally or
18 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” ii.
19 Governm ent of Canada, Office of the Auditor General, “2 0 1 0  Spring R eport of the Auditor General 
of Canada,” h ttp ://w w w .oag-b vg .gc.ca /in tern et/E n glish /p arl_oag_201004_04_e_33717.h tm l 
(accessed March 25 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
20 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” ii.
21 Peter Jull, Political Developm ent in the Northwest Territories (Ottawa: Governm ent of Canada
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regionally divided in the same way as the NWT’s Indigenous population. In general, 
however, they were weakly linked to the territory.
In the words of Kenneth Coates and Judith Powell, “Since the early days of the 
fur trade, non-Natives have, as a group, demonstrated little commitment to the 
North.”22 Like the aforementioned soldiers stationed on Oahu, for many staatsvolk 
the NWT was a temporary home. In 1971, 93 percent of the NWT’s First Nations and 
Inuit residents had been born in the territory, whereas for the remainder of the 
population that figure was 27 percent.23 In that same year, at least 49 percent of the 
NWT’s settlers had arrived in the past five years.24 Even today just 22 percent of the 
NWT’s non-Indigenous residents were born in the territory.25 Turnover remains 
high: As of the 2011 federal census, 27.5 percent of the NWT’s staatsvolk had arrived 
in the past five years. A similar proportion had departed.26 Fully five percent were 
so new that they would not have met the NWT’s one-year residency requirement for 
voting.27 Predictably, staatsvolk transience mirrors transience in Yellowknife, which 
has for decades been home to most of the NWT’s non-Aboriginals. In 1996, at the 
cusp of division, 29 percent of Yellowknifers had arrived in the NWT in the past year
Federal-Provincial Relations Office, 1 9 7 8 )  , 35.
22 Coates and Powell, The M odern North, 16.
23 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee on 
Constitutional Development, “Residency Requirem ents” (Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est 
T erritories, 1 9 8 3 )  , p art II, 11. In this is study, it is unclear to which of these two categories Metis 
w ere assigned.
24 Ibid., 10 . This study divided NWT residents into the categories “English,” “French” and “other.” It 
would appear th at the category “oth er” included not m erely Aboriginals but im m igrants to Canada. 
The cited 49 -p ercen t figure refers only to the combined “English” and “French” population, and thus 
excludes im m igrants who w ere neither Anglophones nor Francophones. This figure is thus likely an 
underestim ation of true settler in-migration.
25 Kate Odziemkowska, Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories statistician, e-mail m essage to 
author, April 13 , 2 0 1 1 .
26 Viktoria Bassarguina, Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories statistician, e-mail m essage to 
author, May 8, 2 0 1 4 .
27 A w ord of caution: I have compiled these statistics by adding the num ber of “inter-provincial” 
m igrants (i.e., the num ber of people within Canada who moved into or out of the NWT) to the 
num ber of external m igrants (i.e., the num ber of people from outside Canada who did so) . It is only 
for the form er category th at Census Canada records the Indigenous/non-Indigenous breakdow n. It 
seem s safe to assum e, how ever, th at the v ast m ajority of people moving to the NWT from foreign 
countries are not people Indigenous to the NWT.
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compared to 12 percent of non-Yellowknifers.28 After division, between 2006 and 
2011, Yellowknifers, though comprising less than half of the NWT population, 
accounted for two-thirds of the territory’s in- and out-migration, a lack of 
attachment to the NWT starkly at odds with the stability found in outlying 
Indigenous communities.
In 1996, 44 percent of NWT residents lived in Yellowknife, 29 percent in five 
other semi-urban regional centers (Fort Simpson, Fort Smith, Hay River, Inuvik and 
Norman Wells) , and 27 percent in twenty-seven outlying communities.29 Residential 
patterns divided deeply along ethnic lines, with non-Indigenous people 
overwhelmingly predominant in Yellowknife and Indigenous people forming a 
supermajority almost everywhere else. As of 1996 approximately 82 percent of the 
NWT’s Indigenous people lived outside Yellowknife. They made up at least 90 
percent of the population in all but six NWT communities, and formed 
approximately half the population in the five semi-urban regional centers. In 
Yellowknife alone, Indigenous people were a small minority: just one-fifth of the 
population.30 It can thus be said that there were two NWTs: non-Indigenous urban 
Yellowknife, and the Indigenous rural territory everywhere else.
5.4 Devolution of power to Yellowknife
As has been demonstrated above, the NWT’s key demographic divide lay between 
Yellowknife and the predominantly Indigenous remainder of the territory. Such a 
schism would almost invariably have presented political challenges, but 
Yellowknife’s distinctive history exacerbated those challenges.
In the post-World War Two era, says Coates, the federal government “sent 
large numbers of civil servants north and their arrival recast several northern
28 Governm ent of Canada, Statistics Canada, “Electronic Area Profiles: Data Tables,” 
h ttp ://w w w 12 .sta tcan .ca /en g lish /cen su s96 /d ata /p ro files /R p -
eng.cfm?TABID=2&LANG=E&APATH=3&DETAIL=0&DIM=0&FL=A&FREE=0&GC=0&GK=0&GRP=1& 
PID=35782&PRID=0&PTYPE=3&S=0&SHOW ALL=0&SUB=0&Temporal=1996&THEM E=34&VID=0&  
VNAMEE=&VNAMEF= (accessed April 13 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
29 GNWT, Our Population Profile, 5.
30 Ibid., 6.
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towns.”31 Recast most dramatically was Yellowknife, which, as noted above, became 
the NWT capital in 1967. This move triggered a dramatic expansion of the territorial 
bureaucracy. According to Dene political scientist Glen Coulthard, “Between 1967 
and 1979 . . . the GNWT [Government of the Northwest Territories] grew from 
seventy-five to 2,845 employees.”32 Yellowknife’s population boomed, jumping by 
64 percent between 1966 and 1971.33 In this same period the territory’s overall 
population grew just 21 percent. Coulthard thus concludes that bringing “home 
rule” to the NWT in fact substantially increased the territory’s proportion of settlers.
Both the deployment of civil servants to the NWT and the establishment of 
Yellowknife as the home of the devolved territorial administration might have been 
interpreted as establishing a “social contract,” a la Locke. Power had been 
authorized to Yellowknife generally, and to bureaucrats specifically, ostensibly to 
benefit Northerners. These Yellowknife bureaucrats were overwhelmingly 
staatsvolk. Even as of 2008, only about 30 percent of the NWT government’s civil 
servants were Indigenous, and among senior bureaucrats that number was just 15 
percent.34 Graham White has called this bureaucracy “the principle human face of 
government” in the NWT, noting that it was disproportionately powerful and 
observing that its values were overwhelming Euro-Canadian.35
It is unsurprising, then, that as the NWT swelled with bureaucratically 
powerful outsiders who formed a substantial voting bloc, some Aboriginals saw this 
influx not as a benefit but a threat. According to Dene leaders, after 1967, “[W] e 
were finding ourselves to have less say in the administration and laws of our land.”36 
This might be perceived as an unintended consequence of devolution: Bringing
31 Kenneth Coates, Canada’s Colonies: A History o f  the Yukon and Northw est Territories (Toronto:
Jam es Lorim er & Company, 1 9 8 5 ) , 2 1 2 .
32 Glen Coulthard, “Facing the Challenge of Freedom : Dene Nationalism and the Politics of Cultural 
Recognition” (m aster’s thesis, University of Victoria, 2 0 0 3 )  , 30.
33 Peter Edw ard Ostergaard, “Quality of Life in a Northern City: A Social Geography of Yellowknife, 
N.W.T.” (m aster’s thesis, University of British Columbia, 1 9 7 6 )  , 19.
34 Herb Mathisen, “Aboriginal Jobs W ith GNWT Flatlines,” N orthern News Services, July 13 , 2 0 0 8 , 
h ttp ://w w w .n n sl.co m /fram es/n ew sp ap ers/2008 -06 /ju n 13_08aj.h tm l (accessed  April 2 7 , 2 0 1 1 )  .
35 Graham W hite, “Politics and G overnm ent in the Territorial North: Fam iliar and Exotic,” in The 
Canadian North: Em bracing Change, ed. Centre for Research and Information on Canada. Montreal: 
Centre for Research and Information on Canada (2 0 0 2 )  , 1 9 .
36 Rene Fumoleau, D enendeh: A Dene Celebration (Yellowknife: Dene Nation, 1 9 8 4 )  , 19.
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home rule to the NWT had incidentally created a constituency of transplants. Others
found the process more nefarious. According to Coulthard:
From the standpoint of the Dene, the path chosen for northern economic and 
political development reflected anything but the promotion of legitimate and 
responsible government in the north. Instead, for them, the influx of . . . 
government officials and non-Native settlers that occurred after 1967 better 
reflected a continuation of Canada’s profoundly illegitimate colonial 
exploitation of Denendeh’s land and original inhabitants.”37
In a paper written for the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, a Northern-focused
social and environmental activist organization, Richard Laing and his co-authors
expressed this view even more emphatically:
Thousands of civil servants and their families were stationed in a few tiny 
enclaves, and the fiction of the ‘northerner’ was created. ‘All northerners are
equal’ was the proclamation One could claim to be a ‘northerner’ however
recent one’s residence, and the status claimed by those with no intention of 
staying beyond retirement or promotion to Ottawa. Moreover, the effect of 
the declaration was that thousands of transient bureaucrats, concentrated in 
a few small enclaves, assumed the right to voice their opinions about what
happened in all of the Northwest Territories However absurd the
‘equality’ of the mythical ‘northerner,’ the fiction plays an important part in 
the colonization of the Northwest Territories. In exchange for this ‘gift’ of 
formal equality, the Native peoples are expected to pay with real inequality, 
the denial of their national identities, and, indeed, the denial of their 
Aboriginal rights.38
According to this argument, having numerically “swamped” the NWT, settlers then 
sought to legitimize their bid for dominance by deeming themselves “Northerners” 
whose “stake” in territorial affairs was equal to that of Aboriginals. Critics cried foul. 
Political scientist Michael Asch wrote that giving NWT transients the same voting 
rights as locals “would create a situation unique in Canada: a province in which 
those persons with the least commitment to the jurisdiction and its people would 
have legislative control.”39 It is no wonder that Indigenous people viewed
37 Coulthard, “Facing the Challenge of Freedom ,” 31.
38 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the 
N orthw est T erritories,” in N orthern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
R esources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8  , 319 .
39 Michael Asch, Hom e and Native Land: Aboriginal Rights and the Canadian Constitution, New York: 
Methuen (1 9 8 4 )  , 104 .
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Yellowknife as not merely demographically distinct from the rest of the NWT but as 
a sort of colonial Trojan Horse. The federal government’s decision to make 
Yellowknife the capital of the NWT was not, in this view, an act of Northern 
empowerment, but the opposite: a duplicitous betrayal of Indigenous self­
determination.
5.5 Consociational accommodations
As articulated previously, NWT settlers and Indigenous residents long competed to 
define the constitutional parameters of the territory. In the midst of this conflict, the 
NWT government40 was nonetheless compelled to govern. Perhaps by default as 
much as by design, it adopted certain consociational practices. Various scholars41 
explored these distinctive adaptations. White deemed these “more than an exotic 
curiosity, but . . . political responses to the unique political problems of the North.”42 
The NWT’s distinctive policies and practices included the recognition of nine official 
Indigenous languages, an affirmative-action policy favoring Indigenous residents,43 
the decentralization of administration to Indigenous-dominated regions, and public 
government that blended Northern political culture with traditional British 
parliamentarianism.44 Several elements of that blend warrant examination.
40 In the con text of the N orthw est T erritories, “NWT governm ent” m eans different things in different 
contexts. Most broadly, it refers to the entire architecture of territorial public-governance, including 
the NWT’s adm inistrative, judicial, legislative and executive functions. In this context, “NWT 
governm ent” is synonym ous with the com m only used acronym  “the GNWT.” More narrow ly, “NWT 
governm ent” som etim es refers only to the NWT legislative assembly, the legislative/executive entity  
that, sep arate from the territorial b ureaucracy or the judiciary, makes and executes the laws. Finally 
and m ost narrow ly, “NWT governm ent” often refers only to the assem bly’s prem ier and cabinet -  the 
executors of governance.
41 Michael Asch, “Consociation and the Resolution of Aboriginal Political Rights: The Example of the 
N orthw est Territories, Canada.” Culture X, no. 1 (1 9 9 0 )  ; Michael Asch and Gurston Dacks, “The 
Relevance of Consociation to the W estern  N orthw est T erritories,” in Partners fo r  the Future: A 
Collection o f  Papers Related to Constitutional Developm ent in the W estern Northw est Territories, ed. 
W estern  Constitutional Forum  (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, 1 9 8 5 )  , 39 ; 
Graham W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness, R epresentation by Population and the Charter: The 
Politics of Redistribution in the N orthw est T erritories,” Journal o f  Canadian Studies 28 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )  .
42 W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness,” 28.
43 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories D epartm ent of Human R esources, “Human Resources 
Manual - Affirmative Action Policy,” h ttp ://w w w .h r.g o v .n t.ca /p o licy /h rm /0 1 0 0 % 2 0 -  
% 20H irin g % 20P ro cess/101 /d efau lt.h tm  (accessed  April 23 , 2 0 1 1 )  .
44 Cameron and W hite, N orthern Governments in Transition, 53.
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The most frequently cited example of consociation in the pre-division NWT 
was the legislature’s convention of operating by “consensus.” As White explains, 
under consensus government there exist neither political parties nor numeric 
domination by a governing faction of an opposition faction.45 Rather, by tradition, 
candidates run as independents, without party affiliation. Once elected, members of 
the legislative assembly (MLAs) decide by majority vote who among them will be 
the premier and the ministers in cabinet. Under consensus government, the premier 
and cabinet are a numeric minority vis-a-vis the “regular” (non-cabinet) MLAs. 
While the term “consensus” is a misnomer, as the assembly operates by majority 
rule and the cabinet needs the support of only a few of the regular members to pass 
legislation, it remains true that the NWT consensus system has typically been more 
collaborative than politics elsewhere in Canada.46 Though “consensus government” 
was of bureaucratic rather than Aboriginal origin, Indigenous Northerners widely 
viewed it as preferable to southern party politics. This is at least in part because, as 
Dacks observes, Native governance traditions tend to be “consensual rather than 
adversarial.”47
Another distinctive governance convention in the pre-division NWT was 
regional balance in cabinet. This meant allotting specific proportions of cabinet 
positions to the eastern portion of the territory, dominated by Inuit, and to the 
western portion, home to Dene, Metis, Inuvialuit and settlers.48 As will be shown, on 
the cusp of division, proposals were made to preserve this tradition by insuring that 
representatives of non-Yellowknife (and therefore likely Indigenous) electoral 
districts would numerically dominate the cabinet.
A further consociational feature of NWT governance was the traditional 
numeric dominance of the legislature by rural Indigenous representatives. Between 
1975, when the assembly became a fully elected body, and division in 1999, the
45 Graham W hite, “The Adaptation of Non-Aboriginal Institutions of Governance in the N orthw est 
T erritories,” (Paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 9 9 3 )  , 7.
46 Ibid., 8.
47 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 31.
48 W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness,” 16.
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majority of representatives, and all but two premiers, were Indigenous.49 This 
historical dominance owed mainly to the substantially greater ratio of Indigenous to 
non-Indigenous residents in the pre-division NWT. However, a contributing factor 
was the practice of overrepresenting rural Indigenous residents. Though 
proponents sometimes justified this practice on substantively egalitarian grounds 
(i.e., providing equal quality of representation to voters in remote districts) , other 
factors were also important. White noted that Indigenous political culture puts 
emphasis on “cultural communities as collectivities, with the corollary that 
representation of cultural groups may be more important than that of individuals.”50 
This augured in favor of providing representation to Native cultural communities 
even in cases where their small population might not otherwise have justified it. 
Finally, rural overrepresentation was fueled by a desire to preserve the 
consociational “balance of power” between Aboriginals and settlers in the NWT. As 
White’s research showed in the case of the NWT’s 1989 reapportionment, 
overrepresentation was considered a “central element in maintaining th[e] 
precarious arrangement” of consociation.51 It was feared that eliminating rural 
overrepresentation, and thus shifting power toward urban non-Natives, might bring 
consociation toppling down.
Apart from the structure and function of the NWT assembly, certain policies 
gave the pre-division territory an arguably consociational flavor. Key among these 
was the federal government’s longstanding practice of fulfilling its fiduciary 
responsibility to the Indigenous people of the NWT by way of the territorial 
government. Unlike in the provinces, where many Aboriginal live on reserves which 
interact directly with Ottawa, in the NWT only a tiny proportion of Aboriginals live 
on reserves. For non-reserve NWT Aboriginals, the public government has 
functioned as a federal agent, with Ottawa fulfilling its financial obligation to 
Aboriginals though its annual operating grant to the territory.52 The NWT 
government, in turn, provided to Aboriginal residents services to which they are
49 Abele, “Aboriginal Peoples in Northern Canada,” 10.
50 W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness,” 24.
51 Ibid., 16.
52 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” 30.
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entitled by historic treaties, as well as programs deemed “integral to distinct 
Aboriginal culture” under the federal Inherent Right Policy, including adoption and 
child welfare, education and housing.53 (Aboriginal groups, it should be noted, did 
not consent to this arrangement, and some have accused the NWT government of 
usurping what should properly have been a role reserved to Ottawa.54)
5.6 Summary
This chapter has demonstrated that the pre-division “western” NWT was 
distinctively divided -  culturally, demographically and historically. The territory 
comprised at minimum two discrete demographic groups: highly transient settlers, 
mostly in Yellowknife, and Aboriginals, deeply rooted in their rural home regions. 
Though Yellowknife was made the territorial headquarters ostensibly to devolve 
power from Ottawa to the North, some Aboriginals perceived the booming new 
capital to be a beachhead of colonialism, through which an influx of staatsvolk could 
“swamp” and democratically dominate the territory. To reconcile the political 
cultures and aspirations of these two constituent groups, the NWT government 
developed various consociational features that distinguished it from more 
conventional parliamentary-style governments elsewhere in Canada. These 
consociational features, including Aboriginal overrepresentation both on cabinet 
and in the assembly as a whole, demonstrated a compromise between settler and 
Indigenous political modes and goals. As will be shown, however, this compromise 
was tenuous, with both settlers and Indigenous peoples consistently pressing for 
the realization of their own polity’s particular constitutional vision.
53 W estern  NWT Aboriginal Summit, “Letter to the Honourable Jane Stew art” (M arch 22 , 1 9 9 9 )  , 3.
54 Aboriginal Summit, “Letter to Jane Stew art,” 3.
78
Chapter 6: Constitutional development in the pre-division NWT
Gurston Dacks’ observation, cited previously, bears repeating: “[O]f all jurisdictions 
in Canada, only in the NWT does the question still remain open as to which political 
philosophy -  liberalism based on the individual, nationalism based on ethnic 
identity, or consociationalism which attempts to integrate the two -  will ultimately 
guide the political process.”1 This chapter traces the constitutional evolution of the 
NWT until the separation of Nunavut. It shows that Aboriginals and non-Aboriginals 
long pursued divergent constitutional paths for their people and for the territory as 
a whole, pitting them against one another in a power struggle and placing the 
territory in constitutional limbo. This chapter analyzes the history of that conflict, in 
which settlers pressed for the NWT to evolve into a liberal region-based federal 
subunit in the mold of Canada’s eight Anglophone provinces, while Aboriginals 
pressed for the NWT to become, or at least exhibit qualities of, a nationalist federal 
subunit not unlike Quebec or Nunavut, or a consociational subunit not unlike New 
Brunswick. This chapter shows that each of these two competing peoples perceived 
that the realization of their constitutional ambitions would hinge in part on their 
relative political power, including their power in the NWT government -  power 
accorded to them by the apportionment of representation in the legislative 
assembly. This chapter finally shows that, in the absence of a clear victory on either 
side, the pre-division NWT was governed through an uneasy consociational detente.
6.1 Settler and Indigenous visions for constitutional development
As has already been suggested, Indigenous and settler visions for the constitutional 
development of the NWT were long at odds. In the words of Dacks, long-term 
Northern staatsvolk displayed a “colonial political culture.”2 More specifically, they 
exhibited “settler colonialism,” working to replicate their exogenous political,
1 Gurston Dacks, “Politics on the Last Frontier: Consociationalism in the N orthw est T erritories,” 
Canadian Journal o f  Political Science  19 , no. 2 (1 9 8 6 )  : 354 .
2 Gurston Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures: Politics in the Canadian North  (Toronto: Methuen, 1 9 8 1 ), 94.
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cultural and economic systems on an expropriated Indigenous land base.3 These
imported staatsvolk cultural systems included the philosophy of liberal-
universalism, according to which the NWT comprised a single polity and should
feature a unitary government and a political culture in which, as Dacks explains,
homogeneity dominates difference. According to this vision, all people who 
have chosen to make their lives in the North are fundamentally northerners, 
hence should be treated uniformly in a territorial constitution, regardless of 
their ethnic identity. Moreover, differential rights enjoyed by different 
groups of northerners should be minimized because they involve potential 
injustice, contradict the spirit of universalism expressed by the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms and are likely to provoke tensions within territorial 
society.4
As will be seen, for many years the federal government supported this view. When 
the NWT government was under settler control, it championed this view as well.
Indigenous inhabitants supported a very different, nationalist vision for the 
NWT’s constitutional development.5 As such, says constitutional lawyer Bernard 
Funston, they championed “cultural, political and economic ‘self-determination’ . . . 
[which] suggests a desire to establish new or modified structures of public 
government, with a requisite extension of legislative power to accomplish and to 
maintain this restructuring.”6 This vision challenged the legitimacy of the existing 
“settler colonial” NWT government and saw the rightful future of territorial 
governance as Indigenous-controlled, either through a nationalist public 
government, a constellation of “treaty-federal” Indigenous self-governments, a
3 Patrick Wolfe, “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Journal o f  Genocide Research  
8, no. 4  (2 0 0 6 )  : 3 8 8 . Asch and Dacks confirm this, stating th at NWT settlers “conceived of them selves 
as representing . . . m ajority culture” and “presum ed that, by and large, the future institutional 
developm ent of the NWT will reflect [their] values.” See Michael Asch and Gurston Dacks, “The 
Relevance of Consociation to the W estern  N orthw est T erritories,” in Partners fo r  the Future: A 
Collection o f  Papers Related to Constitutional Developm ent in the W estern Northw est Territories, ed. 
W estern  Constitutional Forum  (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, 1 9 8 5 )  , 56.
4 Gurston Dacks, “Canadian G overnm ent and Aboriginal Peoples: The N orthw est Territories: Paper 
prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,” RCAP Notes (Ottawa: Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 9 9 5  , 17.
5 According to Dacks, “A m ajor concern of the Aboriginal people is validation of their belief th at the 
different Native groups constitute peoples or nations.” See Gurston Dacks, “Political Representation  
in the N orthw est T erritories,” in Representation and Electoral Systems, eds. J. Paul Johnston and 
Harvey E. Pasis (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1 9 9 0 ) , 138 .
6 Bernard W. Funston, “The N orthw est Territories and its Future Constitutional and Political 
Development: An Exam ination of the Drury Report,” Polar Record  21 , no. 1 3 1  (1 9 8 2 )  : 117 .
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number of highly decentralized Indigenous-majority regional governments, or 
various combinations thereof. The ultimate goal of any of these arrangements was 
to establish “external protections” that guarded Indigenous rights to self­
determination and autonomy, ensuring their cultural survival.7 They thus desired an 
NWT constitutional structure that blocked rather than accommodated settlers in 
their quest to import staatsvolk governance.
6.2 History of constitutional development: 1960s
As a territory rather than a province, the NWT has by definition always been a 
government in transition. As was noted previously, the NWT government is not 
constitutionally entrenched and its framework remains under development. 
Multinational divisions, especially between Indigenous and staatsvolk residents, 
hobbled its evolution out of “internal colony” status. Two countervailing forces 
characterized this evolution: The empowerment of staatsvolk-style public 
government institutions, on one hand, and the campaign for Aboriginal self­
determination, on the other.8
During the first half of the twentieth century, when the NWT was 
administered remotely from Ottawa, the territory’s Indigenous population was 
neither enfranchised nor, likely, sufficiently politically organized to press for its 
constitutional interests. The NWT’s settler population, meanwhile, also remained 
relatively politically powerless, due in part to its small size and its transient frontier 
nature. This began to change in the early 1960s.
In the words of Peter Jull, in the NWT “[t]he white people are very conscious 
of the fact that they’re building a new society, but it isn’t new in any qualitative way.
. . . For them there is no interest in new forms of organization but rather getting the
7 Their goal, says Canadian political scientist Peter Jull, “is ‘security.’ The Native people fear the loss 
of their land and w ay of life as has happened elsew here in Canada, and not only wish to preserve  
these, but do not w an t to have settlers m ove in and dom inate all their actions in their region.” See 
Peter Jull, Political D evelopm ent in the Northwest Territories (Ottawa: Governm ent of Canada Federal- 
Provincial Relations Office, 1 9 7 8  , 58.
8 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , “Amended  
Brief of Fact and Law of the Intervenors,” 6.
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proven Canadian ones, pronto, and dominating them.”9 At the same time, settlers in 
the 1960s bristled under the authority of the federal government in Ottawa, 
conceiving of themselves as a people colonized from afar by out-of-touch, self­
serving bureaucrats.10 Political scientist Jerald Sabin has termed this hybrid status, 
in which the NWT’s settlers were both colonizers and colonized, “contested 
colonialism.”11 Settlers took advantage of both roles in their campaign to draw down 
power from the federal government while denying the same power to Indigenous 
peoples. As early as 1962, staatsvolk leaders, predominantly in Yellowknife, began 
agitating for greater territorial autonomy and a move toward province-like status.12 
They pressed for the NWT to be divided between the Inuit-dominated eastern 
Arctic, to be called Nunatsiaq Territory, and the more non-Indigenous west, to be 
called Mackenzie Territory.13 By separating, and thus altering the boundaries of 
their subunit to give it an approximate staatsvolk majority, these settlers sought to 
transform the western NWT from an internal colony into a self-governing, region- 
based federal subunit that would operate in accordance with Canada’s mainstream, 
majority-nation traditions.
In response to these demands, Prime Minister Lester Pearson established the 
Carrothers Commission, which in 1966 issued recommendations on NWT 
constitutional development. The commission’s seminal proposition, enacted the 
following year, was that Ottawa devolve administration of the territory to 
Yellowknife. But if this was a victory for the NWT’s settlers, the federal government 
did not concede entirely to settler demands. Out of apparent concern for balancing 
Indigenous and settler interests, the commission advised against splitting the 
territory, stating that, “Division would create a white majority in the Mackenzie, 
with the very great likelihood of a white government. Division could have the 
accidental and unintended effect of gerrymandering the Indigenous peoples of the
9 Jull, Political Development, 34.
10 Ibid., 7.
11 Jerald Sabin, “Contested Colonialism: Responsible Governm ent and Political Developm ent in 
Yukon,” Canadian Jo urnal o f  Political Science  47 , no. 2 (2 0 1 4 )  : 3 92 .
12 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 102 .
13 Mark Dickerson, Whose N orth? Political Change, Political Developm ent and Self-Government in the 
Northw est Territories  (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , 85.
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north out of effective participation in territorial self-government.”14 The report thus 
recognized that separation would amount to “cracking” the territory’s Indigenous 
population, disempowering them.15 The Carrothers report did not, however, 
represent a victory for Native self-determination. It presumed that territorial 
governance would develop along the standard staatsvolk model, applying 
universally to all residents, with no accommodations for Indigenous nationalism.16 
According to historian Kerry Abel, the commission “was clearly a white man’s 
commission appointed to investigate the white man’s grievances.”17
6.3 History of constitutional development: 1970s
In the 1970s, the power gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous northerners 
began to close.18 Though settlers enjoyed enhanced autonomy after the territorial 
administration moved to Yellowknife, their efforts to convert the NWT into a 
southern-style province hit a roadblock.19 For the first time, Northern Indigenous 
peoples mounted a nationalist campaign, resisting settlers’ region-based federal 
aspirations. In the western NWT this campaign was led by the Indian Brotherhood, 
which soon renamed itself the Dene Nation. After the NWT Supreme Court ruled in 
1973 that Treaties 8 and 11 had not legally extinguished Dene ownership of their 
traditional territory, and following the federal government’s release that same year 
of a comprehensive Aboriginal land-claims settlement policy, Dene Nation leaders
14 A.W.R. C arrothers, Report o f  the Advisory Commission on Developm ent o f  Governm ent in the 
Northw est Territories  (Ottawa: G overnm ent of Canada, 1 9 6 6 )  , 148.
15 As Asch and Dacks observed, “It is, of course, possible to achieve dem ocratic governm ent through  
the use of a universal system  and hence by the strict application of m ajority rule. This will likely lead 
ultim ately to legislative control by the portion of the population th at now forms (or a t least m ay soon  
form ) a distinct m ajority, the non-Aboriginals. Under these conditions, there is concern th at the 
assim ilative tendencies inherent in universalism as well as other factors m ay underm ine the ability 
of the Dene/M etis and the Inuvialuit to retain and strengthen their cultural com m unities.” See Asch 
and Dacks, “The Relevance of Consociation,” 42.
16 Kirk Cameron and Graham W hite, Northern Governments in Transition: Political and Constitutional 
D evelopm ent in the Yukon, Nunavut and the W estern Northw est Territories  (M ontreal: The Institute 
for R esearch on Public Policy, 1 9 9 5 ), 49.
17 Kerry Abel, Drum Songs: Glimpses o f  Dene History (M ontreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press,
1 9 9 3 )  , 2 44 .
18 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 99.
19 As Jull states, non-Natives’ “unwittingly m onoethnic approach to the future . . . received a pretty  
devastating jolt since the Natives began speaking out [to] . . . articulate their own visions via land 
claims proposals.” See Jull, Political Development, 35.
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announced their intention to file claim to more than a million square kilometers of 
NWT land. They also condemned the NWT’s staatsvolk-dominated administration 
as, in the words of political scientist Graham White, “transitional and illegitimate”20 
-  a false front for colonialism.21 Tellingly, in 1975, the same year the NWT legislative 
assembly became fully elected (and thus, in the view of many settlers, 
democratically legitimate) , the Dene Nation boycotted the assembly and both of its 
sitting Dene members, George Barnaby and former Dene Nation grand chief James 
Wah-Shee, resigned.22 Indigenous groups articulated their own visions for self­
determination. In a proposal that inverted the earlier “Mackenzie Territory” 
scenario, Eastern Arctic Inuit in 1976 demanded formation of Nunavut, a nationalist 
federal subunit that would be overseen by a de facto  Inuit-dominated public 
government. Meanwhile, in the west, Dene and Metis pursued plans for self-rule 
designed to prevent swamping and domination by settlers.
In 1976, the Dene Nation issued the “Dene Declaration,” demanding 
“independence and self-determination within the country of Canada.”23 Shortly 
thereafter, the Dene Nation served the federal government with a self-government 
proposal entitled “Agreement in Principle between the Dene Nation and Her Majesty 
the Queen, in Right of Canada.” The proposal demanded that, to prevent Dene from 
being overwhelmed by staatsvolk, “[t]here will therefore be within Confederation, a 
Dene Government with jurisdiction over a geographical area and over subject 
matter now within the jurisdiction of either the Government of Canada or the 
Government of the Northwest Territories.”24
Staatsvolk blasted this proposal as illiberally race-based, prompting the Dene 
in 1977 to issue an revised plan for self-government, the so-called “Metro Proposal,” 
urging that the NWT be split into Dene-, Inuit- and non-Indigenous-majority
20 Graham W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness, R epresentation by Population and the Charter: The 
Politics of Redistribution in the N orthw est T erritories,” Journal o f  Canadian Studies 28 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 ) :  
14.
21 Dickerson, Whose North?, 102 .
22 Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics o f  Recognition  (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2 0 1 4 )  , 68.
23 Mel W atkins ed., D ene Nation: The Colony Within (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 9 7 7 ) , 3.
24 Dene Nation, A greem en t in Principle Betw een the Dene Nation and H er Majesty the Queen in Right o f  
Canada (Yellowknife: Dene Nation, 1 9 7 6 )  , 3.
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territories. According to this proposal, each jurisdiction would be ostensibly race- 
neutral, providing self-determination and de facto  autonomy to each ethnic group 
indirectly, as each group would have a territory in which they were numerically 
preponderant.25
When federal and territorial officials rejected the Metro Proposal, the Dene 
and Metis in 1981 jointly advanced the plan “Public Government for the People of 
the North.” It proposed transforming the western NWT into an Indigenous- 
nationalist territory -  a “province-like” jurisdiction called “Denendeh”26 
incorporating both Indigenous peoples and settlers. Though the Denendeh 
government would ostensibly be public, it would depart radically from the Anglo- 
Canadian norm. Political decisions would be made by consensus “rather than by a 
small cabinet representing a political party with a majority in the legislative body.”27 
Major decisions would be made by public referenda. The assembly (which would 
notably be called the “national assembly,” a la Quebec) would have a minimum of 30 
percent Dene seats. This body would be backstopped by a fully Indigenous senate, 
empowered to veto any law that “adversely affects Aboriginal rights,” sending it 
back to the “national assembly” for revision.28 A “Charter of Founding Principles” 
would reflect Indigenous values and provide guidance to the government and its 
bureaucracy. Finally, all voters would have to meet a ten-year residency
25 Doug McArthur, “The Changing A rchitecture of Governance in Yukon and the N orthw est 
T erritories,” in Northern Exposure Volume 4 : Peoples, Powers and Prospects in Canada’s North, eds. 
Frances Abele, Thom as J. Courchene, F. Leslie Seidle, and France St-Hilaire (M ontreal: Institute for 
Research on Public Policy, 2 0 0 9  , 200 .
26 Bernard W. Funston, “The N orthw est T erritories and its Future Constitutional and Political 
Development: An Exam ination of the Drury Report,” Polar Record  21 , no. 1 3 1  (1 9 8 2 )  : 124 .
27 Ibid., 1 24 .
28 Dene Nation, “Public Governm ent for the People of the North” (Yellowknife: The Dene and Metis 
Association of the N orthw est T erritories, 1 9 8 2 )  , 17.
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requirement to vote in Denendeh elections,29 effectively barring non-stakeholding 
transient staatsvolk from the voter rolls.
As with the Dene Declaration, Staatsvolk reacted to these subsequent 
proposals with outrage.30 Feeling settler rights and interests threatened,31 the non- 
Indigenous-dominated32 NWT legislative assembly went on the attack. In 1977 it 
produced an incendiary pamphlet entitled “You’ve Heard From the Radical Few 
About Canada’s North . . . Now Hear From the Moderate Many,” decrying the Dene 
Nation’s views as “abhorrent,” un-Canadian and akin to apartheid.33 In a related 
statement, the assembly scornfully suggested the Dene Nation “be renamed the 
Radical Left.”34 It called upon the federal government to insure that “the settlement 
of Native claims . . . shall not erode any constitutional authority of the Government 
of the Northwest Territories.”35
Then, in a more measured document entitled “Priorities for the North,” the 
assembly rejected calls to alter the boundaries of the western NWT, maintaining 
that “the ‘Native state’ concept is, and always will be, totally unacceptable to the
29 Noted Dacks, “This requirem ent would certainly enable the Aboriginal people to dom inate the 
system  of representation, but would certainly be judged unconstitutional for unjustifiably limiting 
the right to vote guaranteed in the Charter of Rights and Freedom s. It has been suggested th at three  
years would be the longest residence requirem ent the courts would accept, with tw o years m ore  
likely to be the maximum acceptable. Extending the residence requirem ent by an extra year would 
enhance the representation of the Aboriginal population, but it would not guarantee it future 
domination over the system  of representation .” See Dacks, “Political R epresentation,” 1 43 . Notably, in 
the 1 9 8 2  plebiscite on territorial division, voters had to m eet a th ree-year eligibility requirem ent. See 
Kenneth Coates and Judith Powell, The M odern North: People, Politics and the Rejection o f  Colonialism 
(Toronto: Jam es Lorim er & Company, 1 9 8 9 )  , 76.
30 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 66.
31 In Dacks’ understated assessm ent, settlers felt “som e anxieties about how  they would fair a t the 
hands of governm ents controlled by well organized and politically self-conscious Native people.” See 
Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 68.
32 Nominally, even after W ah-Shee and Barnaby’s resignations, the 1 9 7 5 -7 9  NWT legislative 
assem bly retained an Indigenous m ajority: six Inuit, six whites and one Metis. However, perhaps due 
to regional and inter-ethnic divisions, or due to the ideologies of certain Aboriginal MLAs, or because  
the head of the governm ent rem ained the non-Aboriginal, federally appointed com m issioner, Dacks 
confirms th at staatsvolk sym pathies nonetheless dom inated the body.
33 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories Legislative Assembly, “You’ve Heard from the Radical 
Few  . . . Now Hear from the M oderate Many” (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 
1 9 7 7  , 6.
34 Coates and Powell, The M odern North , 112 .
35 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 69.
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people of the Northwest Territories”36 as it is “foreign to the Canadian political 
tradition”37 -  that is to say, contrary to liberal universalism.38 Legislators specifically 
referenced both mobility and voting, the two rights at play in “Kymlicka’s dilemma”: 
“There can be no institution of government in Canada which denies minorities that 
freedom of movement within and without the Territories which Canadians enjoy in 
other parts of the country. Nor can any person living in Canada be denied the right 
to participate in local political institutions in his country, having fulfilled a 
reasonable residency requirement in his region.”39 In short, settlers viewed 
Indigenous nationalist demands for adjustments to the boundaries and/or powers 
of the NWT as affronts to liberally sacrosanct mobility and voting rights. They 
insisted those rights be protected.40
The government of the Northwest Territories did not merely appeal to the 
federal government to rebuff Indigenous nationalism, but moved to intercede 
directly, by inserting itself into claims talks between Aboriginal groups and Ottawa. 
According to Dacks, the NWT government sought “full participation in the 
negotiations and a veto power over the outcome.”41 The NWT government insisted 
that Native claims be treated as real-estate transactions, with no political 
component. Unsurprisingly, Natives groups opposed the NWT’s participation in 
claims negotiations, seeing the settler-controlled territorial government as not 
merely resistant to, but in direct competition with, Aboriginal interests. In 1979, for 
example, Inuit leaders passed a unanimous resolution calling on the federal 
government to bar the NWT government from negotiations over the formation of
36 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories Legislative Assembly, “Priorities for the North,” 
(Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 7 7 ) , ii.
37 Ibid., 1.
38 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 70.
39 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Priorities for the North,” ii.
40 According to Jull, NWT settlers “saw  their deep-rooted liberalism m enaced by ap parent racism  and 
rejection of the individualist values of the English and French Revolutions; they began to insist on the 
clear consum m ation of the political values they felt com fortable with, but which appeared to the 
Native m ajority as a recipe for their own destruction.” See Jull, Political Development, 5.
41 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 69.
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Nunavut.42 The federal government, however, defended the NWT government’s 
right to a place at claims-negotiating tables.43
According to Dacks, the NWT’s staatsvolk were frustrated when, out of 
deference to Dene concerns, the federal government in Ottawa refused to transfer 
even greater powers to the territorial assembly.44 At the same time, many staatsvolk 
likely took solace in the fact that Ottawa rejected the legitimacy of Indigenous 
nationalism.45 Infamously, the federal minister of Indian Affairs and Northern 
Development, Judd Buchanan, called the Dene Declaration “gobbledygook that a 
grade ten student could have written in fifteen minutes”46 and cut off funding that it 
had been providing to Dene land-claims negotiators.47 Similarly, the federal 
government condemned the 1977 Metro Proposal as offensive to liberal 
individualism: “[T]here is no place in Canada for governments based on race or 
ethnicity.”48 The 1981 Denendeh Proposal, too, was rejected. As a condition of 
further discussions with the Dene, the federal government insisted the Dene Nation 
drop “its previous insistence . . . that a substantive right to self-government form a 
fundamental component of any land claim.”49 The federal government affirmed that 
the only government of the NWT would be the existing one, providing rights to 
individuals but not cultural groups.50 Ottawa remained committed to pointing the 
NWT in a universal, majority-nation direction. Even if land was ceded to Aboriginals, 
power would not be. Staatsvolk, both in Ottawa and Yellowknife, had no desire to 
see the territory become an Aboriginal nationalist subunit.
42 Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, “ITC Calls for Removal of GNWT from Land-Claims Negotiations,” July 17, 
1 9 7 9 , h ttp s://w w w .itk .ca/itc-calls-rem oval-gnw t-land-claim s-negotiations (accessed March 28 , 
2 0 1 5  .
43 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 69.
44 Ibid., 89.
45 Ibid., 68.
46 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 69.
47 Coates and Powell, The M odern North , 123 .
48 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the 
N orthw est T erritories,” in N orthern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
R esources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8  , 314 .
49 Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks, 75.
50 Ibid., 75.
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6.4 History of constitutional development: 1980s
At the dawn of the 1980s, the Dene Nation switched tactics, dropping its boycott of 
the NWT government. Native activists, once again including the Dene Nation’s 
former grand chief, James Wah-Shee, ran for and won election to the territorial 
assembly. The body became, for the first time, Indigenous-dominated.51 It 
immediately repudiated the previous assembly’s hostile attitude toward Native 
claims.52 In 1981, formal land-claims negotiations commenced with the Dene and 
Metis. (The Inuvialuit, having begun negotiations in the mid-1970s, signed the 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement, a land-claims but not self-government deal, in 1984.) 
While Indigenous groups did not pin their nationalist hopes for self-determination 
exclusively on their newfound control of the NWT public government, they 
harnessed it to their cause.53
As Dacks stated, “only in the NWT does the pursuit of Aboriginal self­
government raise fundamental questions about the future structure of public 
government.”54 Both the NWT and federal governments began exploring forms of 
constitutional development aimed at politically accommodating the NWT’s ethnic 
divisions without abridging liberal principles.55 At least initially, staatsvolk, both in 
Yellowknife and Ottawa, appeared to favor decentralizing authority to cultural 
communities and sub-regions in the NWT, rather than altering boundaries and 
powers as the Dene Nation had suggested in its various self-government proposals. 
That was the recommendation of the 1980 federally commissioned report 
Constitutional Development in the Northwest Territories, compiled by C.M. Drury and 
often called the Drury Report.56 The report did not embrace ethnically exclusive
51 Dacks, A Choice o f  Futures, 70.
52 Ibid., 70.
53 Kenneth Coates, Canada’s Colonies: A History o f  the Yukon and Northw est Territories (Toronto: 
Jam es Lorim er & Company, 1 9 8 5  , 231 .
54 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” 1.
55 Asch and Dacks, “The Relevance of Consociation,” 37.
56 Cameron and W hite, N orthern Governments in Transition, 50 . As Cameron and W hite put it, 
“Aboriginal styles of governance emphasize keeping governm ent close to the people and maximizing 
popular participation in political decision making. Accordingly, Aboriginal self-governm ent is by its 
very  nature com m unity-centered.” See their N orthern Governments in Transition, 59.
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Indigenous self-government. Rather, it conceived of public government as 
preeminent.57
Beginning with the 1982 plebiscite approving the separation of Nunavut, 
meanwhile, Indigenous groups and the Native-dominated NWT territorial 
government began jointly studying ways to merge Aboriginal self-government and 
public government in the “western” NWT -  the part that would remain after 
Nunavut’s departure. The first such effort, by the Western Constitutional Forum, 
commissioned papers exploring options ranging from exclusive Indigenous control 
of a “quasi-provincial nature” to a “completely integrated Indigenous/public 
government system”58 in which Native residents would enjoy guaranteed 
representation. The Western Constitutional Forum also explored requiring NWT 
voters to meet “possibly a longer than usual requirement for residency”59 -  perhaps 
as much as three years.60 Fearing that the splitting off of Nunavut might render 
Aboriginals a minority in the western NWT (a circumstance certain to diminish their 
majoritarian political power in the public government) Aboriginal negotiators 
insisted that no changes to the territory’s boundaries should occur until self­
government powers were integrated into the fabric of public government and 
Indigenous rights were enshrined in law.61
Then, in 1987, an agreement struck between Nunavut negotiators and NWT 
officials laid out a set of principles for developing a constitution for the post-division 
NWT. Foremost among these would be “to build a system of public government
57 Cameron and W hite, N orthern Governments in Transition, 50.
58 W estern  Constitutional Forum  and Nunavut Constitutional Forum , Boundary and Constitutional 
A greem en t fo r  the Im plem entation o f  Division o f  the Northw est Territories betw een the W estern  
Constitutional Forum  and the Nunavut Constitutional Forum  (Iqaluit: Canadian Arctic Resources 
Committee, 1 9 9 7 ) , introduction.
59 Steve Iveson, “Several W ays to Interface Aboriginal Self-Government with Public G overnm ent in 
the W estern  N orthw est T erritories,” in Partners fo r  the Future: A Collection o f  Papers Related to 
Constitutional Developm ent in the W estern Northwest Territories, ed. W estern  Constitutional Forum  
(Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 8 5 ) , 32.
60 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, Legislative Assembly, Special Committee on 
Constitutional Development, “Residency Requirem ents” (Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est 
Territories, 1 9 8 3 )  , p art II, 2. It is notew orthy th at voters in the 1 9 8 2  plebiscite on division of the 
NWT w ere required to m eet a th ree-year term  of residency.
61 Lesley Malloch, Dene Governm ent Past and Future: A Traditional Dene Model o f  Governm ent and its 
Implications fo r  Constitutional Developm ent in the Northw est Territories Today (Yellowknife: W estern  
Constitutional Forum , 1 9 8 4  , 38.
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which will protect the individual rights of all of its citizens and the collective rights 
of its Aboriginal peoples and whose overarching principle is one of bringing peoples 
together.”62 The agreement proposed that “mechanisms shall be entrenched to 
enable each community to flourish as a distinct cultural entity regardless of its 
proportion of the total population.”63 The agreement stated that such mechanisms 
would include a guarantee of Indigenous participation in government.64
In 1989, the federal government agreed to a Dene/Metis comprehensive 
land-claims agreement-in-principle. However, the tentative settlement did not 
address Aboriginal self-determination, which the federal government felt should be 
exercised through public-government channels.65 Dene leaders supported the 
agreement-in-principle, but at the 1990 Dene Assembly, rank-and-file First Nations 
members rejected it, feeling the draft agreement wrongly conceded Aboriginal 
“inherent” and treaty rights. Ottawa refused to renegotiate. The NWT’s Indigenous 
groups then splintered, at once weakening Indigenous self-determination efforts (a 
boon to settlers) and raising the specter of territorial balkanization and 
unmanageability (which settlers feared) .
The federal government soon signed land-claims agreements with the 
Gwich’in, in the Mackenzie Delta, and the Sahtu, in the central NWT. Those First 
Nations, and the NWT’s other Aboriginal groups, have since pursued diverse self­
government arrangements. The Sahtu for a time proposed a “segmental” plan 
providing for public government for economic development, social services and 
taxation but Indigenous-exclusive government for the management of lands and 
resources; in 2013, one small Sahtu community, Deljne, signed a self-government 
agreement. The Gwich’in and the Inuvialuit for a time jointly sought decentralization 
of power to a public sub-jurisdiction to be called the Western Arctic Regional 
Municipality;66 now the Gwich’in are seeking self-government separate from the 
Inuvialuit. The Akaitcho have pursued self-determination through a strictly
62 W estern  Constitutional Forum , Boundary and Constitutional A greem ent, 3.
63 Ibid., 3.
64 Ibid., 4.
65 McArthur, “The Changing A rchitecture of Governance,” 200 .
66 Cameron and W hite, N orthern Governments in Transition, 69.
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Indigenous government encompassing their traditional homeland in the territory’s 
southeast. The Deh Cho pressed for a new, separate territory in the southwestern 
NWT that would, a la Nunavut, provide de facto  Indigenous control under a 
nationalistic public government. And after division, in 2003, a settlement with the 
Ttjchg became the first joint land-claim and self-government agreement in the NWT, 
with the Ttjchg establishing an Indigenous government that provides limited 
(though not non-existent) representation and services to non-Ttjchg residing in its 
homeland.
With this splintering of Native claims, dreams of a territory-wide, 
Indigenous-controlled public government, as once envisioned by the Dene Nation, 
seemed to dissipate. Nationalists devoted more energy to the claims of individual 
First Nations, and to self-determination that would be expressed through exclusive, 
ethnonational, community- or region-based governments. These governments, such 
as the aforementioned Deljne and Ttjchg governments, would interact with 
Yellowknife and Ottawa through interstate “treaty federalism.” However, as will be 
seen, many Indigenous leaders still pressed for the NWT public government to take 
on a more nationalist character, either as a means to an end (i.e., facilitating the 
negotiation of ethnonational self-governments) or as an end in itself. As well, some 
settler leaders, likely fearing a disintegration of the NWT into multiple Indigenous 
regimes and a concomitant weakening of the public government,67 changed their 
tune: If Indigenous aspirations could be accommodated by weaving “external 
protections” into public government, and thus achieving direct, intrastate 
consociation, perhaps the center could hold. There remained concerns, however, 
that among the general settler population, such “external protections” would prove 
unpalatable, as they would be seen as privileging Aboriginal interests over those of 
settlers.68 In this dichotomy, parallels can be drawn to Canada’s failed 
Charlottetown Accord: Though staatsvolk elites might grant concessions to minority 
nationalists, would the staatsvolk public go along?
67 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” 19.
68 Ibid., 75.
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6.5 History of constitutional development: 1990s
The 1990s saw three developments that collectively both complicated and spurred 
work on an NWT constitutional accord. The first was the impending separation of 
Nunavut, which raised the stakes of ethnic competition due to both geographic and 
demographic opportunities and threats. Second, the federal government affirmed 
the “inherent right” of Indigenous self-government, and, moreover, announced that 
it desired to accommodate this right within the NWT public government, providing 
hope for Indigenous nationalists. Third and finally, providing countervailing hope 
for settlers, the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the consequent 
adjudicability of voting rights called into question the constitutionality of 
overrepresentation in general69 and, more specifically, the constitutionality of the 
accommodation of the Indigenous “inherent right” in public government. These 
developments brought “Kymlicka’s dilemma” to a head in the NWT. They amplified 
the constitutional struggle, leveled the political playing field, and provided each side 
-  Aboriginals and settlers -  with a potential constitutional trump card. While the 
resultant intensification of competition may have spurred efforts to devise a 
workable governance regime in time for Nunavut’s separation, it also, conversely, 
underscored the dramatic divisions that stood in the way. These divisions pitted 
universal individual rights against non-universal Indigenous rights.
6.5.1 Nunavut's separation and resulting threats and opportunities
The first of the NWT’s three key constitutional developments of the 1990s was the 
prospect of Nunavut’s separation. As has been shown, the NWT was preparing for 
the departure of Nunavut long before the official 1993 signing of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement. For the western NWT, the separation of Nunavut presented both 
an opportunity and a threat. Opportunity lay in the fact that separation would create
69 Kent Roach, “One Person, One Vote? Canadian Constitutional Standards for Electoral Distribution 
and Districting,” in Drawing the Map: Equality and Efficacy o f  the Vote in Canadian Electoral Boundary  
Reform, ed. David Small (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1 9 9 1  , 4.
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not one new territory but two.70 The west, like Nunavut, would become a new 
jurisdiction, potentially with a new name and certainly with new borders, 
demographics and political dynamics. For both Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
residents, this would present a chance to shape the NWT in their own ethnocultural 
image. For non-Indigenous residents, the territory, shorn of its less-developed, 
Inuit-nationalist eastern half, could finally evolve into something like “Mackenzie 
Territory.” For Indigenous residents, conversely, the new NWT might finally become 
a Dene nationalist jurisdiction.
Essential to both Indigenous and settler visions would be the issue of 
boundaries and powers. The NWT’s new boundaries would, for both groups, be 
something of an opportunity. For Indigenous people, the post-division NWT would 
become largely co-extensive with the historic Dene homeland, providing better 
geographic “fit” with Dene self-determination. For settlers, meanwhile, the new 
borders would be similar to those of the once-proposed Mackenzie Territory, 
encompassing the more economically valuable, staatsvolk-influenced portion of the 
NWT. The issue of powers, however, was highly fraught. As noted previously, 
demographics in the post-division NWT would become almost precisely evenly 
divided. For settlers, this would represent a dramatic gain. They would either have a 
numerical upper hand or could easily achieve one by adding just a few hundred 
staatsvolk from the millions in southern Canada. This prospect, according to Dacks, 
gave settlers no incentive “to support a constitutional innovation what would 
undermine the majoritarian principle.”71 The opposite would be the case for 
Indigenous people. Without the entrenchment of “external protections,” the post­
division demographic situation would open them up to swamping. Hence, the lead- 
up to Nunavut’s separation brought into even sharper relief the conflict between 
Indigenous residents and staatsvolk regarding the acceptability of Indigenous 
voting-rights-related “external protections.”
70 Constitutional Developm ent Steering Committee, Working Toward Consensus: C onference Report, 
First Constitutional Conference, W estern NW T  (Yellowknife: Constitutional Developm ent Steering  
Committee, 1 9 9 5  , 1.
71 Dacks, “Political Representation,” 151 .
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6.5.2 The ‘inherent right' of self-government
The second of the aforementioned seminal constitutional developments of the
1990s was the recognition of the “inherent right” of Aboriginal self-government. As
previously noted, when the Chretien government issued the “Inherent Right Policy”
in 1995, affirming that section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 guarantees
Indigenous self-government rights, it discussed various means of implementing
those rights. One avenue, which it deemed especially applicable to the NWT, was
through Indigenous accommodations in public government:
Aboriginal groups in the western NWT have a unique opportunity to develop 
self-government arrangements that are not readily available south of the 
sixtieth parallel. In the western NWT, the Government would prefer that the 
inherent right find expression primarily, although not exclusively, through 
public government. . . .
In the federal government's view, the self-government aspirations of 
Aboriginal peoples in the NWT can be addressed by providing specific 
guarantees within public government institutions. The creation of Aboriginal 
institutions to exercise certain authorities may also be a useful approach.72
The phrase “specific guarantees” must be read as referring to non-universal 
“external protections,” particularly the asymmetric apportionment of 
representation. As has been shown, Aboriginal groups pressing for power-sharing in 
the NWT had for two decades been calling for guarantees of representation.
At the time of the “Inherent Right Policy,” the idea of guaranteed 
representation was enjoying currency. In 1996, the federal government’s Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested Native self-government in Canada 
might include “sharing power in joint governmental institutions, with guaranteed 
representation for the nations and peoples involved.”73 Various scholars proposed 
that guaranteed representation is among the “inherent rights” of Canadian 
Aboriginals. Some argued that guaranteed representation should accrue to 
Aboriginals as a consequence of their loss of sovereignty, in the same way that the
72 Governm ent of Canada, Aboriginal Self-Government: The Governm ent o f  Canada's Approach to 
Im plem entation o f  the Inherent Right and Negotiation o f  A boriginal Self-Government (Ottawa: 
Governm ent of Canada, 1 9 9 5 )  .
73 Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Final R eport (1 9 9 6 )  , Chapter 3 -  Governance, Section 1 ­
1.1.
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former colonies of British Columbia and Newfoundland relinquished their 
autonomy and joined the confederation in exchange for seats in Parliament.74 Other 
scholars suggested guaranteed representation in public bodies is an essential 
corollary to enacting and preserving of Aboriginal self-government.75 Finally, some 
thinkers suggested that Aboriginals’ unique constitutional status as fiduciary 
dependents of the federal government entitles them to a fixed share of power in 
Parliament.76 Based on that logic it might follow that, as the NWT government acts 
as Ottawa’s fiduciary agent in the North, Aboriginals there deserve a fixed share of 
power in the NWT legislature.
For at least some of these legal and philosophical reasons, and likely also in 
the simple interests of unity and efficiency, by the mid-1990s the federal 
government was clearly keen to accommodate Indigenous nationalism within, 
rather than outside of, the public government of the NWT. By maintaining the 
western NWT’s boundaries, and by adjusting its powers through consociational 
“specific guarantees within public government institutions,” federal officials seemed 
to hope the “inherent right” could be satisfied without offending the majority-nation 
liberal principles of staatsvolk, including the territory’s settlers. The NWT 
government also championed this goal, vowing in 1996 “to move forward with a 
meaningful self-government agenda which is based on both a recognition of the 
Inherent Right and on an integrated public government/self-government model for 
the rationalized delivery of services.”77 It remained unclear, however, exactly how 
the integration of self-government and public government would be achieved.
74 T revor Knight, “Electoral Justice for Aboriginal People in Canada,” McGill Law Journal 4 6  (2 0 0 1 )  , 
1 1 0 8 .
75 Tim Schouls, “Aboriginal People and Electoral Reform in Canada: Differentiated Representation  
versus Voter Equality,” Canadian Journal o f  Political Science  39 , no 4  (1 9 9 6 )  , 7 3 9 -7 4 0 .
76 Governm ent of Canada Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reform ing  
Electoral Dem ocracy: Final Report, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1 9 9 1 ) , 
182 .
77 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories Legislative Assembly, “Building a Foundation for the 
Future: The N orthw est T erritories’ Agenda for Change” (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est 
Territories, 1 9 9 6  , 16.
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6.5.3 Implications of Charter voting-rights protections
The third of the NWT’s three significant constitutional developments in the 1990s 
was the threat posed by the Charter to illiberal voting rights protections. Following 
the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the specter of constitutional 
challenges quickly began to constrain formal inegalitarianism in Canadian 
apportionment. As will be shown, this was the case in the NWT: During the 
territory’s 1989 apportionment, its legislatively-appointed boundaries commission 
warned of the perils of departure from parity and took unprecedented steps to 
reduce malapportionment. Yet as will also be shown, settlers in Yellowknife 
nonetheless clamored for even greater parity, insisting they were unconstitutionally 
underrepresented and threatening legal action. Thus, by the mid-1990s, the 
prospect of a Charter challenge was the key sticking point in the plan to provide the 
“inherent right” of self-government through Indigenous accommodations in the 
NWT public government.
6.5.4 Pre-division proposals for merging public and self-government
Prior to the 1995 release of the Chretien government’s “Inherent Right Policy,” the 
NWT-commissioned report Working Toward a Common Future, (often called the 
Bourque Report, after the report’s lead author, J.W. Bourque) had in 1992 avoided 
explicitly recommending Indigenous self-government for the future western 
territory, instead proposing a potentially radical decentralization of power from 
Yellowknife to “district orders of government” that might encompass individual 
communities or entire regions. The Bourque Report also floated the idea of pairing 
the NWT legislative assembly with a second, Indigenous-controlled body, a “senate 
or council of elders,”78 but did not explicitly recommend it.
On the heels of the Bourque Report, and during and after the release of 
Chretien’s “Inherent Right Policy,” there came an array of efforts to develop a new 
governance arrangement for the post-division NWT. These efforts were made by a 
succession of joint Indigenous/public-government bodies, including the Committee
78 Commission for Constitutional Development, W orking Toward a Common Future  (Yellowknife: 
Commission for Constitutional Development, 1 9 9 2 )  , 36.
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of Political Leaders, the Commission for Constitutional Development, the 
Constitutional Development Steering Committee and the Western Constitutional 
Forum. Proposals with titles such as Partners in a New Beginning and Common 
Ground advanced various schemes.79 These included constituting a public 
government that “may provide for guaranteed representation for Aboriginal people 
within the legislative assembly,”80 a consociational arrangement involving a 
legislature consisting of two discrete cultural caucuses either of which could veto 
legislation, and various bicameral scenarios in which an Indigenous-only chamber 
would wield veto power.
Despite the diversity of these proposals, they shared the same goal: to unite 
Indigenous self-government and public government via direct, intrastate 
consociation.81 Also identical was the challenge facing these proposals: To create a 
regime with enough deference to collective Indigenous rights to please nationalists 
and enough majority-nation liberal-universalism to reassure staatsvolk settlers. 
Though both the federal and territorial governments supported direct consociation, 
elements of the NWT’s Indigenous polity were wary of compromise. For example, in 
1995 the Akaitcho condemned any partnership with the NWT government as 
illegitimate and declared it would “opt out of the new western territory 
constitutional process and seek a direct link with the federal government.”82 Some 
settlers, too, were intransigent: According to Dacks, “[They] will have to modify 
their liberal individualist assumptions”83 and accept that “it is not likely that any 
central territorial government based on universal assumptions will be able to meet
79 These hardly represented  the only efforts to spur discussion and encourage consensus am ong  
N ortherners concerning the direction of NWT constitutional developm ent. Efforts such as the NWT 
governm ent’s 1 9 9 9  “Agenda for the New North” cited the territory ’s forem ost challenge as being th at  
of devising, once again, “[a] system  of governm ent th at respects the collective rights of Aboriginal 
peoples and the individual rights of all N ortherners.” See G overnm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, 
A genda fo r  a New North: Achieving Our Potential in the 2 1 st Century  (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the 
N orthw est Territories, 1 9 9 9 )  , 1.
80 Constitutional W orking Group, W estern  Caucus of the NWT Legislative Assembly, “Common  
Ground” (Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 9 7 ) , 4.
81 Constitutional W orking Group, Partners in a New Beginning, 16.
82 Constitutional Developm ent Steering Committee, Working Toward Consensus, 13.
83 Dacks, “Politics on the Last Frontier,” 360 .
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the expectations of the groups and also govern with a reasonable degree of
efficiency.”84 If settlers failed to compromise, he warned,
the Native people will most likely attempt to distance themselves from any 
form of public government and to pursue separate Dene/Metis political 
institutions gained through the national process for creating Aboriginal first 
nations governments. Because this expedient would limit inter-ethnic 
political contact, it would limit conflict and also the threat of assimilation 
facing Native people. However it would also greatly reduce the prospects for 
a true process of inter-ethnic integration, and for a unified voice for the NWT 
on the national stage.85
Even as the NWT stood at the brink of division, this challenge had not been 
resolved. In 1995, Dacks again wrote, “A balance will be struck between these 
contending forces. The question is where exactly the balance will lie on the axis 
between self-government and public government.”86 At the time, he predicted 
victory for consociationalists. But he added a caveat: “The only development which 
might counter these trends is a successful court challenge of the distribution of 
constituencies in the NWT. A stricter adherence to a ‘one person, one vote’ system of 
representation would increase the number of Yellowknife constituencies,” 
strengthening opposition in the assembly to Indigenous nationalism.87 As will be 
seen, Dacks was correct. The court challenge indeed occurred, its verdict hinging on 
the degree to which rural Indigenous peoples could be overrepresented, and 
Yellowknife staatsvolk underrepresented, in the NWT legislative assembly.
6.6 Summary
This chapter demonstrated that the NWT’s pre-division constitutional evolution was 
defined by a decades-long struggle for power between its two polities, Aboriginals 
and settlers. In the 1960s, settlers sought division of the territory so the west, where 
they were more numerous, could draw down powers from Ottawa and move toward 
liberal-universalist provincehood. Countervailingly, in the 1970s, Indigenous
84 Dacks, “Politics on the Last Frontier,” 357 .
85 Ibid., 3 61 .
86 Dacks, “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples,” 19.
87 Ibid., 39.
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nationalists proposed that the territory, or subdivisions within it, should receive 
“external protections,” entrenching Native power. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
Aboriginal and settler leaders worked toward a constitutional detente. Yet the 
1990s also saw three developments that brought the conflict between the two sides 
into stark relief. First, the adoption of the Charter placed greater emphasis on formal 
egalitarianism in the apportionment of representation, favoring settlers. Second, 
affirmation of the “inherent right” of self-government offered Aboriginals “external 
protections,” possibly including guaranteed majority power in the NWT 
government. Third, the separation of Nunavut, in the east, threatened to leave the 
west’s settler and Aboriginal polities equipopulous, raising the stakes for both sides. 
At the moment when majority representation in the NWT seemed most essential, 
the rules governing the apportionment of representation were thrown into limbo. A 
constitutional crisis seemed at hand.
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Chapter 7: Representation in the NWT
As noted previously, if a federal subunit is to provide a minority nation with 
autonomy and self-determination, the subunit’s boundaries and powers must be 
appropriate to the task. Boundaries alone may not be enough: They can be breached 
through swamping. Hence, a minority nation may seek “external protections” 
concerning how representation in the subunit is apportioned. By arming itself with 
non-universal voting rights, the minority may safeguard itself from outside 
domination. Yet settlers in the subunit, possibly with the backing of the majority 
nation at large, may attack such protections as illiberal. This opposition may be 
grounded in principled liberal individualism or may, of course, merely exploit such 
principles as a means to secure staatsvolk hegemony over the subunit.1
Such a struggle consumed the pre-division NWT, making the process of 
legislative reapportionment there all but unique among Canadian jurisdictions. 
While political disagreements over apportionment in other territories and provinces 
were undoubtedly often heated, they largely involved intra-national competition, 
waged within unified polities between comparatively fluid factions of majority- 
nationals.2 In the NWT, however, pre-division conflicts over representation 
involved, in Peter Jull’s words, “[n]ot healthy dissent to be resolved by the ballot 
box, but fundamental dispute about whose country it is and what the ground rules 
are.”3 Indeed, reapportionment in the NWT exhibited a nation-versus-nation quality. 
Moreover, it encountered Will Kymlicka’s thorny paradox, in which the liberal rights 
of settlers ran headlong into the collective self-governance rights of Indigenous
1 Avigail Eisenberg, “Domination and Political R epresentation in Canada,” in Painting the Maple: 
Essays on Race, G ender and the Construction o f  Canada, eds. Veronica Strong-Boag, Sherrill Grace, Joan 
Anderson and Avigail Eisenberg (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1 9 9 8 )  .
2 This m ay arguably not be the case in New Brunswick, which, like the NWT, is home to substantial 
populations of tw o founding peoples. As has already been shown in this paper, New Brunswick has 
seen Francophone partitionist m ovem ents quelled through consociational accom m odations. By law, 
boundaries com m issions in th at province m ust take into account “effective representation  of the 
English and French linguistic com m unities.” In recen t years, New Brunswick Francophones, 
displeased by com m ission decisions, have sued to enhance their voting power. As well, of course, 
other “internal m inority” founding peoples -  such as Anglophones in Quebec -  have at tim es pressed  
for, and been accorded, non-universal representation.
3 Peter Jull, Political Developm ent in the Northwest Territories (Ottawa: Governm ent of Canada 
Federal-Provincial Relations Office, 1 9 7 8 )  , 7.
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people. This conflict, once again, made the NWT a laboratory for the study of 
political representation.4
As has been noted previously, the federal government remotely 
administrated the NWT for most of the twentieth century. A fully elected assembly 
was not in place until 1975. Since then, as in other Canadian provinces and 
territories, MLAs have been elected from geographically based single-member 
districts. Also as in other provinces and territories, these districts have been 
periodically reapportioned to respond to demographic and statutory changes.5 
Territorial legislation has required this redrawing take place after every second 
general election. It has further required that an independent electoral boundaries 
commission be impaneled to recommend districting changes, but has left the 
decision as to whether to enact those recommendations to the legislative assembly. 
As will be shown in this chapter, pre-division electoral reapportionments in the 
NWT consistently provided overrepresentation to Indigenous rural districts, for 
reasons ostensibly related to substantive egalitarianism and non-universal, 
consociational “balance.” As will also be shown, this practice was not universally 
accepted. Yellowknife settlers, boundary commissioners and members of the 
territorial assembly frequently called for greater formal parity for voters in the 
capital, often justifying their demands by citing section 3 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.6
7.1 The reapportionment of 1978
When the NWT legislature first became fully elected in 1975, it was a fifteen-seat 
body in which Yellowknife held two seats, or about 13 percent of the total. To 
provide recommendations for reapportionment of the territorial electoral districts 
in 1978, a three-member electoral boundaries commission was formed. The
4 Gurston Dacks, “Political R epresentation in the N orthw est T erritories,” in Representation and  
Electoral Systems, eds. J. Paul Johnston and Harvey E. Pasis (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 
1 9 9 0 )  , 138 .
5 Graham W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness, R epresentation by Population and the Charter: The 
Politics of Redistribution in the N orthw est T erritories,” Journal o f  Canadian Studies 28 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )  , 
5.
6 Ibid., 7.
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commission’s chair, appointed by the NWT’s federal commissioner, was a non- 
Indigenous NWT Supreme Court Justice, C.F. Tallis. Upon the advice of the legislative 
assembly, the federal commissioner then appointed an Inuit member, Louis 
Tapardjuk, from the eastern Arctic community of Igloolik. Finally, upon the joint 
recommendation of Tallis and Tapardjuk, Ted Trindell, a Metis from the western 
community of Fort Liard, was made the third member.
The territory’s Electoral District Boundaries Commission Ordinance, assented 
to in May of 1978, guided the commission’s work. The ordinance required the 
commission to address “geographic and demographic considerations,” including 
those relating to population and accessibility; the diversity of “communities of 
interest” in the territory; “means of communication between various parts” of the 
NWT; and “other similar and relevant factors.” The commission reported that 
among the additional factors it considered were “legislative efficiency and efficacy,” 
and, most notably, the goal of “balancing the varied interests.”7 It can thus be seen 
that, even in the NWT’s first electoral boundaries reapportionment exercise, 
boundary-makers grappled with second-axis questions of formal, substantive (i.e., 
“ombudsperson”) and “community of interest” egalitarianism, as well as with third- 
axis questions relating to inter-polity “balance.”
Per the commission’s unanimous recommendations, the assembly was 
expanded to twenty-two seats. Yellowknife gained one seat, maintaining its 
proportion of representation at 13 percent of the NWT total. At the time,
Yellowknife accounted for 19 percent of territorial residents, meaning its voters 
were underrepresented, with one district exceeding parity by 52 percent. The only 
district more populous was Hay River, the sole staatsvolk-majority riding outside of 
Yellowknife,8 at 75.4 percent beyond parity. Meanwhile, the tiniest electoral district 
was Hudson Bay, comprising the small and exceptionally remote Inuit community of 
Sanikiluaq, located on an island accessible only from Quebec. Hudson Bay’s 
population was less than a tenth that of Hay River -  74.4 percent below parity.
7 N orthw est Territories Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, R eport (Yellowknife:
Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 7 8 )  , Appendix 4.
8 Hay River, on the south shore of Great Slave Lake not far from the Alberta border, has for decades 
been the NWT’s road, railway, and river-barge hub, with a substantial settler population.
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7.2 The reapportionment of 1983
For the 1983 territorial reapportionment, a three-member boundaries commission 
was again appointed. It consisted of a non-Aboriginal chair, Supreme Court Justice 
Joseph Potts, and two Native members, Dene chief Jim Antoine of Fort Simpson and 
David Alagalak from the Inuit community of Arviat.
This time, in making its recommendations, the boundaries commission was 
split. Antoine and Alagalak wrote the majority report, which was adopted by the 
legislative assembly. Though since the last reapportionment Yellowknife’s 
population had grown to 21.3 percent of the territorial total, the capital’s share of 
representation was not increased. Indeed, as the assembly was expanded to twenty- 
four seats, Yellowknife’s proportion of seats actually dropped, to 12.5 percent.9 The 
capital’s three districts were left between 44.1 percent and 95.5 percent above 
parity. The only other similarly underrepresented electoral district was Inuvik (also 
with a significant non-Indigenous population) at 62.8 percent over parity. As in 
1978, Hudson Bay was by far the smallest riding.
Once again, the Electoral District Boundaries Commission Ordinance guided 
the commission’s work. The majority, in explaining its recommendations, cited such 
factors as “diversity of interests and great distance between communities,” “means 
of transportation and communication,” “the large number of communities” in a 
particular electoral district, “community of interests,” and the amelioration of 
malapportionment. The majority did not address non-universal factors such as 
“balance” between cultural communities. Nor did it explain its reasons for advising 
that Yellowknife’s share of representation be kept at three seats. Notably, the 
majority did mention that the committee had explored creating a seat reserved for 
Indigenous people in Yellowknife, but concluded such a move would first require 
revisions to the Northwest Territories Act.10
In an extensive “minority report,” the chief commissioner, Justice Potts, 
agreed with the majority in all ways but one. Though noting that the NWT “is very 
unique” with respect to accessibility, diversity of interests, and means of
9 W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness,” 7.
10 NWT Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, Report (1 9 8 3 )  , 13.
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communication, Potts called for a fourth seat for Yellowknife. He maintained that, 
while providing ombudsperson service is undeniably difficult in the rural NWT, 
MLAs’ other, and “probably the more important role,” is representing constituents 
“by speaking and voting for them in the legislative assembly.”11 Given this fact, Potts 
argued that the principle of representation by population “cannot be ignored.” Potts 
cited testimony of several Yellowknife residents who told the commission that 
providing the capital with an additional seat would not only be democratic and just, 
but would encourage Yellowknifers to perceive the NWT government as politically 
legitimate.
7.3 The reapportionment of 1989
As in previous years, the 1989 boundaries commission consisted of three members. 
Justice Tallis was again the chair, with the other members being Rosemarie Kuptana, 
an Inuvialuit leader from Sachs Harbor, and Richard Hardy, a Metis leader from the 
Sahtu region. The commission’s work took place under the territory’s new Electoral 
District Boundaries Commission Act, passed earlier that year. In wording almost 
identical to that of the 1978 ordinance, the act required the commission to address 
“geographic and demographic considerations,” including those relating to 
population and accessibility; “any special community or diversity of interests” in the 
territory; “means of communication among various parts” of the NWT; and “other 
similar and relevant factors.” The act did not establish a threshold of permissible 
deviation from parity.
Graham White extensively analyzed the reapportionment of 1989, studying 
whether, in the wake of the adoption of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, judicial 
attention to the section 3 voting-rights provision would constrain the NWT 
government’s “distinctiveness,” and especially its ability to accommodate 
Indigenous nationalism through overrepresentation.12 In effect, he examined
11 N orthw est Territories Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, R eport o f  the Northwest 
Territories Electoral District Boundaries Commission to the Speaker o f  the Legislative Assembly  
(Yellowknife: G overnm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 8 3 ) , 14.
12 W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness.”
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whether the Charter might do to non-universal voting rights in the NWT what it had 
done to non-universal language rights in Quebec.
White confirmed that it did. He reported that the NWT’s 1989 
reapportionment featured unprecedented conflict between advocates of formal 
egalitarianism, on one hand, and defenders of what White called “Northern 
distinctiveness,” on the other. During the boundaries commission’s hearings, 
Yellowknife residents, demanding fairness, called for two additional seats. Non- 
Yellowknifers pushed back on various grounds: that no single community should be 
dominant in the assembly, that advantaging Yellowknife would destabilize the 
NWT’s balance of power, that Yellowknifers were transient, that they already 
enjoyed disproportionate access to government representatives and services, and 
that the city was unlike, out of touch with, and unconcerned about, the rest of the 
NWT. One prominent witness even “noted approvingly that in the United States, the 
national capital has no representation.”13
In its report, the electoral boundaries commission, though noting “the unique 
nature of this vast territory,” for the first time dwelt upon the topic of voter parity. It 
cited section 3 of the Charter, stating, “[I]f deviation from the principle of voter 
equality becomes too large, then one’s vote may be debased to the point where it 
cannot be justified by special circumstances and considerations.”14 The commission 
thus recommended the elimination of the tiny Hudson Bay riding (“Disparity in 
voting power on the basis of special circumstances has its limits . . .”15) and, more 
significantly, provided Yellowknife with a fourth seat in the twenty-four-seat 
assembly. Though noting that this move “was resisted by some citizens,” the 
commissioners maintained it “will not disturb the balance that was stressed by so 
many speakers.”16 This was because the new seat would be transferred to the 
capital from Pine Point, a staatsvolk mining town that had recently shut down, 
leaving behind a vacant “rotten borough.” Though the new seat would increase
13 Ibid., 15.
14 N orthw est Territories Electoral Districts Boundaries Commission, R eport o f  the 1 9 8 9 /9 0  Electoral 
District Boundaries Commission, Northw est Territories (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est 
T erritories, 1 9 8 9  , 18.
15 Ibid., 19.
16 Ibid., 19.
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Yellowknife’s proportion of MLAs to 16.7 percent, the capital’s population, too, had
increased, to 25.5 percent, meaning its four electoral districts would still be
malapportioned, by values ranging from 52.8 to 54.1 percent above parity. Under
the commission’s plan, most of the NWT’s semi-urban districts would also exceed
parity; all but one rural Indigenous district would fall below parity. The two smallest
NWT electoral districts would be Deh Cho and Tu Nedhe, at 63.4 and 65.7 percent
below parity, respectively.
According to White, when the assembly took up the issue of the boundary
commission’s plan, it did so for the first time under the threat of a lawsuit by NWT
settlers claiming abridgement of their section 3 voting rights.17 A lawsuit was
indeed launched, targeting not the proposed plan but the existing, 1983-era
boundary scheme. The assembly ultimately approved the new plan in all but a few
minor details, rendering the lawsuit moot. Still, White’s analysis of the NWT’s 1989
reapportionment exercise included a trenchant forecast. He noted that,
unprecedentedly:
[t]he Charter forced the commission to concentrate on the equality of 
individual voters, which is only one component of representation even in 
liberal democracies and, in light of the social and political distinctiveness of 
the NWT, by no means the most important component of representation
there [T]o the extent that northern political distinctiveness is more than
an exotic curiosity, but represents a political response to the unique political 
problems of the North, this is not a positive development.18
7.4 The NWT as an intervenor in the Carter case
It is noteworthy that, shortly after the 1989 reapportionment, in the Supreme Court 
of Canada’s Carter case, the NWT government participated as an intervenor. The 
territorial minister of justice protested to the court that the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms does not apply to apportionment, as, since confederation, the redrawing 
of electoral maps had been solely the responsibility of the provinces and
17 W rites W hite, “For some time, rum ours had been circulating of pending legal action by Yellowknife
business interests, which would challenge the Boundary Commission rep o rt [T]he m ayor of
Yellowknife gave an interview  on CBC radio w arning th at serious legal consequences could ensue if 
the city w ere not granted greater representation  than th at recom m ended by the com m ission.” See 
W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness,” 21 .
18 Ibid., 25 .
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territories.19 It can be assumed that the NWT government felt compelled to 
participate in this case out of concern for further Charter constraint of its “Northern 
distinctiveness.” Like Quebec in its opposition to the Charter’s adoption a decade 
earlier, the NWT government presumably worried that the Charter’s limitations on 
“centrifugal territorialism” would imperil the territory’s freedom to use voting- 
rights-related “external protections” that guarded Aboriginal self-determination and 
were at the heart of the NWT’s inter-polity consociational arrangement. The 
Supreme Court, of course, disregarded the NWT government’s argument, confirming 
that provincial and territorial apportionment must indeed respect the Charter.
7.5 Summary
As was shown in this chapter, the apportionment of representation in the pre­
division NWT assembly reflected the territory’s long-running power struggle. In the 
1970s, rural Aboriginals were overrepresented vis-a-vis Yellowknife. This practice 
continued in the next decade, though settlers began agitating for, and threatened to 
launch Charter challenges concerning, their underrepresentation. By the cusp of the 
1990s it seemed likely that in future reapportionments, the Charter might constrain 
rural Indigenous overrepresentation. Combined with the threat of settler 
“swamping” posed by Nunavut’s separation, this prospect boded ill for power- 
sharing in the NWT public government, bringing “Kymlicka’s dilemma” into high 
relief.
19 R obert Behrm an, “Equal or Effective Representation: Redistricting Jurisprudence in Canada and 
the United States,” A m erican Journa l o f  Legal History 51 , no. 2 (2 0 1 1 )  : 2 8 9 .
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Chapter 8: Findings and analysis
In representative democracies, apportionment is inherently contentious, as it affects 
the distribution of power. But in an ethnically divided, constitutionally evolving 
jurisdiction in which nationalist Indigenous peoples and majority-nation settlers 
suddenly find themselves equipopulous, and where the course of constitutional 
evolution has long been torn between nationalist and “region-based” ambitions, and 
where political and judicial decisions about “external protections” such as non- 
universal apportionment may be the deciding factor regarding the constitutional 
shape the jurisdiction will take, it can be surmised that redistricting might be 
especially competitive. In such instances, it would be no surprise that 
apportionment might take on a zero-sum, nation-versus-nation character, and that 
questions of voting-rights theory might be hotly debated. In the NWT at the brink of 
division, the most fundamental of these questions was the challenge posed by 
“Kymlicka’s dilemma.” If, in a multination state, the individual voting rights of 
settlers serve to constrain the self-determination interests of Indigenous national 
minorities, and vice versa, whose rights should prevail?
It has been established in this thesis that, as the NWT neared 1999, a 
constitutional impasse loomed. Yet while significant scholarship was at the time 
devoted to those building tensions, their climax and denouement were largely 
overlooked. This oversight has left fallow a rich field of inquiry, with a potential 
yield of insights. This chapter analyzes the 1998-99 NWT reapportionment and 
related events in three steps. First, this chapter examines the developments leading 
up to the Friends o f  Democracy lawsuit: the legislative debates about whether to 
reapportion the NWT at the cusp of division, the work of the 1998 boundaries 
commission, and the legislative reaction to the commission’s recommendations. 
Second, this chapter explores the Friends o f  Democracy lawsuit: the submissions of 
the applicants, respondents and intervenors, and the ruling of the court. Finally, this 
chapter looks at the legislative and judicial reaction to the lawsuit: the decisions 
make by the NWT cabinet, the countervailing arguments made by Aboriginal 
organizations and non-cabinet MLAs, the attempt to appeal the Friends decision, and 
the hearings, report, and votes on an act aimed to satisfy the Friends ruling. These
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events are analyzed through the lenses of liberal theory, voting-rights jurisprudence 
and the political history of the NWT. By taking this approach, I aim to illuminate 
how “Kymlicka’s dilemma” was confronted in the division-era NWT.
8.1 The 1998-99  reapportionment
The NWT’s 1998 reapportionment was proposed in anticipation of the territory’s 
first post-division election, slated for autumn 1999. Without districting adjustments, 
Nunavut’s separation would leave the NWT legislature with just fourteen seats (see 
Table 1) . Of these, four, or 28.6 percent, would be in Yellowknife. The city’s post­
division population would be 44.2 percent of the territorial total, meaning that 
without adjustment, Yellowknifers would be significantly underrepresented. One 
district, Yellowknife South, with 7,105 residents, would exceed parity by 152 
percent. Yet due to the confluence of legal and demographic factors already 
discussed, any proposal to alter the balance of seats in the territory was sure to 
engender controversy. Thus, when a motion to establish an electoral boundaries 
commission came before the assembly in June 1998, several rural MLAs urged that 
reapportionment be delayed. The ensuing assembly debate represented a 
microcosm of the conflict that would surround the 1998-99 reapportionment.
MLAs opposed to the formation of an electoral boundaries commission 
justified their stance using various rationale. Some said adding assembly members 
would be both too expensive and, as division would reduce the NWT population, 
unnecessary. Some cited “ombudsperson” challenges posed by representing remote 
districts. Some challenged the notion that Yellowknife districts were 
underrepresented, arguing that their populations were miniscule relative to the 
crowded ridings found in most provinces. One MLA, David Krutko, representing 
three small Gwich’in and Inuvialuit communities in the Mackenzie Delta, appealed 
directly for “representation by place,” suggesting that apportionment be based “not 
by the size of the community but by the size of your land base.”1 Some, citing an 
informal agreement struck earlier that year between MLAs and the Aboriginal
1 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories Legislative Assembly, “Hansard,” (Yellowknife: 
Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, June 2, 1 9 9 8 )  , 1 5 6 8 .
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Summit, an umbrella organization representing the territory’s Dene, Metis and 
Inuvialuit, urged reapportionment be delayed for “process” reasons, to allow time 
for a constitutional accord to be crafted between the government and Indigenous 
groups. According to Thebacha MLA Michael Miltenberger, “We can do 
[reapportionment] once division happens, once the dust settles, when two 
territories are up and running, once the constitutional process, which we have 
invested millions in, ha[s] had a chance to deal with this issue.”2 Some appealed 
directly for “balance.” Tu Nedhe MLA Don Morin, whose constituency comprised 
two small Akaitcho Dene and Metis communities, stated, “[Y]ou always have to 
watch the balance of what is happening in this legislative assembly. There is no 
doubt in anybody’s mind that Yellowknife is growing.”3 In speaking about this 
balance, Morin and the assembly’s other opponents of reapportionment referred to 
urban-rural and socioeconomic divisions. At no point did they publicly frame the 
debate in ethnocultural terms.
MLAs supporting formation of a boundaries commission, meanwhile, 
provided similarly diverse justifications for their position. Some, including but not 
limited to Yellowknifers, suggested that having just fourteen members would lead to 
an excessive workload for both ministers and “regular” MLAs, a shortage of 
committee members vis-a-vis committees, a power imbalance between cabinet and 
regular MLAs, and a similar imbalance between legislators and “the bureaucrats.” 
Some challenged the above-mentioned “process” argument, suggesting the timeline 
for achieving a constitutional accord was indefinite and growing more so. Finally 
some MLAs appealed directly for greater representation. At least one, an Inuvik 
MLA, called for more seats for the northern NWT. The others, of whom most but not 
all were Yellowknife MLAs, demanded equitable representation for Yellowknifers.
As stated by Yellowknife MLA Seamus Henry, “[T]he question we have to decide 
here today . . . is about fairness and equality in representation.”4 Some warned that, 
without districting adjustments, a lawsuit was inevitable. Only once did pro­
2 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (June 2, 1 9 9 8 )  , 1 5 6 5 .
3 Ibid., 1 5 6 7 .
4 Ibid., 1 5 6 9 .
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reapportionment MLAs address ethnocultural divisions. According to Yellowknife 
MLA Roy Erasmus, who was himself Indigenous, “There are a lot of Aboriginal 
people, as well as non-Aboriginal people, in my riding, and obviously the Aboriginal 
Summit has indicated that they do not wish to see a boundaries commission. 
However, I have to consider what it best for the whole of my constituency, not just 
one part.”5 Ultimately the assembly voted nine-to-four to appoint a boundaries 
commission.
Table 1: NWT Legislative Assembly composition, 1998-99
Electoral District MLA District Type Position
Deh Cho Sam Gargan Rural Speaker
Frame Lake Charles Dent Yellowknife Cabinet
Hay River Jane Groenewegen Semi-urban Regular MLA
Inuvik Floyd Roland Semi-urban Cabinet
Mackenzie Delta David Krutko Rural Regular MLA
Nahendeh Jim Antoine Rural Cabinet
North Slave James Rabesca Rural Regular MLA
Nunakput Vince Steen Rural Cabinet
Sahtu Stephen Kakfwi Rural Cabinet
Thebacha Michael Miltenberger Semi-urban Cabinet
Tu Nedhe Don Morin Rural Regular MLA*
Yellowknife Centre Jake Ootes Yellowknife Regular MLA
Yellowknife North Roy Erasmus Yellowknife Regular MLA
Yellowknife South Seamus Henry Yellowknife Regular MLA
*Morin served as premier, and thus as a cabinet member, until resigning in December 1998.
8.1.1 The 1998  electoral boundaries commission
On June 10, the assembly appointed the commission’s three members: Nick 
Sibbeston, a Metis and former NWT premier from Fort Simpson, Lucy Kuptana, an 
Inuvialuk from Tuktoyaktuk, and chair Virginia Schuler, a non-Indigenous 
Yellowknifer and NWT Supreme Court judge. As per the NWT’s Electoral Boundaries 
Commission Act, the three were tasked with reviewing “the area, boundaries, name 
and representation of the existing electoral districts” and preparing a report 
recommending whether, and what, changes should be made.
5 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (June 2, 1 9 9 8 )  , 1 5 6 4 .
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That summer the commissioners conducted hearings across the territory. In 
September they issued their report. In it, they explained that their research had, as 
in past reapportionments, been guided by factors laid out in the Electoral 
Boundaries Commission Act, which might generally be categorized as attention to 
voter parity (“demographic considerations”) , consideration of communities of 
interest (“cultural and linguistic interests”) and challenges presented by 
ombudsperson service (“accessibility,” “the means of communication,” etc.) . All of 
the above factors relate to the rights of voters as individuals.6 But the 
commissioners also noted that the legislative assembly had issued them a special 
directive, related to the interests not of individuals but collectivities: to “strive to 
maintain a balance between urban and rural populations.”7
The commissioners reported that in their hearings, public comments 
centered around themes such as opposition to the expense of additional ridings, 
“substantial concern on the part of smaller communities about being ‘overwhelmed’ 
by Yellowknife,”8 the need to proceed cautiously in the face of change, and concerns 
about interrupting or complicating the ongoing process of constitutional 
negotiations. According to the report, “Many view the latter process [constitutional 
negotiations] as the forum where major political changes will be made.”9 In outlying 
regions, including the Deh Cho, Mackenzie Delta, Sahtu and Ttjchg, some presenters 
called for additional seats. Many pointed to challenges concerning “ombudsperson” 
service in their remote regions. Some “urged us to consider that there are factors in 
the north which may justify departure from the 25% rule.”10 In Yellowknife, 
residents of the Indigenous enclaves of Detah and N’dilo called for their own district. 
As for the rest of Yellowknife, “the majority . . . wanted to see the electoral districts 
changed to reflect the principle of ‘representation by population.’”11 A number of
6 Again, per Shaw v. Hunt, voters are aggregated by “com m unity of in terest” in ord er to provide 
individuals with a meaningful vote. The right to be aggregated in this m anner thus attaches to people, 
not “peoples.”
7 N orthw est Territories Electoral Boundaries Commission, R eport o f  the NW T Electoral Boundaries 
Commission (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 9 8 )  , 1.
8 Ibid., 4.
9 Ibid., 4.
10 Ibid., 10.
11 Ibid., 8.
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Yellowknifers made reference to the Carter decision. Some urged adherence to the 
+/-25 percent deviation-from-parity standard “accepted elsewhere in Canada.”12 
When it came to making recommendations, the commission was divided. As 
in 1983, the commission’s Aboriginal members penned the majority proposal. In it, 
Sibbeston and Kuptana prefaced their remarks by discussing factors that make the 
NWT “very different from the provinces”13: a “unique” political history, layers of 
ethnocultural and geographic divisions, the “desire and right of Aboriginal peoples 
to attain and play a meaningful role in the Legislative Assembly,”14 the 
“ombudsperson” advantages of large communities, the need for urban-rural balance, 
the challenges of “adoption and blending of democratic ideals, practices and systems 
of government,”15 and especially the ongoing process of constitution-making. 
Regarding this last factor, the majority went so far as to suggest that “if significant 
changes are to be considered, they should wait until the current processes have 
resulted in a constitutional framework and structure of government which can be 
expected to last for some time. We recognize and indeed we recommend that a 
further boundaries commission should be established when that government is in 
place.”16 The majority then called for Yellowknife to receive two additional electoral 
districts, including a small one, encompassing Detah and N’dilo, where Indigenous 
people would form a near, if not clear, majority. This would result in a sixteen-seat 
assembly in which Yellowknife would occupy 37.5 percent of the seats. Under this 
scheme, all but two of Yellowknife’s districts would exceed parity by more than 25 
percent. The largest would be 38 percent above parity, four times larger than the 
NWT’s smallest district, Tu Nedhe.
In the minority report, the commission’s chair, Justice Schuler, proposed a 
more symmetric division of the six proposed Yellowknife districts in which none 
would have an Indigenous majority nor exceed +25 percent. In rejecting the call for 
a district comprising mainly Detah and N’dilo, she suggested that the riding’s small
12 NWT Electoral Boundaries Commission, R eport (1 9 9 8 )  , 10.
13 Ibid., 11.
14 Ibid., 11.
15 Ibid., 11.
16 Ibid., 12.
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population would create “an imbalance in the Yellowknife electoral districts as a 
whole.”17 Moreover, she suggested that the Akaitcho First Nation’s ongoing self­
government negotiations (mentioned previously) , in which Detah and N’dilo were 
involved, “may better address the goals of the Yellowknives Dene First Nation than 
new electoral boundaries can.”18 Justice Schuler seemed to suggest that the NWT 
assembly was not the best venue through which to protect collective Indigenous 
rights.
8.1.2 The 1998  legislative debates
For two days in November 1998, MLAs gathered in the assembly to discuss and vote 
on the electoral boundaries commission’s recommendations. Compared to the 
assembly’s earlier deliberations over whether to form the commission, this debate 
was more combative, squarely confronting the territory’s ethnocultural divisions.
Several MLAs, including those from Yellowknife, lauded the electoral 
boundaries commission, noting its diverse and esteemed membership, praising its 
hard work, and pointing to what they felt was its right-minded conclusion: that 
Yellowknife should receive two additional seats. In backing this view, supporters 
offered various justifications. These included the inefficacy of a fourteen-seat 
government, the elusiveness of a constitutional accord between Indigenous and 
public-government leaders, the disproportionate tax burden shouldered by 
Yellowknife (an appeal to “stakeholder” egalitarianism , and the potential 
consequences of legislative inaction, including that, in the event of a legal challenge, 
a court might not only add seats in Yellowknife but also strike down the NWT’s 
exceptionally low-population districts, some of which were far more than 25 
percent below parity.
But predominantly, these MLAs grounded their arguments in the logic of 
formal egalitarianism. In doing so, they tacitly characterized the NWT as a unified 
demos composed of individuals, each formally equal to one another. Frequent 
reference was made to democracy, fairness, parity and the Charter. In a forthright
17 NWT Electoral Boundaries Commission, R eport (1 9 9 8 )  , 15.
18 Ibid., 15.
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speech that championed formal over substantive egalitarianism, Yellowknife MLA 
Charles Dent acknowledged the capital city’s enviable socio-economic position but 
deemed it no justification for underrepresentation: “There is no question 
government has fueled the growth of Yellowknife over the past twenty years. The 
law of Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, says individual rights must be 
respected. Relative parity is required. Economic advantage . . . or ability to walk into 
the legislature is not what governs the size of the legislature.”19 Seamus Henry, also 
a Yellowknife MLA, called for egalitarian reciprocity, saying, “You can tell your 
constituents, I did nothing more for the residents of Yellowknife than I would do for 
my own community.”20 Further, echoing Madison, he warned that majorities that 
abuse minorities may end up reaping what they sow: “If individuals of this house 
deny the right to equal representation for one community, it may be your turn 
tomorrow.”21 Meanwhile, Yellowknife MLA Roy Erasmus was even more direct in 
accusing the majority of tyranny: “[T]he sentiment of the members and the rest of 
the communities . . . exactly demonstrates why Yellowknife needs more seats.”22 In 
effect, he charged that rural lawmakers had put reapportionment in a self-serving 
“stranglehold” -  the same sort of anti-democratic monopoly on power that had 
prompted American courts to finally enter the “political thicket.”
Yet perhaps the more distinctive arguments in favor of greater 
representation for Yellowknife were premised not on universalism but the opposite. 
Erasmus, for one, suggested that satisfying Yellowknife’s demands would not impair 
Indigenous self-determination, because in the near future “Aboriginal governments 
may be just as powerful, and perhaps more powerful, than this house,” the 
consequence being that “the communities will have additional representation 
outside of this house. Why are some members afraid to give the Yellowknife area 
more seats in such a diluted government?”23 In effect, Erasmus was raising the issue 
at the heart of “West Lothian problem,” which is ultimately one of “stakeholder”
19 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 18.
20 Ibid., 25 .
21 Ibid., 22 .
22 Ibid., 30.
23 Ibid., 23 .
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inequality: Why should splinter governments need to both draw down power from, 
and also retain disproportionate power in, a central government? Meanwhile, 
Stephen Kakfwi, the MLA for Sahtu, noted that the Indigenous population of 
Yellowknife was growing, meaning it, too, was increasingly underrepresented.24 
Drawing on utilitarian understandings of political legitimacy,25 Kakfwi argued that 
“as long as the Aboriginal population is part of the economic growth of this country 
and that they feel they are partners in the development, the number of people 
representing them directly or indirectly in this legislature would not be that 
significant a concern.”26 Then Kakfwi proposed what amounted to a consociational 
“external protection” to guard Indigenous interests in an otherwise egalitarian 
legislature. He suggested that the assembly could ensure that non-Yellowknife 
ministers dominate the cabinet by establishing a convention whereby two ministers 
would be chosen from the northern NWT, two from the southern NWT, and two 
from the capital.27
Opponents of additional Yellowknife representation spoke with equal 
vehemence. They pointed to the capital’s conspicuous wealth, its disproportionate 
receipt of government projects and funding, the adequacy of a fourteen-seat 
legislature, the expense of adding assembly seats, and, conversely, their displeasure 
at having their own regions’ requests for new seats denied. Some of their logic was 
substantively egalitarian, including emphasis on the ease of direct access to 
government enjoyed by Yellowknifers and the “ombudsperson” challenges said to 
hobble effective representation in remote districts. In a classic appeal to substantive 
egalitarianism, Michael Miltenberger, the Thebacha MLA, quoting a newspaper 
editorial, questioned, “In a democracy everyone is equal on voting day, but what 
happens to equality between elections?”28
24 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 20.
25 This was the view  perhaps m ost famously espoused by Jerem y Bentham , who “proposed th at 
legitim acy depends on w hether a law contributes to the happiness of the citizens.” For m ore, see 
Fabienne Peter, “Political Legitimacy,” Stanford Encyclopedia o f  Philosophy (Sum m er 2 0 1 0  Edition), 
ed. Edw ard N. Zalta. h ttp ://p la to .s tan fo rd .ed u /arch iv es/su m 2010 /en tries /leg itim acy / (accessed  
April 2 7 , 2 0 1 1 )  .
26 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 21.
27 Ibid., 21 .
28 Ibid., 15.
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Most of the arguments of these opponents were premised on a conception of 
the NWT as non-universal. They spoke of the territory not as a united polity of 
individuals who deserved equality (formal, substantive, or otherwise) , but as a 
landscape riven by pluralism. Some referenced the threat of “swamping” by 
Yellowknife newcomers: Said Miltenberger, “Since 1967, they have basically 
quadrupled in size.”29 They characterized the NWT as in need not of egalitarianism 
but of balance among factions. Jim Antoine, the MLA for Nahendeh, who had served 
on the 1983 boundaries commission, implied that the NWT’s rural peoples had 
already made good-faith efforts to share power with the capital: “We have here as a 
government, and this legislative assembly, been able to accommodate 
Yellowknife.”30 Now, however, Yellowknife was keen on what Inuvik MLA Floyd 
Roland called “hoarding the power,”31 which the capital sought to justify by citing 
individual rights. This “hoarding,” it was said, would upset the precarious “balance 
of power” between Yellowknife and the remainder of the NWT. “If this report was to 
go as it is,” said Roland, it would “make for a very difficult operation of a 
government, because you would potentially set up a Yellowknife caucus versus the 
rest of the Western Territory.”32
To preserve the delicate equilibrium upon which the NWT’s political stability 
was said to depend, opponents urged collaboration between polities. Don Morin, the 
Tu Nedhe MLA, stated, “I believe that it is our government’s responsibility to supply 
the glue that holds all those regions together. I myself personally am not ready to 
throw up my hands and give up on establishing a new Western Territory where all 
people can work together for the betterment of all.”33 Miltenberger struck a similar 
note: “We are in the process of . . . trying to weave the political fabric for the new 
Northwest Territories. The fabric has to be strong in the north, south, east and west,
29 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 15.
30 Ibid., 24 .
31 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 10 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 29.
32 Ibid., 29 .
33 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 19.
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and not just in the centre.”34 To achieve this, he suggested, “[W]e cannot forget our 
partners in the Aboriginal Summit.”35
Respecting the NWT’s government’s Indigenous “partners,” opponents 
suggested, was a duty that inhered to Yellowknife as the territorial capital. In effect, 
they suggested that failing to do so would betray a sort of “social contract,” whereby, 
a la Locke, the NWT’s hinterlands had bequeathed power to the capital on the 
condition that it protect Indigenous interests. According to Antoine, “[T]here should 
be an effort by the city to promote Yellowknife as the capital for all the north and 
not only turn its own attention to the interests of Yellowknife.”36 If Yellowknife 
refused to consociate, warned Mackenzie Delta MLA David Krutko, Indigenous 
leaders would follow suit. A rebellion would be at hand. “[T]he Aboriginal groups 
that have been involved in the constitutional process have come to a point of not 
seeing any light at the end of the tunnel to say that there is a possibility of us 
working together and striving for a better Western Territory.”37 Morin issued a 
similar warning, worthy of Lijphart. Indigenous groups, he said, “are going to 
express their inherent right of self-government one way or another, by working 
together or by working in a parallel system” which would likely involve 
ethnoculturally exclusive self-governments.38 Direct, public-government 
consociation would be rejected in favor of a looser Indigenous relationship with 
settlers -  a sort of quasi-separation. “Intrastate federalism” in the NWT would be 
replaced by interstate “treaty federalism,” weakening and perhaps completely 
bypassing the NWT’s public government, dealing a blow to Yellowknife. Indeed, 
Miltenberger suggested that the capital would acquire power not by taking it, but 
giving it: “In this case, a strong Northwest Territories is good for Yellowknife.”39
Finally, the MLAs once again noted that the NWT is constitutionally evolving 
-  “a government in transition” -  and called for deference to the process through 
which the territory’s disparate peoples were negotiating a constitutional accord.
34 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 14.
35 Ibid., 15.
36 Ibid., 23 .
37 Ibid., 21 .
38 Ibid., 19.
39 Ibid., 26 .
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This process, they suggested, shouldn’t be preempted. According to Hay River MLA 
Jane Groenewegen, “When some of the constitutional and governance issues are 
established . . . I will be all for supporting Yellowknife’s equal and fair 
representation in this legislature with additional members.”40 In effect, 
Groenewegen seemed to say, only after representation was apportioned 
appropriately to non-universal polities in the NWT should egalitarianism for 
individuals be addressed.
A contentious series of votes followed. First, a Yellowknife MLA moved to 
enact the recommendations of the boundaries commission, granting two extra seats 
to Yellowknife. This was defeated six-to-seven, with all four Yellowknife MLAs, plus 
Stephen Kakfwi and Nunakput MLA Vince Steen, on the losing side. It was only the 
third time in Canada’s history that the recommendation of an electoral boundaries 
commission had been rejected by a legislature.41 Next came a motion from a 
Yellowknife MLA to add just one extra Yellowknife seat, which was also defeated.
Then, opponents of additional representation for Yellowknife proposed a 
motion to equalize the populations of the city’s four ridings, ameliorating 
underrepresentation in the most egregious outlier, the district of Yellowknife South. 
Yellowknife MLAs and their supporters blasted this suggestion, in part on the 
grounds that compelling parity among Yellowknife districts, while instituting no 
similar requirement across the rest of the NWT, would be a non-universal double­
standard.42 Groenewegen joined Kakfwi, Steen and the Yellowknifers to defeat this 
motion. Legislative options seemingly exhausted, the debate over the electoral 
boundaries commission’s report ended as it had begun, with Yellowknife 
significantly underrepresented and the district of Yellowknife South severely so.
8.2 The Friends of Democracy case
The following day, Yellowknife MLA Jake Ootes rose in the assembly to announce a 
meeting of Yellowknife citizens vowing to challenge the assembly’s boundaries
40 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 26.
41 John C. Courtney, Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada’s Electoral Districts (M ontreal: McGill- 
Queens University Press, 2 0 0 1 )  , 117 .
42 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 30.
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decision in court.43 This came as no surprise. Opponents such as Miltenberger said
they welcomed judicial intervention: “[L]et there be a court challenge I think it is
up to us to make a strong legal case, substantiating the unique northern 
characteristics that would justify maintaining the current number of MLAs.”44 
Others lamented the news, with Steen, who had voted with the Yellowknife MLAs, 
suggesting that if the assembly left the decision to the courts, it would be 
acquiescing to a form of colonial rule.45 Yellowknife MLA Charles Dent made a last- 
ditch proposal that the assembly add five new seats, three in Yellowknife and one 
each in Hay River and Inuvik.46 It came to naught.
8.2.1 The applicants' case
In early December, a group of Yellowknife residents calling themselves the Friends 
of Democracy47 filed the lawsuit Friends o f  Democracy v. Northwest Territories 
(Commissioner) in the NWT Supreme Court. NWT Supreme Court Justice Mark de 
Weerdt, a longtime Northern judge, heard the applicants’48 case. In the applicants’ 
submission, they showed that seven of the NWT’s fourteen electoral districts 
deviated from parity in excess of +/-25 percent, the generally accepted Canadian 
standard. Of these, two Yellowknife districts and the Hay River district were 
exceptionally large while four rural districts were exceptionally small. The 
applicants further noted that the variance in population between the NWT’s largest 
and smallest districts, Yellowknife South and Tu Nedhe, was 843 percent, “meaning 
that, in practical terms, it takes 8.4 votes in Yellowknife South to equal one vote in
43 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 13 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 6.
44 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 12 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 15.
45 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 13 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 7.
46 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (Nov. 11 , 1 9 9 8 )  , 4.
47 The group Friends of D em ocracy was founded by Robert Slaven, a t the time a Yellowknife city  
councilor. Other m em bers included Yellowknife Mayor David Lovell, Fraser W eir, Bill Enge and Sandy 
Holmes. Notably, Slaven m oved aw ay from Yellowknife in 2 0 0 1 . For m ore see B rent Reaney, “Form er 
Yellowknifer Knows His Questions,” Northern News Services, March 23 , 2 0 0 5 , 
h ttp ://w w w .n n sl.co m /fram es/n ew sp ap ers/2005 -03 /m ar23_05 j.h tm l (accessed April 5, 2 0 1 5 )  .
48 In Canadian legal parlance, applicants are parties who file suit, respondent are parties being sued, 
and intervenors are third parties with an in terest in the outcom e of the case granted leave to make 
argum ents and subm it evidence. These roles are largely analogous to plaintiffs, defendants and 
intervenors in the U.S. legal system .
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Tu Nedhe.”49 They concluded: “The existing electoral boundaries therefore clearly 
offend the principle of parity of voting power which is at the heart of the section 3 
right to vote.”50 Arguing in effect that this offense is not redeemed by any uniquely 
Northern requirements of “effective representation,” nor by the territory’s 
distinctive “historical and social context,” the applicants insisted that the NWT “is 
not so different that fundamental democratic principles do not apply.”51 Then they 
attacked other rationale for urban underrepresentation. Questioning justifications 
rooted in substantive rather than formal equality, they suggested that 
“ombudsperson” service was not easier but possibly harder to provide in 
Yellowknife than in remote communities, due to the capital’s greater population and 
heterogeneity of interests. Regardless, they deemed “ombudsperson” arguments to 
be moot. As per the Alberta Reference ruling detailed previously, they maintained 
that “the fact that smaller populations may be warranted for certain rural or isolated 
ridings does not justify the underrepresentation of urban voters [emphasis in 
original].”52 In short, the applicants argued that even if rural ridings are 
exceptionally small, Yellowknife ridings must not be exceptionally large. This 
problem was solvable, they suggested, by providing Yellowknife with additional 
seats.
The applicants then challenged suggestions that adding urban seats would 
upset the territory’s “balance of power.” Such balance, they said, was relevant only 
to the degree that it should reflect the true urban/rural population balance in the 
NWT -  that it respect the sort of “partisan” equality championed by Grofman, 
whereby parties’ proportion of legislative seats should be equal to their vote share. 
Such a view, of course, rests on universalism, presuming that the groups whose 
power must be balanced are second-axis “communities of interest” -  aggregations 
formed of, and designed to protect the rights of, individual voters. The 
countervailing suggestion that “balance of power” should be maintained in a ratio
49 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , “Brief of Fact 
and Law of the Applicants,” 19.
50 Ibid., 20 .
51 Ibid., 29 .
52 Ibid., 22 .
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not reflective of the territory’s population balance presumes that the jurisdiction is 
non-universal, composed of collective “peoples” first and individual people 
secondarily. According to the applicants, this view “represent[s] a fundamental 
misapprehension of the right to vote under section 3. The section 3 right is an 
individual right [emphasis in original].”53 In essence the applicants argued that non- 
universal demands for “balance” are claims that the Charter’s voting-rights clause 
does not acknowledge, and which it would certainly not favor over the voting rights 
of individuals.
Finally, the applicants challenged process-based arguments for delaying 
egalitarian apportionment. They suggested that the NWT’s constitutional 
negotiations might continue for an unforeseeable and possibly protracted period, 
and that in the interim the suspension of section 3 rights was intolerable. In effect, 
they maintained that voting rights in the NWT must be accorded to voters in a 
universal manner at least until such a time as non-universalism became 
constitutionally recognized. Moreover they argued that, given the very gravity of 
these ongoing constitutional talks, and given that the NWT government was a key 
party to the negotiations, insuring that all NWT residents were effectively 
represented in that government, and thus in the establishment of power-sharing, 
was all the more critical.54 (This argument, while on its face laudably egalitarian, 
raises a host of questions related to the previously discussed “boundary problem,” 
concerning whether there exists a universally fair method of constituting a non- 
universalistic state. Delving into that question is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
though it is surely clear that power-sharing cannot be decided by popular vote. After 
all, to repeat Vernon Van Dyke’s observation, “[In] a multinational state, it is as 
inappropriate to think of majority rule as it would be in the world as a whole.”55) In 
summing up their arguments, the applicants asked the court to invalidate the NWT’s 
existing apportionment scheme.
53 Friends, “Brief of the Applicants,” 24.
54 Ibid., 25 .
55 Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity and Discrimination  (W estport, Connecticut: Greenwood  
Press, 1 9 8 5 )  , 172 .
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8.2.2 The respondents' case
In mid-February of 1999, the legal counsel for the NWT attorney general submitted 
the territorial government’s response to the applicants’ submission. The response 
began by quoting Justice McLachlin -  not from Carter, but from the previously 
mentioned Dixon case, decided when she was still the chief justice of the British 
Columbia Supreme Court. In it, McLachlin announced that “departure from the ideal 
of absolute equality may not constitute breach of section 3 of the Charter so long as 
the departure can be objectively justified as contributing to better government of 
the populace as a whole.”56 “Better government,” the NWT government argued, was 
precisely what the territory’s present apportionment scheme had been crafted to 
provide.
“Better government” is a nuanced term. Though McLachlin in Carter repeated 
and affirmed the rationale of “better government,” it is unclear whether she was 
conflating it with her more oft-used phrase in that case, “effective representation.” 
The two concepts are arguably distinct. Where “effective representation” seems to 
attach solely to individuals, better government could be read more broadly, 
protecting meaningful representation of individuals while also securing such 
governance-related values as stability and justice, including perhaps by striking 
consociational detentes between competing polities. As the respondents, the NWT 
government suggested that in the North, better government had always trumped 
voter parity. Since the territory’s first reapportionment in 1978, leaders had 
“accepted that Yellowknife would be underrepresented in favor of the smaller 
communities with Aboriginal majorities.”57 Yellowknife’s underrepresentation 
compensated for rural disadvantages related to “ombudsperson” service, travel and 
socioeconomics, provided effective representation to small but culturally distinct 
“communities of interest” (such as the Chipewyan-language speakers in Tu Nedhe) , 
and facilitated tacit power-sharing between the NWT’s two competing peoples, 
Yellowknifers and Aboriginals. For twenty years, the NWT government maintained,
56 Dixon v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 1 9 8 9  2 4 8  (BC SC) .
57 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , “Brief of Fact 
and Law of the Respondents,” 15.
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the territory had honored this “better government” arrangement, making no 
substantive changes to the apportionment of representation. “The record is clear,” it 
stated, “that there has been an historic balance of interests . . . to preserve a balance 
of power.”58 Now, more than ever, such a balance was essential. Yellowknife still 
dominated the territory by almost every measure. Quoting Graham White,59 the 
government maintained that the capital, home to the NWT’s large, influential and 
mostly non-Indigenous bureaucracy, “represents a concentration of economic and 
political power as formidable as it is unpalatable.” Given what was at stake at the 
cusp of division -  the birth of a new jurisdiction, the negotiation of a landmark 
constitution -  the government argued that, “the limitation on the voters of 
Yellowknife . . . is justified because of the potential political polarization and 
paralysis along ethnic lines which could occur because of the disturbance to the 
balance of power.”60
Just as the apportionment value of “balance of power” was essential in the 
NWT, the government argued that parity had always been a secondary 
consideration. Canada’s federal electoral-boundaries scheme, after all, guaranteed 
representation to Canada’s territories regardless of their population, which the 
government cited as proof that the North was a special case, where perhaps the 
common +/-25-percent “departure from parity” standard should be relaxed. Carter, 
similarly, had exempted Saskatchewan’s two northernmost districts from a strict 
interpretation of section 3.61 If, as McLachlin had written in Carter, “[t]he northern 
regions are in a class by themselves,”62 then shouldn’t the NWT’s remote districts be 
also? From this, the NWT government argued that Yellowknife South should be 
measured not against Tu Nedhe but against typical provincial districts, compared to 
which Yellowknife South’s population was, they said, “miniscule.”63 The NWT
58 Friends, “Brief of the Respondents,” 16.
59 Graham W hite, “Northern Distinctiveness, R epresentation by Population and the Charter: The 
Politics of Redistribution in the N orthw est T erritories,” Journal o f  Canadian Studies 28 , no. 3 (1 9 9 3 )  , 
7.
60 Friends, “Brief of the Respondents,” 18.
61 Ibid., 12.
62 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchew an), 2 SCR 1 5 8  (1 9 9 1 )  .
63 Friends , “Brief of the Respondents,” 16.
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government thus seemed to suggest that districts “in a class by themselves” should 
be considered in isolation, being neither measured against other districts in the 
territory nor having other districts measured against them. (As such, districts like Tu 
Nedhe would in fact not be treated in the same manner as the northern 
Saskatchewan ridings, which are held to a fixed 50-percent standard and included in 
the overall provincial calculation of parity, but rather would be treated like the 
aforementioned Vuntut district in the Yukon, the population of which is neither 
limited nor used in parity calculations.) The latter is key, especially in small 
legislatures such as that of the NWT, as otherwise, inclusion of extremely small 
ridings would mathematically amplify the degree of underrepresentation in large 
ridings, increasing the likelihood of a breach of section 3.
In its submission, the NWT government then posed the question, would 
continued underrepresentation of Yellowknife lead to the capital being 
“tyrannized”? Unlikely, it said. The NWT’s Indigenous population was too 
heterogeneous to conspire against the capital (more echoes of Madison) , and 
anyway, so far, “the Aboriginal majority . . . [has] failed to halt the spectacular 
economic growth of Yellowknife.”64 Not only was Yellowknife currently 
substantively advantaged, but it also had little at “stake” in being underrepresented, 
as it would feel few ill effects. The NWT government conceded that the territory’s 
current apportionment scheme did not impair Yellowknife “as minimally as 
possible.”65 “Better government” could still have been achieved with a more 
egalitarian scheme. But the absence of such a scheme, the NWT government said, 
was the fault of Yellowknife’s own MLAs, who had blocked the motion to equalize 
the population of their four districts.
Given the NWT’s historic and ongoing need for balancing power between its 
discrete polities, and given the import of protecting various sorts of egalitarianism 
of which formal parity had always been but one, and given the minimal “stake” that 
Yellowknifers had in diminishing malapportionment vis-a-vis ruralites’ stake in 
maintaining it, the NWT government argued that “[t]he deviations and electoral
64 Friends, “Brief of the Respondents,” 18.
65 Ibid., 18.
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boundaries can be justified . . . because they contribute to better government.”66 The 
government called for deference: Carter, it noted, had held that “courts ought not to 
interfere with the legislature’s electoral map under section 3 of the Charter unless it 
appears that reasonable persons applying appropriate principles . . . could not have 
set the electoral boundaries as they exist.”67 The NWT, it argued, “is unique and 
deserving of a northern solution which could result in the long run with a model of 
government that could be the envy of any jurisdiction with a significant Aboriginal 
population.”68 To permit this consociational future, to cope with the distinctive 
Northern circumstances of the present, and in conformity with long-honored past 
practices, the NWT government argued that the legislature had behaved reasonably 
and appropriately, and that the apportionment scheme it had approved should be 
allowed to stand.
8.2.3 The intervenors' case
In the Friends case, several Indigenous organizations, together representing almost 
all of the NWT’s Dene and Metis people, successfully petitioned the NWT Supreme 
Court to be accepted as intervenors. In their submission to the court they made little 
effort to muster egalitarian justifications for Yellowknife’s exceptional 
underrepresentation. They barely mentioned the “ombudsperson” role or 
socioeconomic disparities suffered by remote districts. As well, they made only 
oblique appeals to such apportionment considerations as “community of interest” or 
“minority representation” -  considerations that, Carter had affirmed, “may justify 
departure from absolute voter parity in the pursuit of more effective 
representation.”69 Instead, the intervenors’ case hinged on two arguments. The first 
resembled that of the respondents: That section 3 must be interpreted in the light 
of, and that the impugned legislative decision should receive particular judicial 
deference due to, the special historical and political context of the NWT. Secondly, 
the intervenors argued that even if section 3 was found to have been violated, the
66 Friends, “Brief of the Respondents,” 19.
67 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchew an), 2 SCR 1 5 8  (1 9 9 1 )  .
68 Friends, “Brief of the Respondents,” 16.
69 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchew an), 2 SCR 1 5 8  (1 9 9 1 )  .
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impugned legislation should be considered constitutionally “saved” by the Charter’s 
section 25, the Aboriginal “non-derogation” clause.
Concerning the first argument, the intervenors cited Carter: “the content of a 
Charter right is to be determined in a broad and purposive way, having regard to 
historical and social context.”70 They implored that section 3 “be interpreted and 
applied so as to ensure effective representation within the cultural and political 
context of the post-division Northwest Territories.”71 This context reflected the 
NWT’s unique evolution: a decades-long process of reconciling the rights and 
ambitions of, in effect, two demoi -  Indigenous peoples seeking self-determination 
and settlers championing universal liberal democracy. This evolution had reached a 
decisive moment. They quoted Gurston Dacks: “It is to be hoped that the two visions 
will converge as the western NWT constitutional-development process unfolds. 
However, should either side prove too inflexible, the outcome of very separate, and 
cost-ineffective, governments is very apparent.”72 Given all these circumstances, 
they said, “it may not even be appropriate to consider parity of voting power as 
having primacy at the present stage of evolution.”73 Like the respondents, the 
intervenors cited Carter's call for deference: “the courts must be cautious in 
interfering unduly in decisions that involved the balancing of conflicting policy 
considerations.”74 The legislature’s decision should stand, the intervenors said, as it 
“represents an accommodation which is justifiable under section 3 of the Charter at 
this point in time.”75
Pursuing their second argument, the intervenors suggested that, even if a 
section 3 violation had occurred, the NWT’s current apportionment scheme was 
protected by section 25. The intervenors argued that altering the assembly, 
especially on the brink of division and with a constitutional accord under
70 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchew an), 2 SCR 1 5 8  (1 9 9 1 )  .
71 Friends, “Brief of the Intervenors,” 3.
72 Gurston Dacks, “Canadian G overnm ent and Aboriginal Peoples: The N orthw est Territories: Paper 
prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,” RCAP Notes (Ottawa: Royal Commission 
on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 9 9 5  , 3.
73 Friends, “Brief of the Intervenors,” 17.
74 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchew an), 2 SCR 1 5 8  (1 9 9 1 )  .
75 Friends, “Brief of the Intervenors,” 18.
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development, would violate the collective rights of NWT Indigenous peoples. The 
collective rights they emphasized were in effect “process” rights. As the “inherent 
right” would be meaningless if it was not successfully implemented, and as 
implementation required negotiating with the staatsvolk government, the 
intervenors claimed that the “inherent right” implied a corollary “right to a full and 
unfettered negotiation process.”76 They cited extensive case law to show that such 
“process” rights were indeed among the Indigenous rights granted by the 
constitution and protected by section 25. The NWT assembly, they stated, honored 
the “process” when it voted “to postpone electoral realignment until the new 
territory and its government are in place and an appropriate and democratic 
process can be pursued to reshape the government of the territory.”77 In effect, the 
NWT assembly had respected Aboriginals’ “negative” right to protection so their 
“positive” right to self-determination could be freely fulfilled. Alteration of the status 
quo, the intervenors suggested, would betray good-faith negotiations, a move that, 
in contravention of section 25, would “abrogate and derogate from” Indigenous 
rights. The intervenors asked the court to deny the applicants’ challenge.
8.2.4 The ruling
On March 5, 1999, Justice de Weerdt issued his decision. De Weerdt stated that the 
question before the court was “whether the underrepresentation of voters at 
Yellowknife . . . is in violation of section 3 of the Charter.”78 He ruled it was.
In explaining his decision, de Weerdt first addressed issues relating to 
egalitarianism. He made no references to issues of “stakeholder” equality, nor 
“community of interest” equality. Concerning substantive equality, however, he 
agreed that, given the NWT’s distinctive geographical and other features, 
performance of the “ombudsperson” role was doubtlessly difficult in rural districts. 
Hence, he said, many of those districts had been apportioned to have significantly 
fewer constituents than the territorial average, an adjustment providing each voter
76 Friends, “Brief of the Intervenors,” 22.
77 Ibid., 52.
78 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , 6.
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therein with “effective representation.” Having already compensated voters in rural 
districts by making their ridings smaller, why additionally impair urban electors by 
making their districts exceptionally large? Said de Weerdt, “It is surely not 
necessary or appropriate to ensure that the ‘ombudsman role’ of Yellowknife 
representatives is made more burdensome.”79 Then de Weerdt, quoting the Alberta 
Reference decision -  “No argument for effective representation of one group 
legitimizes underrepresentation of another group”80 -  went on to suggest that the 
obvious solution was a larger legislature. Providing two seats to Yellowknife, as 
recommended by the boundaries commission, would “reduce to some degree the 
levels of numerical overrepresentation in many of the outlying districts while at the 
same time reducing quite markedly the levels of underrepresentation in the larger 
centers at Yellowknife.”81
De Weerdt then tackled the non-universal issues advanced by the 
intervenors. While the judge was careful not to concede that concerns relating to 
“balance of power” were germane to the question before the court, he suggested 
that, regardless, they were moot. Providing Yellowknife with two more seats would 
still leave the capital’s legislative share at just six of sixteen, a clear minority. Given 
this, mitigating the underrepresentation of Yellowknifers “need not in any really 
significant way alter the existing balance of political power,” he wrote.82 As this 
balance was not in jeopardy, the judge concluded that judicial deference was 
unnecessary.
De Weerdt then suggested that without judicial action, power would be 
unduly denied -  not merely to Yellowknife settlers but to Yellowknife Aboriginals, 
who formed a fifth of the capital’s population. Here, of course, he was affirming 
egalitarian rights of individual Native voters, not collective rights of non-universal 
Indigenous polities. Finally, de Weerdt condemned suggestions that the population 
of Yellowknife’s four existing ridings should simply be equalized to solve the 
extraordinary underrepresentation of Yellowknife South. To do so, he said, “would
79 Friends , 13.
80 R eference re  Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan).
81 Friends , 13.
82 Ibid., 12.
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create a separate enclave at Yellowknife where all citizens, including Aboriginals, 
would be held to a markedly different standard of effective representation.”83 In 
effect, the judge argued that treating Yellowknife as a “third axis” collectivity would 
be impermissible because doing so would result in “second axis” dilution of the 
voting power of Yellowknifers as individuals.
De Weerdt took a similarly dim view of arguments concerning the Charter’s 
section 25 “shield” and its capability of “saving” voting-rights violations. First, given 
the central role of voting in democracy, he questioned whether Indigenous 
protections could ever trump voting rights: “It is clear that neither the existence nor 
the due exercise of that right should depend on the leave . . . of any government or 
executive authority, be it in relation to the negotiation or enjoyment of any 
Aboriginal land claim or other Aboriginal treaty right.”84 Second, he argued that, as 
laws cannot be enacted if they violate the Charter, any legislation that does so 
(including, he seemed to imply, “external protections” aimed at superseding section 
3) would be ipso facto  invalid.85 But he then qualified his stance, stating that section 
3 was not subject to section 25 “at least in the present instance,” given that the 
evidence before the court failed to show how two additional Yellowknife districts 
would imperil identifiable, existing collective rights. The only Aboriginal rights 
purportedly at stake in this case, he declared, are “process rights,” and it is “entirely 
unacceptable that such a fundamental right of citizenship as that recognized and 
guaranteed in section 3 . . . should be held in suspense, and thus be withheld, during 
government negotiations over the future self-government of Aboriginal or other 
groups which might yet take decades to bring to a conclusion.”86
De Weerdt concluded his ruling by stating, “I am unable to find . . . 
justification for the gross underrepresentation of those . . . districts where the 
variations are markedly (25% or more) above the average. This gross 
underrepresentation must constitute a clear violation of section 3.”87 De Weerdt
83 Friends , 12.
84 Ibid., 10.
85 Ibid., 10.
86 Ibid., 11.
87 Ibid., 8.
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thus found the above-parity “ceiling” in the NWT to be encountered at +25 percent. 
As was previously noted, this is the general Canadian standard, albeit tighter than 
that observed in at least one province at the time, Nova Scotia. He deemed all three 
of the NWT’s “markedly” large districts -  Yellowknife South, Yellowknife North and 
Hay River -  unconstitutional. He gave the assembly one month, soon to be extended 
to six months, to create a new apportionment scheme.
8.2.5 Friends of Democracy: an assessment
When examined against the background of liberal theory, existing apportionment 
case law, and the NWT’s constitutional history, the submissions and ruling in 
Friends o f  Democracy v. Northwest Territories prompt numerous questions and 
observations. The first set of these questions and observations relate to liberal 
egalitarianism, the next set to liberal universalism.
Did Friends give appropriate consideration to “substantive” equality (i.e., the 
equal quality of representation provided to individuals) vis-a-vis formal equality 
(i.e., numerically equal “weight” or “power”) ? This question may be approached 
from several angles. First, it may be asked whether formal equality was as relevant 
to representation in the division-era NWT as it was in other Canadian jurisdictions. 
As noted previously, the NWT legislature, unlike provincial assemblies such as 
Saskatchewan’s, to which the Carter ruling applied, had long operated by 
“consensus.” NWT MLAs thus ostensibly interacted with each other via “Burkean” 
collaboration, not “liberal” competition. As was shown previously, formal equality 
among districts is of little import in a Burkean system, where constituencies are not 
seen to be at odds. It could thus be argued that formally equal apportionment was of 
less relevance in the division-era NWT than it would have been elsewhere in 
Canada. Of course, if the NWT assembly’s “consensus” system was a misnomer, as 
suggested previously, or if settlers desired to end the consociational convention of 
“consensus” in favor of the “liberal,” competitive model practiced in Canada’s 
staatsvolk-controlled provinces, then formally egalitarian districting would arguably 
remain relevant.
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What about the other side of the equation? Was substantive equality more 
relevant in the NWT than it was in other jurisdictions? Given the NWT’s unique 
geography, the performance of “ombudsperson” service in the territory certainly 
posed greater challenges than elsewhere in Canada. It could also be said that the 
rural NWT faced other “substantive” disabilities, due to poverty, English illiteracy, 
low education levels, significant need for government services, and unavailability of 
government-service agencies. Finally, it is true that in the NWT, rural Indigenous 
constituents embraced a “descriptive” concept of representation that would 
arguably have been more difficult to provide in large districts than the 
“authorization” concept of representation embraced by settlers. For all these 
reasons it can be argued that adjusting district sizes to compensate for substantive 
inequality would have been of unusual import in the division-era NWT.
Of course, the Friends ruling did not condemn the creation of very small 
districts in the NWT -  at least not straightforwardly. Instead, it constrained such 
districts backhandedly, in at least two ways. First, it applied the Alberta Reference 
ruling to the NWT, which, by lowering the ceiling on large districts, concomitantly 
raised the floor on small ones, diluting their voice. Second, it set the ceiling 
specifically at +25 percent, the Canadian norm. Each of these decisions must be 
examined in turn.
First, regarding Alberta Reference, was Justice de Weerdt correct in observing 
that, having already made rural ridings exceptionally small, “[i]t is surely not 
necessary or appropriate to ensure that the ‘ombudsman role’ of Yellowknife 
representatives is made more burdensome”?88 This seems an arguably facile 
statement, for if the remedy for substantive inegalitarianism is to provide rural 
ridings with a “quotient” of relatively greater representation, it is mathematically 
irrelevant whether one increases the relative representation of the rural 
“numerator” or decreases the relative representation of the urban “denominator.” 
Under- and overrepresentation are yin and yang, irrevocably interlinked.
88 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , 13.
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Application of the Alberta Reference decision leaves electoral-district 
mapmakers with two options -  or possibly three. The first, which the Friends ruling 
required in the NWT, involves diminishing urban underrepresentation by adding 
more urban ridings. De Weerdt corrected his above oversight by noting that adding 
urban ridings would also impact rural ridings, “reduc[ing] to some degree the levels 
of numerical overrepresentation in many of the outlying districts while at the same 
time reducing quite markedly the levels of underrepresentation in the larger centers 
at Yellowknife.” Increasing the number of seats in the NWT legislative assembly 
would mitigate the territory’s degree of urban underrepresentation. It would do this 
by diminishing rural overrepresentation. Of course, in a large assembly like Alberta, 
where the number of exceptional rural ridings is small and the number of 
“unexceptional” districts is large, adding urban seats will have little effect on rural 
overrepresentation. But in the division-era NWT, where exceptional rural districts 
were almost as numerous as “unexceptional” ridings, adjustments to the latter 
would significantly impact the former. Due to simple mathematics, the Alberta 
Reference ruling’s effects on “exceptional overrepresentation” weighed 
disproportionately heavily on the NWT. This is because, in small legislatures, the 
aforementioned yin-and-yang of under- and overrepresentation are linked more 
tightly than they are in larger legislatures.
Alberta Reference, of course, offers a second option for remedying egregious 
underrepresentation: subjecting small ridings (or perhaps all ridings) to mergers. 
Given the division-era NWT’s clearly exceptional “ombudsperson” challenges, which 
militated against elimination of small ridings, as well as its diverse “communities of 
interest,” which would have been harmed by merging them with other ridings, this 
option would clearly have been undesirable and perhaps, per Carter, illegal, as it 
might have denied “effective representation” to small-district constituents. Thus, in 
this second option as in the first, Alberta Reference provided the NWT with less 
leeway to achieve “effective representation” through variable-sized districting than 
would have been open to less “exceptional” jurisdictions such as Alberta.
Of course, in its response to the court, the NWT government pressed for a 
third option, which would have sidestepped Alberta Reference, in effect de-linking
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over- and underrepresentation. The NWT government argued that the territory’s 
exceptionally small districts should be considered “in a class by themselves” and 
thus should neither be measured against larger NWT ridings (not a problem, said de 
Weerdt) nor have those larger ridings measured against them (which de Weerdt, 
through Alberta Reference, rejected) . By treating the small districts as free-floating, 
they would have been provided with not less but more leeway than is available in 
southern provinces. As noted previously, this is how various territories and 
provinces treat exceptional districts, including the riding encompassing the tiny 
community of Old Crow in the Yukon.
A second and related way in which Friends backhandedly condemned the 
NWT’s small districts relates to where the ruling set the territory’s departure-from- 
parity “ceiling.” The location of this “ceiling” is critical, of course, because it is only 
when urban districts rise above the ceiling that Alberta Reference kicks in. Friends 
put the ceiling in the NWT at +25 percent, the Canadian norm, and deemed all 
ridings in excess of that norm to be unconstitutional. Critics might question this 
decision. After all, the Supreme Court of Canada’s precedent-setting Carter decision 
avoided entrenching a fixed upper limit on departure from parity, thus encouraging 
flexibility where circumstances require it. Yet the “ceiling” established in Friends 
was identical to, and thus no more flexible than, the legislated threshold in Ontario, 
Quebec and B.C. Indeed, +25 percent was lower than the ceiling observed at the time 
in Nova Scotia. Given the division-era NWT’s exceptional “ombudsperson” and 
“community of interest” challenges, and the fact that the application of Alberta 
Reference would impact the NWT disproportionately, it might seem odd that the 
territory would be required to observe a departure-from-parity “ceiling” providing 
it with less apportionment flexibility than was enjoyed by the far more conventional 
jurisdiction of Nova Scotia.
The final second-axis observation that arises from the Friends case is that the 
decision did not address “stakeholder” egalitarianism. As shown previously, the 
holding of a “stake” in the outcome of government decisions is what justifies the 
right to vote. It seems clear that in the NWT in 1998-99, Indigenous voters, as 
compared to Yellowknifers, had more at “stake” -  they had both more to gain and
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more to lose. This was the case the NWT government made to the court, arguing that 
Yellowknife’s record of disproportionate economic success despite its past 
underrepresentation was evidence that its voters had little to fear if 
underrepresentation continued. The government might also have cited the capital’s 
rather remarkable rate of population turnover, the consequence of which was that 
far fewer settlers than Aboriginals would feel the long-term effects of territorial 
legislation, especially legislation of a constitutional nature. Even more so, the 
government might have noted that for Aboriginal people, the NWT was an ancestral 
homeland, whereas for staatsvolk it was a place where almost all of them were 
exogenous and from which they enjoyed a “right of exit” back into any of Canada’s 
other federal jurisdictions. Where two groups are constitutionally opposed, as they 
were in the NWT, and where for one group but not the other the “stakes” at play in 
constitutional decision-making may involve, in effect, cultural survival, it can be 
seen as violating “stakeholder” egalitarianism, and undermining the purpose of the 
right to vote, not to acknowledge that distinction.
Similarly challenging observations arise when Friends is studied from a third- 
axis perspective. To what degree did the ruling take into account the existence of, 
and remedies for, non-universalism in the NWT? This question can be examined 
through various sub-questions: First, was Justice de Weerdt wrong to avoid deeming 
“balance of power” to be relevant to the Friends case? The applicants had argued 
that such concerns mattered only insofar as seats in the assembly should accord 
with, in effect, second-axis “partisan” egalitarianism, whereby “balance of power” in 
the territory would be in line with the balance of population. But as has been shown, 
by the time of division the NWT had seen decades of conflict between competing 
non-universal polities -  Indigenous people and staatsvolk -  each seeking dominance. 
Meanwhile, through consociational political devices, administrative 
decentralization, constitutional negotiations, and the like, these polities had struck a 
tentative balance of power. Because of the threat of settler “swamping,” the key 
demand of Aboriginals was that, in the NWT, representation not be fixed to 
population share. Rather, of course, Aboriginals sought “external protections” 
ensuring retention of control of their homeland even if they became outnumbered.
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The NWT assembly had acknowledged these non-universal concerns when it 
directed the 1998 boundaries commission to “strive to maintain a balance between 
urban and rural populations,” and even the boundaries commission had recognized 
the deep schisms in the territory when it urged deference to the ongoing process of 
constitution-making. So why was the judge dismissive of the relevance of “balance”? 
This question can be examined from a number of angles.
The applicants in Friends had argued that section 3 was a definitively 
individual right, and that to think otherwise “represented] a fundamental 
misapprehension of the right to vote.” Did it? The truth may hinge on whether the 
Charter is read to guarantee “effective representation,” which was the central 
principle in Carter and was the preferred interpretation in the Friends decision, or 
whether it instead guarantees the broader concept of “better government,” central 
to Dixon but merely affirmed in Carter. As noted previously, whereas “effective 
representation” does seem definitively individual, “better government” does not.
The latter would appear capable of encompassing not just first- and second-axis 
questions, relating to individualism and egalitarianism, but also superordinate 
third-axis questions where conflicts must be reconciled not just between people but 
peoples. Where power-sharing arrangements must be established either directly or 
indirectly -  as occurred at Canada’s confederation, or through the U.S. “Great 
Compromise,” or via Belgian consociation -  the aim is not primarily the provision of 
“effective representation” to individuals but rather the “constitutionally prior” goal 
of balancing power between consociating polities so as to achieve “better 
government.”
According to both the NWT government and the intervenors in their 
submissions to the court, and certainly in the view of rural MLAs, the key issues at 
stake at the brink of Nunavut’s separation were not primarily ones of individual 
voting rights but of avoiding “political polarization and paralysis along ethnic lines,” 
striving to “weave the political fabric for the new Northwest Territories,” protecting 
“the collective right of Aboriginal/First Nations peoples to govern themselves, and 
indeed, to survive as peoples,” and so on. These were non-universal concerns, 
essential to “better government.” And what, in cases such as this, might “better”
137
mean? It could mean any of the previously discussed reasons why multinational 
states depart from official universalism and grant group-based rights to internal 
minorities: to better facilitate minority-nation self-determination, to better avoid 
anti-democratic majority tyranny, to better promote culturally rooted liberal 
“individual flourishing,” to better respect preexisting treaties and agreements, to 
better provide Rawlsian justice, and to better facilitate legitimacy, stability and 
peace. To subordinate these goals to egalitarianism, as Friends did, might be seen as 
putting the second-axis cart before the non-universal horse.
Why did Friends do this? After all, Carter declared that the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms should be read in a “broad and purposive way, having regard to 
historical and social context,” and that, moreover, judicial deference should be paid 
to laws passed by “reasonable persons applying the appropriate principles.” 
Certainly, examining the “historical and social context” of apportionment in the 
NWT might have been expected to reveal that “balance of power” was at the crux of 
territorial apportionment, not incidental to it. Further, it might have been expected 
to lead the court to defer to the assembly’s decision, deeming the MLAs to have been 
“reasonable persons” who had “appl[ied] appropriate principles” when, in 
November 1998, they voted to maintain the districting status quo. To turn a blind 
eye to the political salience of non-universalism in the division-era NWT, and to 
treat the case as nothing more than a classic example of “silent gerrymandering,” 
with rural legislators clinging to power by avoiding formally egalitarian 
adjustments, might be seen as historically and politically myopic.
Of course, without deeming “balance of power” to be germane, Justice de 
Weerdt did address concerns about Yellowknife “hoarding the power,” concluding 
that such concerns were baseless. Was he right? He maintained that Yellowknife, 
though it would gain two seats for a total of six, would remain a clear minority in a 
sixteen-seat assembly. This conclusion was premised on two assumptions, one 
definitely faulty and the other arguably so. The first was that striking down three 
underrepresented ridings would result in just three new seats being added. Yet as 
will be seen, Friends ultimately resulted in the creation of five new assembly seats -  
three in Yellowknife, four with a staatsvolk majority, and all five in urban/semi-
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urban areas. While this brought Yellowknife no closer to outright dominance than 
would have been the case in the six-of-sixteen scenario, it gave staatsvolk a bare 
minority of seats, 47 percent, and removed legislative control from rural Indigenous 
communities, turning it over to urban and semi-urban areas. The court’s second, 
arguably faulty assumption was that the power-balance of the assembly would “tip” 
only once Yellowknife had at least half the MLAs. This possibly mischaracterized the 
real “tipping” threat. Even without 50-percent control, each new seat gained by 
staatsvolk meant they could more easily build majorities by exploiting schisms in 
the Aboriginal community -  between Metis, Inuvialuit and Dene, or even between 
individual Dene First Nations. While some observers might see this as the 
construction of “Madisonian” coalitions of minorities, and thus evidence of healthy 
liberal-democratic pluralism in action, others might deem it the brokering of pacts 
between fixed collectivities, as might occur in consociational states comprising three 
or more polities.
Of course, Justice de Weerdt’s conclusion that Friends was not a third-axis 
case was based not solely on his reading of section 3 of the Charter as exclusively 
individualistic, nor his dismissal of “balance of power” concerns as irrelevant due to 
the mathematics at hand. His conclusion also hinged on his determination that 
section 25 of the Charter had no application in this case. For Aboriginal leaders in 
the NWT, none of the findings in Friends were so alarming as this. Was the “non­
derogation clause” indeed inapplicable to NWT apportionment? The judge seemed 
at first to entirely dismiss section 25, concluding that it did not in fact trump Charter 
rights such as section 3 even if they “abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal . . . 
rights or freedoms.” This conclusion seems unsupportable. Legal scholar Bernard 
Morse, in surveying caselaw pertaining to Aboriginal peoples and the Charter, noted 
that de Weerdt’s initial dismissal of section 25 is “the only possible exception” to the 
common judicial understanding of the non-derogation clause.89 Indeed, de Weerdt’s 
argument was explicitly rejected two years later in the aforementioned Campbell v. 
British Columbia, when the B.C. Supreme Court confirmed that provisions of the
89 Bradford W. Morse, “Tw enty Years of C harter Protection: The Status of Aboriginal Peoples under 
the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedom s," W indsor Yearbook o f  A ccess to Justice  21  (2 0 0 2 )  , 4 21 .
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Nisga’a Treaty denying section 3 voting rights to non-Nisga’a were nonetheless 
shielded by section 25.90 De Weerdt’s second conclusion, that no law can be made 
that violates the Charter, and that thus any law violating section 3 is ipso facto  
invalid, is similarly suspect: The Nisga’a Treaty became law in 1999; it clearly 
abridges section 3 and yet was signed by the federal and B.C. governments and 
upheld by the B.C. Supreme Court.
Finally there is de Weerdt’s more qualified conclusion: That even if section 
25 protects the “inherent right” of Aboriginal self-government, it does not provide 
blanket protection of the process used to determine how that right will be 
implemented. It is because of this distinction between “process” rights and existing 
self-government rights that Friends may be seen to differ from the later non- 
universal voting-rights cases of Campbell v. B.C. and Raiche v. Canada. In both of 
those decisions, founding peoples were shielded from section 3 parity requirements 
by third-axis “external protections” that had already been implemented -  the Official 
Languages Act in the case of New Brunswick Francophones and the Nisga’a Treaty in 
the case of the Nisga’a First Nation. In Friends, however, the self-government rights 
of NWT Aboriginals, though affirmed as “inherent,” had not yet been enacted. What 
can one make of this distinction between existing and “process” rights? On one 
hand, while it is easy to imagine “process” violations so egregious that they would 
unquestionably “abrogate” Indigenous interests, the violation alleged by the 
intervenors, involving ameliorating malapportionment in a public legislature, was 
not prima facie  so flagrant. Moreover, many might argue that the judge was not 
unwise to fear the prospect of section 3 being “held in suspense” for “decades.” Up to 
that point, constitutional talks in the NWT had progressed only haltingly. Even 
today, self-government negotiations are unresolved in the case of the Inuvialuit, 
Metis and four of the territory’s five First Nations.
Yet this observation must be considered with caution. Just like over- and 
underrepresentation, settler power and the development of Aboriginal self­
government in the NWT had long been irrevocably intertwined. Years before,
90 Thom as Isaac, “Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom s: The Challenge of the Individual and 
Collective Rights of Aboriginal People,” The W indsor Yearbook o f  A ccess to Justice  21  (2 0 0 2 )  : 444 .
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Richard Laing and his co-authors had stated this view bluntly: “It is important to 
recognize that ‘negotiation’ and a racist relationship are mutually exclusive.”91 
Friends could be seen as having stepped into, and then having accelerated, a vicious 
circle. At least in part due to the longstanding opposition of settlers, who feared 
diminution of their existing authority, the “inherent right” had not yet been enacted 
in the NWT by the time of the 1998-99 reapportionment. The fact that self­
government had not yet been enacted, in turn, obviated the use of the section 25 
“shield” in Friends, as Aboriginals did not yet have an enacted self-government 
agreement that they could claim had been abrogated. This, in turn, threatened to 
pave the way for even more settler power, and thus more resistance to the 
enactment of Indigenous self-government, ad infinitum. Indeed, given the 
overwhelming hostility to Aboriginal self-determination displayed by the NWT 
assembly when it had last been controlled by staatsvolk two decades previously, and 
given Ottawa’s insistence that the NWT government must nonetheless have a seat at 
claims-negotiating tables, Aboriginals were arguably not wrong to fear a return of 
settler dominance over the assembly. Self-government would not only be valueless 
until it was implemented, it would be of diminished value, perhaps permanently, if it 
was not satisfactorily implemented.92 Both by delaying and diminishing self­
government, a settler-controlled NWT government could use its role in self­
government negotiations to advance settler ends. The electoral boundaries 
commission, in its majority decision, had recognized this when it recommended that 
major adjustments to the assembly be delayed so as not to prejudice self­
government talks. MLAs like Groenewegen had recognized this too: “When some of 
the constitutional and governance issues are established . . . I will be all for
91 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the 
N orthw est T erritories,” in Northern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
Resources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8 )  , 319 .
92 Gurston Dacks phrased the problem this way: “W henever a phenom enon is view ed as a variable, 
the question of the threshold or boundary arises: a t w h at point is the ability of a F irst Nation to 
govern itself so attenuated th at it is w rong to accep t a set of arrangem ents as being meaningfully a 
First Nation governm ents?” For m ore, see his “Canadian Governm ent and Aboriginal Peoples: The 
N orthw est Territories: Paper prepared for the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,” RCAP Notes 
(Ottawa: Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1 9 9 5  , 3.
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supporting Yellowknife’s equal and fair representation.” Given the widespread view 
that the fair implementation of self-government -  a constitutional right, shielded 
from “abrogation” by a Charter right -  was at stake, it is hardly surprising, then, that 
Aboriginals sought to temporarily enjoin the formally egalitarian application of 
section 3 in the 1998-99 reapportionment.
Finally, related to the above, was the court wrong not to consider the impact 
of the Friends ruling on the long-discussed constitutional accord, through which it 
was hoped Aboriginal and public government might be merged? The merger of 
Aboriginal and public government was arguably the most promising, and certainly 
the most innovative, avenue for the enactment of the “inherent right” of self­
government in the NWT. Merger had been championed by Ottawa four years earlier 
in its Inherent Right Policy and was backed by many Aboriginals and staatsvolk. 
Over the years, at several constitutional summits, representatives of the NWT’s two 
competing polities had labored to move the idea forward. The constitutional accord 
hinged, of course, on guarantees of Aboriginal overrepresentation in the NWT 
assembly. Any decision by the court that declared such overrepresentation to be 
unconstitutional would inevitably quash prospects for an accord. In this sense, the 
battle over the rules of apportionment in the NWT was the negotiation of self­
government, at least in its most-touted form. As will be seen, by dramatically 
limiting the options available on the negotiating table, the Friends ruling all but 
decided the outcome of the NWT’s constitutional talks, effectively derailing them.
8.3 The reaction to Friends of Democracy
De Weerdt’s ruling plunged the NWT into what media and politicians labeled an 
unprecedented “constitutional crisis.”93 Some observers suggested the ruling might 
have national implications, with British Columbia political scientist Norman Ruff 
calling it “an example of judicial activism that touches very deeply into the political
93 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 23 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 66,
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process.”94 The Aboriginal Summit stated in a press release that it “strongly 
disagrees” with adding urban seats and blasted de Weerdt’s ruling as “narrow, and 
very disappointing,” giving improper weight to individual vis-a-vis collective 
rights.95 Then, in a dramatic protest, the Aboriginal Summit appealed to the federal 
minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Jane Stewart, to consider “the 
abolition of an elected public government in the western Northwest Territories,”96 
thereby returning the territory to federal management. The Summit accused the 
NWT government of breaking what is in effect the “social contract” (or sub-contract, 
really) through which it had been delegated the authority to exercise Ottawa’s 
“fiduciary responsibility” to Northern Indigenous peoples. (Wrote the Summit, “Our 
people have tolerated this anomaly . . . because there was a majority of MLAs who 
represented ridings with a majority of Aboriginal voters. Now it appears that even
this minimal degree of Aboriginal control will be diluted ”97)
As well, the Aboriginal Summit made a plea for “stakeholder” egalitarianism: 
“There is something unfair in a system that places so much more importance on an 
individual’s right to an effective vote, where the largest riding contains only 7,105 
people, than on the collective right of Aboriginal/First Nations peoples to govern 
themselves, and indeed, to survive as peoples.”98 The Summit maintained that both 
sides had much at stake, as permitting settler interests to take control of the NWT 
legislature would harm both Aboriginals and staatsvolk, on one hand sabotaging 
self-government negotiations and on the other amplifying Native resistance to the 
devolution of province-like powers from Ottawa to the territorial assembly.99 The 
Summit condemned the notion that section 3 voting rights should not be balanced
94 “Yellowknife Wins Im portant Political Battle,” CBC News, March 9, 1 9 9 9 ,
h ttp ://w w w .cbc.ca /n ew s/can ad a/yellow k n ife-w in s-im p ortan t-p o litical-b attle-1 .171460  (accessed  
April 5, 2 0 1 5 )  .
95 Daniel M acIsaac, “MLAs Struggle Over New Seats,” N orthern News Services, March 17 , 1 9 9 9 . 
h ttp ://w w w .n n sl.co m /fram es/n ew sp ap ers/1999 -03 /m ar17_99 leg .h tm l (accessed October 30, 
2 0 1 4  .
96 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 23 , 1 9 9 9 ) .
97 W estern  NWT Aboriginal Summit, “Letter to the Honourable Jane Stew art” (M arch 22 , 1 9 9 9 )  , 4.
98 Ibid., 2.
99 Ibid., 4.
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with section 25 and 35 Indigenous rights,100 and suggested that, without dramatic 
action, the long-held goal of instituting self-government through the NWT public 
government (“for example through guaranteed representation of Aboriginal 
governments”) would be foreclosed. Instead of direct consociation, quasi­
separation, through “treaty federalism,” would be the only remaining option101 -  but 
even this avenue of self-government might be foreclosed. Wrote the Summit, “Some
of us have already experienced roadblocks in these negotiations How likely is it
that a legislature composed of more ridings comprised of a majority of non­
Aboriginal voters will . . . be more liberal?” The Aboriginal Summit implored both 
the federal and territorial governments to appeal the Friends decision, citing the 
NWT government’s fiduciary duty to defend Indigenous interests and its 
responsibility to negotiate in good faith on land claims and self-government.
Meanwhile, MLAs met to seek a solution. This would not be easy, as some 
Yellowknife MLAs cheered the court’s decision and urged the government to comply 
by immediately increasing representation in Yellowknife and Hay River.102 Others, 
however, suggested the ruling could be satisfied with no (or almost no) addition of 
seats, by merging sections of underrepresented urban ridings into rural districts.
For example, Michael Miltenberger called for creating a single new Yellowknife 
constituency (“the minimum necessary to comply with the judgment”) and 
readjusting the NWT’s other ridings such that none would be underrepresented by 
more than 25 percent.103 Here can be seen the alternative to the Alberta Reference 
prescription: To avoid adding urban districts, as de Weerdt had envisioned, existing 
seats could be amalgamated. Yet this would reduce overrepresentation (and thus 
substantive equality) of rural ridings and would also, in this instance, gut second- 
axis “interest” equality, both by “cracking” many Yellowknifers into rural-controlled 
districts and by mixing rural voters belonging to different communities of interest 
into the same riding. Ultimately the assembly rejected this option, likely for reasons 
similar to those expressed by Hay River’s Jane Groenewegen: “I am not prepared to
100 W estern  NWT Aboriginal Summit, “Letter to the Honourable Jane Stew art” (M arch 22 , 1 9 9 9 )  , 4.
101 Ibid., 4.
102 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 24 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 1 1 0 -1 1 1 .
103 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 26 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 5.
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impose extinguishment on small ridings, or rolling them up with non-traditional 
components in the interests of balancing the numbers.”104 Also rejected were even 
more unorthodox proposals, such as amending assembly rules so that even if seats 
were added in Yellowknife, legislation could only be passed by a supermajority, thus 
obviating the threat of Yellowknife majoritarianism.105
8.3.1 Bill 15
On March 24, Premier Jim Antoine gave an extended speech before the assembly in 
which he lamented de Weerdt’s ruling: “At a time that the world is congratulating 
the people of Nunavut for creating their own territory, we risk tearing ours 
apart.”106 Yet he suggested that, based on the legal advice his government had 
received, there was “no other viable option” than to comply with the decision. With 
that, Antoine formally introduced Bill 15. In keeping with the proposal MLA Charles 
Dent had made in December, the bill would add five electoral districts, three in 
Yellowknife and one each in Hay River and Inuvik, bringing the total number of 
assembly seats to nineteen. The proposal was said to be the most conservative way 
to satisfy de Weerdt’s ruling without amalgamating or radically altering existing 
ridings.107 It had the advantage of leaving small ridings, such as Tu Nedhe, intact. On 
the other hand, by increasing the size of the assembly by more than one-third, it 
would have the effect of diluting the overrepresentation of Tu Nedhe and other 
“exceptional” ridings. Moreover, it would have dramatic non-universal impacts. 
Yellowknife’s seat share would jump from four of fourteen MLAs to seven of 
nineteen, an increase of 75 percent. The proportion of staatsvolk-majority ridings
104 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 26 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 5.
105 Daniel M acIsaac, “MLAs Debate Friends Ruling,” N orthern News Services, March 12 , 1 9 9 9 , 
h ttp ://w w w .n n sl.co m /fram es/n ew sp ap ers/1999 -03 /m ar12_99fo d .h tm l (accessed October 30,
2 0 1 4  .
106 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 24 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 91.
107 The decision to add five seats, rath er than three, was driven by w h at John Courtney calls “the 
peculiar domino effect of boundary readjustm ents.” This effect is amplified in small legislatures such 
as th at of the NWT, w here each change has proportionally greater im pact. Assigning tw o new ridings 
in Yellowknife and one in Hay River, as m ight have seem ed the obvious response to the Friends  
ruling, would have low ered the territory ’s average riding size so th at an additional Yellowknife riding 
would exceed the p lu s-25-p ercen t threshold. Adding another Yellowknife seat to cope with that 
m alapportionm ent would in turn send Inuvik over the brink. Only once Inuvik received additional 
representation did all districts finally find them selves within the law.
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would climb from five of fourteen to nine of nineteen, up by 80 percent. And 
urban/semi-urban ridings would become a majority, increasing from six of fourteen 
seats to eleven of nineteen, an 83-percent increase. The proportion of Indigenous- 
majority ridings, meanwhile, would fall to a bare majority: 53 percent. And the 
proportion of rural, Indigenous-supermajority ridings would plunge, from nearly 60 
percent to barely 40 percent.
8.3.2 The appeals
Immediately following Premier Antoine’s speech, Tu Nedhe MLA Don Morin 
condemned the proposed bill. In an address deemed “sometimes blunt, sometimes 
emotional” he accused the NWT government of betraying the territory’s Indigenous 
people, a breach of its tacit social contract.108 He instead presented a motion calling 
on the government to appeal de Weerdt’s decision. The motion highlighted the 
territory’s role in facilitating the implementation of the “inherent right” through the 
negotiation of joint land-claim and self-government agreements. (As noted 
previously, the territorial government was, along with the federal government and 
Aboriginal groups, a partner in these negotiations. Historically, when the NWT 
government had been Indigenous-dominated, it had championed Native claims; 
when it was staatsvolk-dominated it had worked to quash such claims.) Morin’s 
motion also questioned de Weerdt’s interpretation of the relationship between 
sections 3 and 25 of the Charter and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. At the 
heart of his speech was a plea for consociation over separation and potential 
instability: “If people want to vote to keep the western territory together, to work 
together, they’ll vote in favor of that motion -  if they want to break it apart . . . then 
vote against that motion.”109 Other MLAs backed Morin in his call for the NWT 
government to appeal the Friends decision, including David Krutko, James Rabesca, 
Michael Miltenberger and, in a noteworthy turnabout, Roy Erasmus, Yellowknife’s
108 Daniel M acIsaac, “Governm ent Says No to Morin,” N orthern News Services, March 26 , 1 9 9 9 ,  
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2 0 1 4  .
109 Daniel M acIsaac, “The House is Divided,” N orthern News Services, March 24 , 1 9 9 9 , 
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2 0 1 4  .
146
sole Aboriginal member, who in November had passionately appealed for more 
Yellowknife seats. Erasmus now told the assembly, “I realized I had to do what was
right and not what would probably be best for me [T]his issue is more than
about seats for Yellowknife . . . It is about how rights are interpreted.”110 (Erasmus 
later suggested that de Weerdt’s decision “is tantamount to reading sections 25 and 
35 out of the Charter altogether.”111) Yet Premier Antoine remained steadfast in his 
view that the government had “no basis to appeal on the merit of the judgment”112 
and suggested that territorial resources would be better spent seeking a “political 
solution rather than having the court decide.”113 When Morin’s motion was put to a 
vote, Antoine and his ministers abstained. The motion passed easily, but, as motions 
are simply expressions of opinion by the assembly and not legally binding, it was to 
no avail.
Antoine did, however, commit his government to financially supporting an 
appeal by the Aboriginal intervenors in the Friends case. Unlike the NWT 
government, which as the respondent had an automatic right to appeal, the 
intervenors needed permission from the court to contest de Weerdt’s ruling. The 
government stated that its lawyers felt there was a “pretty good chance” of 
permission to appeal being granted. In May the intervenors applied to the NWT 
Court of Appeal for leave to appeal, maintaining that the Friends decision 
contravened their Indigenous rights guaranteed in sections 25 and 35. On June 16, 
Justice Rene Foisy denied their application. Foisy ruled that the intervenors “cannot 
point to any specific agreement or negotiation or treaty which is or may be affected 
by [de Weerdt’s] decision.”114 Rather, he said, the intervenors merely asserted that 
negotiations on the future implementation of their rights “might be affected.” Even 
on this point, Foisy was not persuaded. “As governments succeed one another, there 
is nothing concrete to suggest that bona fide negotiations with respect to self­
government and/or treaty negotiations will not continue. If they do not, and section
110 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 24 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 108 .
111 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 26 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 137 .
112 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 24 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 109 .
113 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (M arch 26 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 144 .
114 Friends o f  Dem ocracy v. Northw est Territories (Commissioner), 4 2 5 6  NWT SC (1 9 9 9 )  , “Reasons for 
Decision,” 3.
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25 and/or section 35 rights are infringed, remedies are available through the 
judicial process.”115 With that, the Friends o f  Democracy court case came to a close.
8.3.3 The report on Bill 15
After receiving second reading in March, Bill 15, the proposal to expand the 
assembly to nineteen seats, moved into the assembly’s Standing Committee on 
Government Operations, which had 120 days to review the legislation and propose 
amendments before delivering it to the full assembly for a vote. The standing 
committee, formed of the assembly’s seven non-cabinet MLAs, splintered along 
ethnic lines. Non-Aboriginals Jake Ootes and Seamus Henry from Yellowknife had 
vocally backed Bill 15, and Jane Groenewegen, though having expressed doubts 
about the practical necessity of a second seat in her community of Hay River, and 
thus less clearly a supporter of Bill 15, had nonetheless opposed Morin’s motion to 
appeal. When the committee’s four Aboriginal members, Morin, Erasmus, Krutko 
and Rabesca, declared they would “take Bill 15 to the people” and conduct public 
hearings on the legislation throughout the NWT, the dissenting members declined to 
participate. Public hearings took place in June and early July in six NWT 
communities, including Yellowknife. About four-dozen presenters testified. 
Yellowknife media reported that “[w]hile . . . the hearings have been sparsely 
attended . . . the issues involved are weighty.”116 Journalists confirmed that the NWT 
public displayed only moderate interest in, and understanding of, the ongoing 
“constitutional crisis.”117 While some urban commentators condemned the hearings 
as a dog-and-pony show “for politically motivated individuals to garner some free 
publicity,” and some Indigenous leaders complained the hearings visited too few 
rural communities and were thus “biased” in favor of urbanites,118 others cheered
115 Friends, “Reasons for Decision,” 3.
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the hearings as a way to spur discussion about a “political solution,” as well as to 
buy time for the intervenors, whose appeal at that point was still outstanding. On 
July 27, less than two weeks after the intervenors were rebuffed, the standing 
committee issued a report in which it summarized its findings and presented 
recommendations.
In its “Report on Bill 15: An Act to Amend the Legislative Assembly and 
Executive Council Act,” the standing committee reported that in Yellowknife it had 
heard substantial support for Bill 15. Outside Yellowknife, residents vociferously 
opposed the measure, feeling the new bill’s electoral scheme would upset the 
political equilibrium of the territory, shifting power, perhaps irrevocably, to 
urbanites. The committee reported that this view did not appear to be race-based, 
as it had been expressed by both rural staatsvolk and Aboriginals.119 The standing 
committee cited testimony from rural presenters who felt Bill 15 would “alienate,” 
“betray” or “disenfranchise” the NWT’s Indigenous population, and would entrench 
a colonial regime that should instead have given way to Indigenous self­
determination. The report quoted Bill Erasmus, the grand chief of the Dene Nation, 
who had testified, “the imbalance we have always feared is upon us.”120 It also 
quoted Nick Sibbeston, the former premier and, only months before, a member of 
the electoral boundaries commission, who told the standing committee that Bill 15 
would over-concentrate power in urban centers and potentially spell the end of 
consensus government.
The report stated that some rural residents had derided the Friends 
applicants as the “Fathers of Apartheid”121 and suggested that the NWT government 
“should have learned from the Oka crisis.”122 One presenter reportedly lamented 
that Bill 15 is “setting up a government for people who move here from, and retire
119 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (July 29 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 21.
120 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories Legislative Assem bly Standing Committee on 
Governm ent Operations, “R eport on Bill 15 : An Act to Amend the Legislative Assem bly and Executive 
Council Act” (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the N orthw est Territories, 1 9 9 9 ) , 8.
121 GNWT Legislative Assem bly Standing Committee, “R eport on Bill 1 5 ,” 9.
122 Ibid., 9. The “Oka crisis” took place over tw o months in 1 9 9 0 , when Mohawk protestors engaged in 
an arm ed and at tim es violent standoff with police and m ilitary a t Oka, Quebec, w here municipal 
officials had approved construction of a golf course on land the First Nation deem ed sacred. In the 
end, a single Quebec police corporal was killed and the golf-course developm ent was cancelled.
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to, the south,”123 in effect compromising the “stakeholder” equality of locals. Others 
feared that if Bill 15 passed, “this would be the end of any meaningful constitutional 
development or discussions in the Northwest Territories,”124 with Aboriginals 
“separating” via ethnoculturally exclusive self-governments. Some residents in 
Inuvik and Hay River questioned whether their towns needed additional 
representation, suggesting that splitting each community into two districts might be 
divisive and confusing (an argument that places “community of interest” concerns 
above those of formal parity) .125
Presenters proposed blunting the effect of the new electoral scheme through 
means such as longer terms of residency for voting (upping “stakeholder” 
egalitarianism) , decentralizing government offices to rural communities (a limited 
form of indirect consociation) , or even relocating the seat of government out of 
Yellowknife (an inverse sort of separatism, whereby, instead of breaking from an 
oppressive government, the government is broken from the oppressors) .126 Many, 
however, warned that no matter what, cooperation with settlers was at an end: 
“There was a strong sentiment that perhaps the GNWT should be bypassed, and that 
the expression of the inherent right to self government through parallel 
governments may be the only viable option.”127
Having relayed the above testimony, the report then provided the 
committee’s own conclusions. Stating that “the political, economic and social fabric 
of the Northwest Territories is jeopardized by Bill 15,”128 the committee condemned 
the cabinet for not appealing the Friends ruling. Noting that Friends suggested “that 
the right to vote protected by section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms is not to be read together with the sections which protect and guarantee 
Aboriginal and treaty rights,”129 it called upon the cabinet to request that the
123 GNWT Legislative Assem bly Standing Committee, “R eport on Bill 1 5 ,” 9.
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Supreme Court of Canada clarify the relationship between sections 3 and 25 of the 
Charter and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The standing committee further 
recommended that Bill 15 automatically “sunset” when the term of the next 
legislature expired. Then, through various means, it called for the entrenchment of 
non-universalism in the NWT. It suggested Indigenous power be bolstered by 
requiring rural overrepresentation in cabinet -  in effect, a form of intrastate 
consociation. Further, the committee urged the government to develop a “workplan 
with clear timelines for the negotiation of a political accord with NWT Aboriginal 
governments,”130 and, further, to establish a constitutional commission that would 
prepare a draft constitution for review by NWT residents within three years. It 
called for exploration of other innovative electoral arrangements, including an 
Indigenous-only at-large riding in Yellowknife and a territorial senate in which 
representation would be apportioned based on region rather than population. The 
standing committee concluded its report on an ominous note: “If the government 
chooses not to support the standing committee recommendations . . . it risks seeing 
the territory break apart.”131
8.3.4 Legislative consideration of Bill 15
On July 28, the NWT legislative assembly considered the recommendations made by 
the standing committee in its report on Bill 15. In introducing the recommendations, 
the committee chair, Yellowknife MLA Roy Erasmus, stated that the Friends ruling, 
and the subsequent electoral scheme laid out in Bill 15, had created “tremendous 
animosity” between rural and urban residents. “I certainly hope,” he said, “that we 
can do the few things that we have suggested to bring some measure of relief, some 
measure of comfort to the smaller communities . . . who are very, very frightened by 
the bill that we are going to pass over the next little while.”132 Committee member 
Don Morin, the MLA from Tu Nedhe, was even more demonstrative: “If people 
believe that there is no hope to hold the western territory together, then they should
130 GNWT Legislative Assem bly Standing Committee, “Report on Bill 1 5 ,” 16.
131 Ibid., 22 .
132 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (July 28 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 21.
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say that. But if members believe that we should show some leadership and supply 
the glue that holds the fabric of the new western territory together, then you should 
make bold decisions and move ahead.”133 Sounding a more despondent note, 
Mackenzie Delta MLA David Krutko opined: “I think that the biggest losers in all of 
this is the relationship that has been worked on for twenty years, regarding 
Aboriginal people’s desires, expectations and goals of some day being able to deal 
with their own problems, programs and services and be a positive light in the 
society of building a new Northwest Territories.”134 Yellowknife members fired 
back, with MLA Seamus Henry stating, “I believe that people in the territories 
understand the democratic principles and the rights that are granted to all citizens 
with the passage of this bill are also granted to people who are complaining about a 
power shift. These democratic principles are tried and proven and they will protect 
each and every person in the Northwest Territories.”135
The standing committee then advanced a series of non-binding motions 
related to the recommendations in its report. In keeping with assembly convention, 
the cabinet abstained from voting, though the premier, in his comments on the 
recommendations, made clear the government’s position. With only “regular” (i.e., 
non-cabinet) MLAs voting, the assembly approved a motion to develop a workplan 
for achieving a political accord with Indigenous governments. The assembly also 
approved a motion to pursue a legal reference on Indigenous Charter rights, seeking 
an advisory opinion from the courts on the relationship between sections 3, 25 and 
35, though this motion received only cool support from Yellowknife MLAs Jake 
Ootes and Seamus Henry, and cabinet expressed uncertainty as to whether such a 
reference could legally proceed. More divisive was a motion to require regional 
overrepresentation on cabinet, with Ootes and Henry opposed and the premier 
insistent that overrepresentation be achieved via unwritten convention rather than 
through law. Finally, the assembly considered a motion to establish a constitutional 
commission that would strive to prepare a draft constitution for review by NWT
133 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (July 28 , 1 9 9 9 ) , 21.
134 Ibid., 22 .
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residents within three years. With the premier rejecting the idea and instead 
suggesting that the government would pursue constitutional talks through a non­
legislated “intergovernmental forum,” the motion passed four-to-two with cabinet 
once again abstaining. With the government having refused to support two of the 
standing committee’s recommendations, and having offered only guarded support 
for a third, Morin declared, “I have never been so disgusted in my life to see people
sit on their hands and offer no solution This is a dark day in the history of the
Northwest Territories.”136
On July 29, the assembly began formal consideration of Bill 15. MLAs 
Erasmus and Morin continued pressing the government to commit to establishing a 
constitutional commission as well as to requiring regional overrepresentation on 
cabinet. Premier Jim Antoine vowed to consult with Indigenous leaders on those 
ideas. As well, the assembly pressed cabinet to amend Bill 15 to dissolve the 
nineteen-seat electoral scheme at the end of the next legislative term. With this last 
demand, the so-called sunset clause, cabinet complied. The amendment was carried, 
with dissenting votes only from the two Yellowknife regular MLAs. The text of Bill 
15 was then approved clause by clause. The next day, July 30, Bill 15 saw third 
reading and anticlimactically passed into law. It was supported by cabinet en bloc, 
and was supported as well as by the three Yellowknife regular MLAs, notably 
including Erasmus. Three rural regular MLAs, Krutko, Morin and Rabesca, opposed 
the bill. At the upcoming election, five seats would be added to the assembly -  three 
in Yellowknife and one each in Hay River and Inuvik -  with the scheme slated to 
sunset before the subsequent election. In the media, even the bill’s official 
proponent, Premier Antoine called the change “a bitter pill and . . . a shift in 
power.”137 Commentators condemned the government for passing the buck to the
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next assembly, leaving to the next crop of leaders the challenge of reconciling 
section 3 voting rights and Aboriginal self-government.138
8.4 Summary
As this chapter demonstrates, in the NWT’s 1998-99 reapportionment, which 
overlapped with Nunavut’s separation, the NWT’s rural-controlled assembly at first 
declined to ameliorate the longstanding underrepresentation of Yellowknife. 
Yellowknifers sued, and the NWT Supreme Court ruled in their favor. The court held 
that, while rural NWT ridings may permissibly be very small, urban ridings may not 
be overly large. It concluded that adding seats in Yellowknife would remedy this 
problem. The court further suggested that “balance of power” was not relevant to 
the case at hand; that even if “balance of power” was relevant, such balance was not 
under threat; and that at least in this case, the Charter’s section 25 “non-derogation” 
clause did not shield the NWT government from section 3 claims. Following the 
decision, the NWT government resisted Aboriginal pressure to appeal the ruling and 
proposed a bill that would add five seats, in Yellowknife, Hay River and Inuvik. An 
appeal by Aboriginal groups failed, as did efforts by opposition MLAs to devise 
various last-ditch solutions. Significant changes, if they were occur, would have to be 
made by the next legislative assembly.
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Chapter 9: Epilogue
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine thoroughly the constitutional 
evolution of, and the reapportionments exercises in, the NWT in the years since the 
events of 1998-99, it would be remiss not to acknowledge some of them in passing. 
As in the NWT’s division-era period, relatively little scholarly attention has been 
given to the territory post-division; thus, the post-division developments discussed 
in this chapter merit further research. This chapter first addresses the denouement 
of the 1998-99 NWT electoral boundaries reapportionment “crisis.” This chapter 
then examines the degree to which predictions made during the 1998-99 
reapportionment “crisis” came to fruition. Finally, this chapter glances at the NWT’s 
reapportionment exercises of 2006 and 2013, observing similarities between those 
exercises and the NWT’s pre-division and division-era reapportionments.
9.1 Denouement
As noted in the preceding chapter, upon the approval of Bill 15 in July 1999, critics 
of the NWT government chided it for “passing the buck,” shifting responsibility for 
resolving the NWT’s constitutional impasse to the next legislative assembly. Yet in 
late-2003, when the life of the next assembly came to an end and the previously 
discussed “sunset clause” was to have taken effect, the territory’s electoral map 
instead remained unchanged, with the size of the legislature still at nineteen 
members. In a sixty-four-page report issued in May 2003 by that assembly’s Special 
Committee on the Implementation of Self-Government and the Sunset Clause, the 
eponymous clause was barely mentioned. The report revealed clearly that the 
territory’s constitutional evolution had entered a new era.
Gurston Dacks had observed after the Friends ruling that “[t]here is now only 
one table for implementing the inherent right -  the self-government table.”1 The 
aforementioned report confirmed this: No longer were Aboriginal leaders seeking to 
express self-government primarily, or even partially, through “special guarantees” 
in public government. In 2003 the Ttjchg Agreement, the first comprehensive
1 GNWT Legislative Assem bly Standing Committee, “Report on Bill 1 5 ,” Appendix: Presentation by 
Gary Bohnet, Metis Nation, 4.
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Aboriginal self-government agreement in the NWT, was signed into law, 
establishing a standalone government, including a constitution, assembly, 
administration and funding structure, for the territory’s most populous Indigenous 
group, the Ttjchg. Clearly, creating similar self-governments had become the 
primary goal of the NWT’s Aboriginal leaders. Such governments would at most 
seek an “interstate” relationship with Yellowknife, via “treaty federalism.” Indeed, 
they might look to bypass the territorial government entirely, preferring more 
direct nation-to-nation interactions with Ottawa.
Likely as a consequence of this focus by Aboriginal groups on de facto  
separation, efforts to fashion a consociational territorial constitution fell by the 
wayside. Both Native and staatsvolk leaders seemed to accept that the governance- 
structure of the future NWT would develop in an ad hoc fashion, reacting to 
decisions made at Aboriginal negotiating tables. The special committee’s report 
dealt almost entirely with how the territorial government might cope with this 
constitutional sea-change.2 High-level power sharing, to the degree that it would 
occur at all in the NWT, would thenceforth be quasi-federal. Power would not so 
much be shared at the center, in Yellowknife, but drawn down from both Ottawa 
and the NWT government, to varying degrees at various times, by outlying Native 
governments. Clearly, between 1999 and 2003, the NWT government’s vision of the 
territory’s constitutional future had undergone a dramatic alteration. Scholars might 
find it fruitful to give further attention to how and why this occurred.
9.2 The predictions of 1998-99
Were predictions made during the NWT’s 1998-99 reapportionment regarding the 
threat of nation-versus-nation discord accurate? Despite talk at that time of the 
NWT “tearing apart” if Aboriginal “external protections” were not entrenched, overt 
inter-ethnic conflict neither persisted in the political realm nor spilled over into 
broader areas of Northern life. The NWT saw no drama similar to the separatism
2 N orthw est Territories Legislative Assembly, Special Committee on the Im plem entation of Self­
Governm ent and the Sunset Clause, “The Circle of Self-Government: Report of the Special Committee 
on the Im plem entation of Self-Government and the Sunset Clause” (Yellowknife: Governm ent of the 
N orthw est Territories, 2 0 0 3 )  .
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crisis that engulfed Quebec following the rejection of Bill 101. Rather than 
escalating, the NWT’s “constitutional crisis” by all appearances largely abated. It 
may be argued that relations between NWT Aboriginals and staatsvolk are no worse 
than they were in 1998-99.
Though high-level, inter-polity power-sharing has not come about within the 
NWT public government, and though the broadly accepted vision for the territory’s 
future has shifted from “intrastate” to “interstate” consociation, many of the NWT’s 
on-the-ground realities remain the same. Aspects of the public government’s 
uneasy consociational detente endure. That government still exhibits many 
“distinctive” consociational features observed by Graham White and other scholars 
twenty-five or more years ago. These include the practice of governing by 
“consensus,” the (now more constrained) overrepresentation of rural Indigenous 
ridings in the legislature, the convention of guaranteeing regional representation on 
cabinet, and uniquely Northern policies relating to language, affirmative-action and 
decentralization.
Aboriginal MLAs have remained a majority in the assembly, both overall and 
in cabinet. All four NWT premiers since 1999 have been Aboriginal. Native 
participation in territorial elections is especially noteworthy: In all NWT elections 
since 1999 (indeed, since at least 1983) , non-Yellowknife ridings have seen higher 
voter turnout than Yellowknife ridings, usually by a substantial margin.3 Studies in 
other jurisdictions suggest a linkage between electoral participation and 
perceptions of governmental legitimacy,4 conceivably suggesting that Indigenous 
residents, more so than settlers, accept the GNWT as a rightful authority. (It should 
be noted, however, that other factors, such as rurality and duration of residency, are 
also positively associated with voter turnout.5)
3 In 1 9 8 3 , Yellowknife’s tu rn ou t was 68 .6  p ercen t while the territorial average was 6 9 .7  percent. In 
1 9 8 7 , the respective turnouts w ere 5 2 .7  p ercen t versus 7 1 .6  percent; in 1 9 9 1 , 5 8 .8  p ercen t versus 
7 6 .3  percent; in 1 9 9 5 , 6 0 .6  p ercen t versus 7 5 .4  percent; in 1 9 9 9 , 6 3 .9  p ercen t versus 7 1 .6  percent; in 
2 0 0 3 , 5 4 .3  p ercen t versus 68 .5  percent; in 2 0 0 7 , 5 7 .6  p ercen t versus 67 .0  percent; and in 2 0 1 1 , 34.2  
p ercen t versus 4 8 .0  percent.
4 Sarah Birch, “Perceptions of Electoral Fairness and Voter Turnout,” Comparative Political Studies 43 , 
no. 12 (2 0 1 0  : 1 6 0 3 .
5 Alan D. M onroe, “Urbanism and Voter Turnout: A Note on Some Unexpected Findings,” A m erican  
Journal o f  Political Science  2 1 , no. 1 (1 9 7 7 )  : 71.
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Meanwhile, despite concerns about the NWT splintering into a constellation 
of competing ethnocultural regimes, Aboriginal self-governments have not 
proliferated. As noted previously, since 1999, only the Ttjchg First Nation and the 
small Sahtu community of Deljne have enacted self-government agreements. From 
one perspective this could be interpreted as indicating Indigenous satisfaction with 
the status quo and a lack of urgency to “separate” from the territory’s staatsvolk- 
style political system. On the other hand, it would also appear that Aboriginal 
groups have continued pursuing self-government. The lack of tangible progress 
could thus countervailingly be seen as the product of the aforementioned “vicious 
circle” of settler control, whereby increased settler power in public government 
presents a barrier to the realization of Indigenous self-determination. Further 
research would be required to determine whether either of these interpretations is 
correct.
As well, some might argue that, to the degree that Aboriginal groups and the 
NWT government now exhibit a “treaty-federal” relationship, this relationship has 
been collaborative rather than confrontational. For example, when the federal 
government devolved authority over lands and resources to the NWT government 
in 2014, the NWT government successfully struck “devolution agreements” with 
most of the territory’s Aboriginal groups, guaranteeing them a portion of the 
territory’s revenues from natural-resource development. This could be seen as an 
example of a flourishing interstate relationship between Yellowknife and the NWT’s 
Indigenous polities. On the other hand, two Indigenous groups, the Deh Cho and 
Akaitcho, have thus far refused to sign a devolution agreement; the territory’s Dene 
chiefs denounced devolution (literally rallying outside the legislative assembly) ;6 
and, in at least one case, an Aboriginal group filed suit to block devolution from 
taking place.7 Thus again, additional scholarship would be required before
6 Patrick Scott, “Dene Rally Against Devil-ution Yellowknife,” January 26 , 2 0 1 1 ,  
h ttp ://w w w .youtub e.com /w atch ?v=0d nk Jf73vH c (April 21 , 2 0 1 1 )  .
7 CBC News, “Gwich’in Tribal Council Launches Court Case over Devolution,” February 1, 2 0 1 2 , 
h ttp ://w w w .cbc.ca/new s/can ad a/n orth /g w ich -in -trib al-cou n cil-lau n ch es-cou rt-case-over- 
d ev o lu tio n -1 .1170842  (accessed March 26 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
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determining whether contemporary “treaty federalism” exemplifies fruitful inter­
polity consociation in the NWT.
As noted previously, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” came to a head in the division-era 
NWT not merely as a result of an inter-polity clash of rights, but due to the 
equipopulousness of those polities and the threat that one would swamp the other. 
This observation, too, opens a door to further research. Despite considerable fears, 
sixteen years after Nunavut’s separation, exogenous settlers have not numerically 
“swamped” the NWT. Whereas in 1996 settlers formed a bare majority of the overall 
population in the western territory, they are now a slight minority -  48.6 percent as 
of July 2014.8 This is likely because staatsvolk out-migration has exceeded in- 
migration9 while the territory’s Aboriginal ranks have grown due to natural 
increase. Over the past decade, settler numbers in the territory have fallen by 
approximately 750 even as the Aboriginal population has increased by more than 
1,000.10 A recent NWT government plan to recruit 2,000 new settlers to the NWT by 
2019, ostensibly to bolster the territorial economy, has thus far born little fruit.11
Scholars might also explore whether the sharp political line between settler- 
dominated Yellowknife and the NWT’s rural Indigenous regions has begun to blur. 
As in many hinterland jurisdictions, the NWT is urbanizing, with rural Indigenous 
people relocating to the city. Thus, Yellowknife’s share of the NWT’s Aboriginal 
population has grown. Whereas in 1996 only one-fifth of the capital’s residents were 
Indigenous, that fraction is now one-quarter.12 And it is conceivable that the eroding 
of the NWT’s urban/rural divide may not merely be demographic. Though research 
is lacking, one might speculate that factors such as technological change and 
improved transportation may be reducing the perceived gap between the territory’s
8 Governm ent of the N orthw est T erritories, Bureau of Statistics, “Population Estim ates: Community 
Population by Ethnicity, 2 0 0 1 -2 0 1 4 ,” h ttp ://w w w .statsn w t.ca/p op u lation /p op u lation -estim ates/ 
(accessed March 26 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
9 Dall Carmichael, “Statistics Show NWT Population Decline in 2 0 1 4 ,” N orthern Journal March 23 , 
2 0 1 5 , h ttp ://n o rj.ca /2 0 1 5 /0 3 /sta tis tics -sh o w -n w t-p o p u la tio n -d e clin e -in -2 0 1 4 / (accessed March 
26 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
10 GNWT Bureau of Statistics, “Population Estim ates.”
11 Chris W indeyer, “People Moving: Can the GNWT Really A ttract 2 ,0 0 0  More Residents?” YK Edge, 
February 18 , 2 0 1 5 , h ttp s://ed g eyk .co m /article /p eo p le-m o vin g-can -th e-gn w t-really-attract-2000- 
m o re-resid en ts/ (accessed  March 26 , 2 0 1 5 )  .
12 GNWT Bureau of Statistics, “Population Estim ates.”
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metropole and hinterlands. The erosion of geographic and cultural barriers 
separating the NWT’s two polities -  Indigenous peoples and staatsvolk -  could 
reduce the likelihood of, and diminish the stakes involved in, constitutional conflict.
If this is the case, scholars might also return to the observation made near 
the beginning of this thesis: that one person’s nation-building is another’s 
colonialism. Critics might suggest that the absence of an ongoing “crisis” in the NWT 
demonstrates that the fears of 1998-99 have come true. Certainly the current vision 
for (to say nothing of the present reality of) inter-polity power-sharing in the NWT 
is quite attenuated when compared to the ambitions of First Nations leaders in the 
pre-division era, or to the goals articulated by consociation-oriented staatsvolk in 
the federal Inherent Right Policy, or to the very real accomplishments of Inuit in the 
creation of Nunavut. It might be found that Indigenous nationalists, with their hopes 
for intrastate power-sharing eliminated, and with the possibility of quasi-federal 
“treaty” power-sharing still unrealized for all but the Ttjchg and Deljne, have not 
made peace with the NWT government but rather have acquiesced to it. Some 
scholars have suggested that, in some cases, Indigenous nationalism in the NWT has 
been co-opted: Says Dene political scientist Glen Coulthard, there “has been a 
reorientation of the meaning of self-determination for many (but not all) Indigenous 
people in the North; a reorientation of Indigenous struggle from one that was once 
deeply informed by the land . . . to a struggle that is now increasingly fo r  land, 
understood now as a material resource to be exploited in the capital accumulation 
process.”13 The goal of settler-colonialism, of course, is not to tear Indigenous 
jurisdictions apart, but to incorporate them into the fold of the majority nation. If 
the current political situation in the NWT seems subdued, scholars might examine 
whether this is because Indigenous nationalism has, in a sense, been subdued. 
Certainly, whether settler-colonialism in the territory has failed or succeeded in the 
NWT remains an open question, ripe for further inquiry.
13 Glen Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics o f  Recognition  (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2 0 1 4 )  , 78.
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9.3 The reapportionments of 2006  and 2013
Given that the NWT public government’s uneasy consociational detente remains in 
place, it is no surprise that both of the post-1999 reapportionment exercises in the 
territory have been contentious. In 2006 and again in 2013, efforts to redesign the 
NWT legislative map once again pitted Yellowknifers against Indigenous interests.
In 2006, the territory’s electoral boundaries commission recommended two new 
seats, in Yellowknife and the fast-growing community of Behchokg, home to the new 
Ttjchg government. Though every Yellowknife MLA supported that 
recommendation, the assembly rejected it. Yellowknife MLAs raised the specter of a 
Charter challenge again based on universal rights of representation,14 but none was 
launched.
Then, in 2013, per the mandate of the NWT legislature, the boundaries 
commission presented three options, for an eighteen-, nineteen- or twenty-one-seat 
assembly. MLAs chose the middle option, and ordered the merger of the tiny, 
Chipewyan-speaking Tu Nedhe riding with N’dilo and Detah, the two TtjchQ- 
speaking Aboriginal enclaves on the outskirts of Yellowknife. This move prompted 
protests both from Yellowknifers, who once again had hoped for more seats, and 
constituents of Tu Nedhe, who maintained that their voting power would be 
swamped by the more numerous Ttjchg-speakers. In late 2014 the City of 
Yellowknife hired a legal firm to prepare a malapportionment challenge,15 which the 
riding of Tu Nedhe reportedly planned to join.16 As of this writing, no suit has yet 
been filed.17 Certainly, the NWT reapportionments of 2006 and 2013 might merit 
further scholarship.
9.4 Summary
This chapter highlighted several of the post-division developments in the NWT, 
identifying areas that arguably might justify continuing research. This chapter 
showed that in the denouement of the 1998-99 NWT electoral boundaries
14 GNWT Legislative Assembly, “Hansard” (O ctober 24 , 2 0 0 6 )  , 432 .
15 Dan W ong, Yellowknife city councilor, e-mail m essage to author, Novem ber 4, 2 0 1 4 .
16 Tom Beaulieu, Tu Nedhe MLA, e-mail m essage to author, February 4, 2 0 1 5 .
17 Nalini Naidoo, City of Yellowknife, e-mail m essage to author, April 16 , 2 0 1 5 .
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reapportionment “crisis,” the vision for power-sharing in the NWT seemed to shift 
significantly, from an intrastate orientation, involving Aboriginal/staatsvolk power- 
sharing at the center, to an interstate orientation, involving a “treaty-federal” 
relationship between the federal government in Ottawa, the territory’s public, 
staatsvolk-dominated metropole in Yellowknife, and quasi-separate outlying 
Aboriginal governments. Next, this chapter explored whether predictions made 
during the 1998-99 constitutional crisis have indeed come true. It suggests that, 
though low-level consociational interaction continues in the territory, the relative 
absence of ongoing strife in the territory might be attributable to demographic and 
cultural change, to mutually satisfactory inter-polity power-sharing, or to the 
opposite: the quashing of Aboriginal nationalism. Finally, this chapter looked at the 
NWT’s reapportionment exercises of 2006 and 2013, noting that, as before, they 
featured discord between underrepresented Yellowknife settlers and 
overrepresented rural Aboriginal interests.
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According to Canadian political theorist Will Kymlicka, in liberal-democratic 
multination states, settlers from the majority-nation staatsvolk may, by exercising 
their universal mobility and voting rights, “swamp” and democratically dominate 
the homelands of Indigenous national minorities -  or, conversely, these minorities, 
by exercising collective rights, may challenge the universal rights of settlers. I have 
called this clash-of-rights phenomenon “Kymlicka’s dilemma.” As was shown in this 
thesis, this clash constrained the pre-division constitutional evolution of Canada’s 
Northwest Territories, and finally came to a head during the territory’s 1998-99 
electoral-district reapportionment. The 1998-99 reapportionment pitted the 
individual rights of NWT settlers to live where they want and to vote where they live 
against the collective rights of NWT Indigenous peoples to enjoy self-determination 
and autonomy in their homeland. Per the legal and political decisions made during 
the “constitutional crisis” that resulted from the reapportionment, settler rights 
predominated over Aboriginal rights within public government, resolving this 
instance of “Kymlicka’s dilemma” in favor of settler interests and reshaping the 
constitutional fabric of the territory.
This thesis argued that, for numerous reasons -  nationalistic, democratic, 
liberal, legal, moral and pragmatic -  liberal democratic multination states owe 
minority nations “external protections” that shield their collective rights to self­
determination and internal autonomy from violation by majority-nation staatsvolk. 
Such protections may be facilitated through consociational power-sharing: either 
via direct “intrastate” arrangements, or indirectly, via federalism. Yet while 
federalism may empower national minorities, it may alternatively be arranged to 
disempower them, through “cracking” or “stacking.” One form of stacking, which 
poses a particular threat in settler-colonial states, is “swamping.” There, staatsvolk 
settlers exercise their individual rights of movement and voting to occupy and 
democratically dominate a national-minority homeland. Where the national 
minority exercises “external protections” to prevent “swamping” and democratic 
domination, a clash of rights arises, presenting a constitutional quandary. This 
quandary is “Kymlicka’s dilemma.”
Chapter 10: Conclusion
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Where “Kymlicka’s dilemma” occurs, the rights in conflict are likely to relate 
to the apportionment of democratic representation. Conflicts involving 
representation may usefully be considered along three dimensions, corresponding 
to the three foundational liberal principles: individualism, egalitarianism, and 
universalism. Along the first axis, voting systems are rarely individualistic, as group- 
blindness is antithetical to the aggregation of voters so as to provide them with a 
meaningful vote. Hence, for purposes of representation, voters are grouped into 
districts based in part on commonalities they share with fellow voters, such as social 
class, ethnicity or employment-type. Along the second axis, voting systems must 
weigh various interpretations of voter equality. These include formal equality, 
where voters are aggregated into districts with equal numbers, as well as 
substantive equality, where they enjoy equal quality of representation, and 
“stakeholder” equality, where the weight of their voting power is proportional to 
their stake in the electoral results. Along the third axis, representation may be either 
universal, apportioned solely to voters as individuals, or, in a divided state, non- 
universal, and thus apportioned first to “polities” and only secondarily to 
individuals. Entrenched non-universal, polity-based representation is an “external 
protection.” In settler-colonial states, such an external protection for Indigenous 
polities may be entrenched through treaties or “inherent rights.” In Canada, section 
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 affirms such rights, while section 25 “shields” those 
rights from “derogation.” For Francophones, the Official Languages Act protects such 
rights. As Canadian case law suggests, where apportionment encounters non- 
universal Aboriginal or Francophone voting protections, formal egalitarianism likely 
must give way. Thus, in at least certain cases where “Kymlicka’s dilemma” involves 
Canadian apportionment, the “constitutional quandary” has been resolved in favor 
of collective rights.
Canadian political scientist Gurston Dacks called the NWT “a laboratory for 
students of political representation.” Owing to unique demographic and historical 
factors, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” simmered there for decades prior to Nunavut’s 
division. The pre-division “western” NWT was a “divided state,” split along cultural, 
demographic and historical lines. The territory comprised at minimum two discrete
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demographic groups: highly transient settlers, mostly in Yellowknife, and 
Aboriginals, deeply rooted in their rural home regions. From at least the mid-1970s, 
the NWT’s pre-division constitutional evolution was defined by a struggle for power 
between these two polities. Though Yellowknife was made the territorial capital 
ostensibly to devolve power to Northerners, some Aboriginals perceived the 
booming capital to be a beachhead of colonialism, through which an influx of 
staatsvolk could “swamp” the territory and not only democratically dominate the 
public government but inhibit Aboriginal land-claims and self-government. Indeed, 
in the 1960s, settlers sought division of the territory so the west, where they were 
more numerous, could draw down powers from Ottawa and move toward liberal- 
universalist provincehood. Countervailingly, in the 1970s, Indigenous nationalists 
proposed that the territory, or subdivisions within it, should receive “external 
protections,” entrenching Native self-determination and autonomy. To reconcile the 
political cultures and aspirations of these two constituent groups, the NWT 
government developed various consociational features that distinguished it from 
more conventional parliamentary-style governments elsewhere in Canada. 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Aboriginal and settler leaders worked toward a 
high-level constitutional detente where the rights and interests of both polities 
would be reconciled within public government. Yet the 1990s also saw three 
developments that brought the conflict between the two sides into stark relief. First, 
the adoption of the Charter placed greater emphasis on formal egalitarianism in the 
apportionment of representation, favoring settlers. Second, affirmation of the 
“inherent right” of self-government offered Aboriginals “external protections,” 
possibly including guaranteed majority power in the NWT government. Third, the 
separation of Nunavut, in the east, threatened to leave the west’s settler and 
Aboriginal polities equipopulous, raising the stakes for both sides. A constitutional 
crisis seemed at hand.
Unsurprisingly, the apportionment of representation in the pre-division 
NWT assembly reflected the territory’s long-running power struggle. In the 1970s, 
rural Aboriginals were overrepresented vis-a-vis Yellowknife. This practice 
continued in the next decade, though settlers began agitating for, and threatened to
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launch Charter challenges concerning, urban underrepresentation. By the cusp of 
the 1990s it seemed likely that in future reapportionments, the Charter might 
constrain rural Indigenous overrepresentation. Combined with the threat of settler 
“swamping” posed by Nunavut’s separation, this prospect boded ill for hopes of 
establishing consociational power-sharing in the NWT public government, bringing 
“Kymlicka’s dilemma” into high relief. As if in a natural experiment, these 
developments created the conditions for a volatile reaction, finally catalyzed by the 
NWT’s electoral reapportionment of 1998-99. This thesis analyzed that 
reapportionment.
The clash-of-rights phenomenon that I call “Kymlicka’s dilemma” was at the 
crux of the constitutional crisis that engulfed the 1998-99 reapportionment. The 
clash was apparent from the beginning. Even before a boundaries commission was 
impaneled, Aboriginal interests in the territory pressed for delaying 
reapportionment, fearing that redrawing the electoral map would result in the 
egalitarian transfer of voting power to individual settlers, pre-empting Indigenous 
efforts to secure self-determination and autonomy at the brink of division -  the very 
moment when Aboriginal rights had become most vulnerable.
The NWT assembly nonetheless appointed a boundaries commission, which 
gathered testimony highlighting the two irreconcilable sides of “Kymlicka’s 
dilemma.” Yellowknifers appealed to the commission for formally egalitarian 
treatment, which would result in greater representation for the capital. Aboriginals, 
meanwhile, asked the commission to reject such appeals, citing non-universal 
concerns relating to balance of power and Indigenous rights. In its report, the 
electoral boundaries commission acknowledged Aboriginal concerns and suggested 
that a more thorough reapportionment be conducted once high-level, 
constitutionally entrenched consociation was arranged between the territory’s two 
polities. Yet, likely feeling constrained by requirements of the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, as Canadian political scientist Graham White had forecast, the 
commission also recommended adding two Yellowknife seats to the assembly.
When the boundaries commission’s report went before the assembly, the 
debate was starkly divided between settler and Indigenous interests. Yellowknife
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MLAs and their supporters, citing the Charter and the values of liberal universalism, 
called for equality and fairness for individuals, which they said necessitated greater 
formal parity in the apportionment of representation. Aboriginal MLAs and their 
supporters, meanwhile, called for consociational “balance of power” and respect for 
the process by which the NWT’s two non-universal polities were working to 
establish intrastate power-sharing. They argued that diminishing rural 
overrepresentation would undermine both inter-polity collaboration and Native 
rights at a highly sensitive time. In a majority vote, the assembly sided with 
Aboriginal interests, and the electoral map remained unchanged.
Disgruntled Yellowknife staatsvolk then launched a lawsuit in the NWT 
Supreme Court, Friends o f  Democracy v. Northwest Territories. The appellants, 
characterizing the NWT as a liberal-universalist, mononational polity, appealed for 
egalitarian treatment of all residents, and suggested that the Charter’s section 3 
voting provision, interpreted by Carter as guaranteeing “effective representation” to 
all Canadian citizens, does not countenance non-universalistic rights or interests. 
The respondents, the NWT government, countervailingly maintained that section 3, 
interpreted by Dixon as guaranteeing to Canadians “better government,” requires 
that apportionment take into account non-universalistic concerns such as inter­
polity power-sharing. Taking a similarly non-universalistic position, the intervenors 
maintained that NWT Aboriginals, as a discrete rights-bearing polity, possess not 
only positive rights (the section 35 right to self-government) but also negative 
“external protection” rights (the section 25 “shield”) , causing their collective self­
determination concerns to trump the individual egalitarian demands of settlers. In 
the court’s decision, Justice Mark de Weerdt effectively privileged egalitarianism 
over non-universalism, embracing the “effective representation” interpretation of 
Section 3, suggesting that “better government” concerns are moot as Yellowknife 
majoritarianism was not an immediate threat, and ruling that Indigenous “external 
protections,” if defensible at all, could not be brought to bear on the case at hand.
In the wake of the Friends ruling, the NWT government (i.e., the premier and 
cabinet) seemed to resign itself to the court’s universalistic interpretation of section 
3. It declined to appeal the decision and introduced legislation to significantly
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increase urban and semi-urban representation in the assembly. Aboriginal 
detractors, however, argued that the court had acted as an agent of colonialism, 
promulgating a view of rights certain to advance settler interests. They maintained 
that the court had wrongly rejected the applicability of section 25 “external 
protections.” The appeals court, however, agreed with the Supreme Court. 
Meanwhile, Aboriginal members of the Standing Committee on Government 
Relations, challenging the government’s proposal for enhanced urban and semi- 
urban representation, detailed widespread concerns on the part of non-Yellowknife 
citizens, and proposed a variety of non-universalistic remedies. The NWT 
government, though, acted on few of these suggestions. Though non-universal 
representation did become a convention of the NWT’s post-division cabinet, the 
government otherwise “kicked the can down the road,” increasing staatsvolk seats 
and suggesting that future legislatures could work to achieve intrastate, inter-polity 
power-sharing. In the end, however, intrastate, inter-polity power sharing was not 
further pursued. It appears the legal and legislative decisions of 1998-99 convinced 
both Aboriginal and settler leaders that “treaty federalism,” rather than high-level 
intrastate consociation, was the inevitable future of the NWT. Within public 
government, “Kymlicka’s dilemma” had been resolved in favor of universalistic 
settler interests.
Some scholars might say they anticipated this outcome. Writing nearly forty 
years ago, Richard Laing and his co-authors stated that, in the NWT, “the creation of 
a ‘settler’ phase of colonialism so as to overcome the population advantage of the 
Native peoples” was accomplished by recruiting “a bureaucracy and ship[ing] them 
north by the thousands. Immediately the population ratio is profoundly affected. 
Overnight a settler class is created. In the name of the non-Native ‘settler,’ certain 
democratic rights are asserted.”1 It could be argued that, in the 1998-99 
reapportionment, at least within public government, the decisions of the NWT 
government and the courts finally and decisively affirmed these long-asserted
1 Richard Laing, Peter Puxley, C. Gerald Sutton, and Wilf Bean, “Political Developm ent in the 
N orthw est T erritories,” in Northern Transitions Volume 2 : Second National Workshop on People, 
Resources and the Environm ent North o f  60°, eds. Robert F. Keith and Janet B. W right (Ottawa: 
Canadian A rctic Resources Committee, 1 9 7 8  , 318 .
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settler-class rights, perhaps putting the finishing touches on the NWT’s settler phase 
of colonialism.
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